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Abstract
This thesis examines three questions: first, do national government coali-
tions favour local governments connected to them to receive local public
goods? Secondly, does favouritism in the allocation of public goods imply
large welfare losses? Finally, how national governments form, and what
are the consequences of this for national policy making? These ques-
tions are answered in the particular context of Brazil, where rich data on
national politics and local public good allocation is available.
The first chapter of the thesis summarizes aspects of the Brazilian
context that are relevant for the rest of the thesis – covering aspects of
Brazilian national politics, and of the rules for allocation of funds for
local public goods. The chapter also discusses the disaggregated data
on the universe of matching grant transfers from the Brazilian national
government to municipalities, used in the second and third chapters.
The second chapter answers the following question: are regions con-
nected to the national government favoured to receive funding for local
public goods? While a broad literature shows that “politically connec-
ted” regions receive more funds from national governments, it is unclear
whether this reflects favouritism, or simply connections allowing the na-
tional government to know better the needs of regions connected to them.
The chapter finds evidence broadly consistent with favouritism.
The third chapter then examines the welfare losses associated with
favouritism. I build a model of grant requests by cities and approvals by
the national government and provide estimates of the model’s paramet-
ers. Despite ample evidence of favouritism, if the only source of conflict
between the national government and society is due to favouritism, the
welfare losses for society due to favouritism are of the order of 0.24% of
the budget for grants.
The second and third chapters suggest large effects of the national
coalition over local public good provision. The fourth and final chapter,
instead, analyses how national coalitions interact with national policies.
More precisely, do government coalitions form to include legislators ideo-
logically close to the executive, or ideologically unattached legislators
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whose votes are “easier to buy”? Moreover, what are the consequences
of this for policy making at the national level – in particular, for roll call
votes in the chamber of deputies?
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1. Introduction
This thesis contains three chapters on the effects of connections/association
with the national government over policy making in Brazil between 2009-
16. The next chapter (chapter 2) covers the Brazilian context. In particu-
lar, it covers information on Brazilian national level politics, interactions
between national and local politics, and implications for the allocation of
public funds across regions. It also covers the data source used for two
out of the three following chapters in the thesis.
Chapter 3 then moves to answer two questions. First, do political con-
nections of local politicians - namely, shared partisan identities between
local mayors and national politicians - affect the allocation of public
goods across regions? Secondly, are regions connected with the national
government being favoured to receive public goods, or are connections
creating some type of “second best” allocation - by either providing in-
formation about local needs to the national government, or means of
enforcement?
The chapter provides answers to these questions using data on the
universe of grant requests and approvals in Brazil between 2009-16, doc-
umenting effects for a broad cross section of public goods without ag-
gregation. Secondly, the setting allows me to have significant variation
in connections within a city-year, across the 27 different ministries in
charge of approving grant requests for the different types of public goods
- for one example, a city might be connected to the ministry of health,
which provides hospitals and sanitation; while not being connected to
the ministry of urban planning, which provides grants for urban roads
and housing. Finally, I can explore exogenous variation in connections
arising only from national level changes in the partisan identity of each
of the ministers, holding fixed the mayor.
This setting allows me to detect potentially welfare relevant effects
of connections that would not be detectable without disaggregated data
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on different types of public goods: if all cities were connected to differ-
ent ministries and connections were relevant, it could well be that all
cities get the same amounts of grants. Yet, because of their particular
connections to particular ministries, some cities would only get hospit-
als, and some other cities would only get roads, when it is possible that
the additional roads for the second group of cities doesn’t substitute for
not getting hospitals. By observing disaggregated data, the chapter is
able to detect such effects of connections, and by observing a broad cross
section of public goods, the chapter is able to present estimates that are
representative across many different types of public goods. Similarly, if
only some cities get connections to obtain all types of public goods, once
again the setting allows for the identification of the effect for each type
of public good, which can then be summed up to obtain a total effect
over overall expenditures.
The results suggest that connected cities request and get 15% more
funds than unconnected cities. These effects are not driven by ideological
differences between mayors of different parties: even after controlling for
proxies of ideological distance between the mayor and the minister, res-
ults remain largely unchanged. Similarly, the results are unlikely to be
driven by information effects: even for a subset of grants where alloca-
tion is relatively less ideological, and where I can observe the reaction
to publicly known shocks to local demands, I show that connected cities
still get 17% more funds than unconnected cities, suggesting that dif-
ferences in information are not driving the effects of connections. This
lack of information effects is further confirmed by the fact that this po-
tential information doesn’t seem to spillover to bureaucrats analysing
the grants in preliminary stages; and that whatever information about
mayoral competence is available from past connected ministers, this in-
formation doesn’t seem to be learned by future ministers. I interpret
these results, instead, as consistent with favouritism in the allocation of
grants to connected mayors.
Given the evidence in chapter 3 for favouritism in the allocation of
grants, how do we compute the aggregate welfare losses associated with
favouritism? In particular, do the gains obtained by connected cities
compensate for the losses for unconnected cities? Chapter 4 answers this
question. The key challenges in answering this question are that, first of
all, we often don’t observe measures of local welfare obtained from many
11
types of public goods - consider the relative welfare gains of grants for
sports courts in one city versus in another city. Even if we did, and even
if we could compute whether grant amounts have decreasing or increasing
returns on local welfare, we often don’t know the extent to which society
has inequality aversion. Finally, we often don’t observe society’s welfare
weights across different regions, and heterogeneous demands for public
goods across different regions.
I first provide a model of grant requests and approvals where both
municipalities and the national government have separable preferences
across different types of public goods.1 The model is then used to sep-
arate between the losses for unconnected cities and gains for connected
cities. Based on information about the parameters of this model, the
chapter computes the costs of political connections from the viewpoint
of a non-partisan ministry. I argue this is a useful welfare criterion, as
it serves as a plausible lower bound on the welfare costs of delegating
these decisions to the political ministries relative to first best: if this is
the right welfare function, the claim is obvious, while if there are even
more sources of divergence between the partisan ministers and society,
the costs of delegating the decisions to partisan ministries is higher than
the cost I compute in the chapter. By doing so, the chapter deals with
the lack of knowledge about the welfare effects of grants by computing
plausible bounds on the welfare losses associated with partisan ministers.
I show that despite the evidence of favouritism, if the only source
of distortion in the allocation of public funds is the one stemming from
political connections, the welfare losses from connections based alloca-
tions are of the order of 0.24% of the typical ministry’s budget, or 1
hospital per year in a country of 5500 cities. The reason for that is that
ministers are estimated to behave as if grants had close to linear returns.
This implies that the marginal return on the dollar removed from the
unconnected city is similar to the marginal return on the dollar given to
the connected city, and consequently welfare losses are relatively small.
Moreover, this implies that under the assumption of separability of pref-
erences, ministries behave as if different types of public goods are close
substitutes.
While chapters 3 and 4 analyse the effects of connections to the na-
1Note that this still allows for several patterns of complementarities and substitu-
tion, such as Cobb Douglas or CES preferences.
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tional government over local provision of public goods, chapter 5 turns
to understand how alliances between parties at the national level affect
national policies - in particular, roll call votes in Congress. While in
western democracies, checks and balances are often viewed as an import-
ant mechanism to prevent the executive from unilaterally implementing
its will, it is not clear that checks and balances are always effective: the
executive can form coalitions with like-minded congressmen only, or rely
on congressmen whose votes are easy to change/easy to buy. Chapter 5
then discusses (i) how coalitions are formed - which types of ideological
interests it includes, and whether easy to buy votes are included more
often in the coalition, (ii) what are the consequences of this for voting
in the legislature: in particular, does the legislature effectively check the
executive?.
The key challenge in answering this question relies on estimating
whether coalitions change votes of congressmen (by buying off votes),
or whether coalition members voting together reflects only sorting on
ideology - that is, whether the coalition is formed by including congress-
men that think alike. This chapter addresses this question by relying of
moves of congressmen and parties in and out of the governing coalition,
while controlling for an arbitrary dimensional ideological space.
The paper first present a model where the executive forms a coalition
with congressmen in the legislature by offering cabinet positions in ex-
change for more favourable votes in congress. The model suggests that
when a substantial share of congressmen are ideologically similar to the
executive, the executive prefers to form coalitions with congressmen who
are hard to buy off, and instead prefers to form a coalition with congress-
men that think alike the executive. In these situations, the coalition has
a small effect over congressional votes. When the executive is, on the
other hand, ideologically distant from most congressmen, the coalition
involves instead easy-to-buy legislators, and the executive then relies on
putting pressure on the coalition to change their votes.
The model further suggests a voting equation where congressmen’s
votes depend on their ideologies and a “coalition pressure” term, with
parameters that can be identified from the large number of congressmen,
large number of bills voted on, and from switches of parties into and out
of the coalition. Moreover, from this voting equation, we can estimate
what is each congressmen’s sensitivity to pressure (or, how easy is it to
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“buy-off” the congressman).
The model estimates that while PT is a political party that is ideo-
logically distant from most parties in congress, PMDB is ideologically
similar to a large group of parties (typically referred to as “Centra˜o”).
Consistently with the theoretical model, while PT is in power, the presid-
ent forms a coalition with congressmen who are sensitive to pressure and
are easy-to-buy. When PMDB gets to power, instead, the president forms
a coalition with congressmen who are ideologically similar to the presid-
ent and who are less sensitive to pressure. The model is further validated
by the fact that the estimated amounts of pressure are well explained by
a linearised first order condition for the executive, which was not used to
estimate the voting model. Finally, the estimated model suggests that
during the PT years, without coalitional pressure, Congress would have
approved 79.5% of the bills the executive pressed against; with coali-
tional pressure, Congress instead approved 66.7% of these bills. During
the PMDB years, on the other hand, coalitional pressure had no effect
over votes, and both with and without coalitional pressure, Congress
(would have) approved 81.6% of bills the executive pressed against. This
suggests that while the executive can undermine checks and balances by
“buying off” congressmen’s votes in the process of coalition formation,
Congress still effectively checks the executive by approving bills against
the executive’s will in 66.7% of bills the executive presses against.
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2. National government and
local public goods in Brazil:
Context
2.1 Context
2.1.1 The agents
For future reference, it’s useful to establish beforehand the active players
in the context analysed in the paper. On the national government (also
referred to as federal government), ministries in the executive branch
are the ones in charge of approving and rejecting grant requests. In the
context of this thesis, I consider grants requested by the 5565 municipal
governments in Brazil.
2.1.2 National politics
At the national level, the Brazilian government follows a presidential
system. The executive branch is headed by a President who is directly
elected every four years by a run-off voting system, where, if no pres-
idential candidate gets more than 50% of the national votes in the first
round, a run-off election with the two front runners from the first round
happens, and the majority winner from the run-off then wins the pres-
idency. Once elected, the president appoints ministers, each in charge of
different areas, such as health, urban planning, and so on; among their
many tasks, they have substantial power to approve and reject grant re-
quests aimed at financing local public goods in their area - so that the
ministry of health has power to approve grant requests for hospitals and
sanitation in particular areas, the ministry of urban planning has power
to approve grant requests for urban roads and housing, and so on. While
15
the number of ministries varies over time, for the time-span of this study,
we focus on 27 ministries that could legally allocate matching grants to
local governments.
As in typical presidential systems, the executive branch faces some
checks from the legislative branch, in particular, when approving yearly
budgets and other pieces of legislation. The legislature in Brazil is bicam-
eral: the Senate contains three representatives per State serving 8-year
long terms. Every four years, on the same day as the first round of the
presidential election, either one or two senators are elected by simple
plurality, so that the one or two candidates for the senate with largest
vote shares get elected in a single election round. Similarly, on the same
day as the first round of the presidential election, citizens vote for candid-
ates running for the Chamber of Deputies. Each state elects a number
of deputies that is roughly proportional to the state’s population1 for
a total of 513 deputies nationwide; and within each state, congressmen
are elected according to an open list proportional voting system. That
is, in each state, citizens vote on congressional candidates (or on the
party). Then, within each state, seats are allocated to parties according
to the party vote share at the state level, and within the party seats, the
most voted on congressional candidates for that party get allocated seats
first. Importantly, due to regulatory constraints, political parties can
only campaign on TV and radio by using an allowance of free airtime,
where each party’s endowment is proportional to its number of seats in
the Chamber of Deputies (see law 9504/1997).
This type of electoral system often encourages a large number of
parties to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies (see, for instance,
Duverger (1954) and Morelli (2004)). Moreover, the regulations on cam-
paigning by political parties imply that the large number of parties in the
chamber of deputies get to campaign on TV and radio for all elections,
implying a large number of parties also in the Senate. Consistently with
this, in 2009, 15 political parties held seats in the Senate and 21 political
parties held seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 2009, since then, the
number of parties in both chambers has increased. This implies that the
executive, effectively, never has a majority in either chamber, and con-
1Each state has a number of deputies that is proportional to population, as long
as they get at least 8 deputies and at most 70 deputies. Effectively, this implies that
northern states with small populations get 8 deputies, the large state of Sa˜o Paulo gets
70 deputies, and most other states have a number of seats proportional to population.
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sequently, needs to build a government coalition - often a super-majority
- by allocating different ministries to different parties. This implies, then,
that most ministries responsible for grants are headed by ministers affil-
iated with political parties, often different from the presidents’ party. In
particular, the median cabinet in my sample has ministries coming from 7
different political parties (for more details on the cross party distribution
of ministries, see figure 2.2).
Also consistently with this, most changes in the parties heading min-
istries happen together with changes in the presidential and congressional
terms. In the sample period, new presidential and congressional terms
have started in January 2011 and January 2015 - due to elections -, and
in May 2016 - due to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. Given that
these periods come with substantial changes in the composition of Con-
gress and of government coalitions, it can be seen in graph 2.3 that these
are also the years that face the largest changes in ministerial party af-
filiation. In particular, over 60% of the changes in ministerial affiliation
came during the years with changes in the presidential term. These years
are also the years with most changes in number of ministries moving from
one party to another, and with most ministries moving from non-partisan
ministers to partisan ones.
2.1.3 Interactions of local and national politics
Given that ministries in the executive power have substantial discretion
in deciding whether to approve or reject a grant, political connections
with ministries might play a role in allocation of grants in this context.
This section reviews the process and timing through which cities might
become more or less politically connected with the ministries throughout
a given mayoral term.
While presidential changes and most ministerial changes happen in
2011, 2015 and 2016 during this sample period, new mayors start their
terms in January 2009 and January 2013. Mayors are also elected from
the same political parties that are present in the legislature. Due to this
timing of mayoral terms, midway through their terms (typically in the
third year), mayors lose and gain “political connections” with ministries
- measured as being in the same party of the minister -, and this is only
due to changes related to the national level politics.
One possible concern with this source of variation might be that, given
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that the estimates happen on the sample of switchers, future connections
can substitute for current connections. Table 2.1 displays the share of
cities that have been connected for at least one year between 2009-15,
2009-16 and 2003-16 with each of the largest 6 ministries (in terms of
budget for grants). Between 97% and 59% of cities were never connected
with each of these ministries throughout the 7 years between 2009-15.
Including the year of the impeachment, between 79% and 52% of cities
are never connected with the largest 6 ministries throughout 8 years.
Going further back between 2003-16, between 79% and 43% of cities have
remained unconnected with the largest 6 ministries throughout 14 years.
For the average ministry, 64% of cities remain unconnected throughout
14 years. This suggests that for a large sample of cities, they do not
manage to replace current connections with future connections for time
horizons of 14 years.
This might raise the concern that the source of variation is not rep-
resentative of the full sample of cities. The fact, though, that I have a
sample of 27 ministries occupied by a median of 7 parties allows me to
cover in the set of switchers a significant share of the cities in the sample.
The second to last row of table 2.1 shows the share of cities that are con-
nected with at least one ministry for at least one year. Between 2009-15,
86% of cities had some political connection with at least one ministry.
Including the impeachment year, the share of cities having at least one
year of connections with at least one ministry rises to 97% of cities.
Given that future connections with a given ministry are not com-
mon, connected mayoral candidates often campaign on the promise to
bring resources on the basis of their political alignment. In Pelotas, RS,
Fernando Marroni, affiliated with PT (the president’s party), when asked
in an interview during his 2012 campaign about the differences between
him and his rival, answered
“we represent the real change. A government aligned with
the federal government and that can benefit from the resources,
projects and programs to bring development to Pelotas.” (Le-
boutte and Macedo, (2012))
In Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Eduardo Paes, affiliated with PMDB (the main
coalition partner during the period), mentioned during a radio interview
during his 2008 campaign that
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“The time of political isolation is over. I have support
from the state governor Se´rgio Cabral, and I can guarantee to
voters that the mayor will also work together with the federal
government.” (G1, Rio de Janeiro, (2008))
Mayors also expect their connections to bring in extra attention and
projects from the naitonal government. In an interview with Revista
Piau´ı from June 2017, Fernando Haddad, affiliated with PT and Sa˜o
Paulo’s mayor between 2013 and 2016, reports on a quick meeting with
president Dilma Rousseff the morning after his electoral victory, where
he
“insinuated to the president that he thought the federal
government should treat Sa˜o Paulo in a singular manner,
given the city’s importance” (Haddad (2017))
The report further mentions his expectations for a meeting with President
Dilma Rousseff in the beginning of his mayoral term:
“My expectation was to have a first meeting with strategic
ministries to establish what Bras´ılia [the federal government]
could do to change Sa˜o Paulo.” (Haddad (2017))
The reasons behind this expectation are hard to pin down. Brollo and
Nannicinni (2012) show evidence that for two-candidate election, vic-
tories with small vote margins by connected candidates were associated
with higher re-election rates, suggesting that the grants coming with
connections could increase re-election rates of connected mayors. The
extra funding could also be a way to facilitate campaign donations to
the political party. Anecdotally, the interview by Fernando Haddad also
suggests the national government might want other policy responses from
the mayor:
“What I heard was the extreme oposite demand: what
would Sa˜o Paulo do to help the national government? [...]
The issue of [bus] prices had become a problem for the team
in charge of the economy, who was fighting against inflation.
I knew that I would be demanded to do something hard: the
price maintenance after it had been kept unchanged for two
years” (Haddad (2017))
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The expectation that these political connections might bring in money
to cities motivated a number of rules and institutions regulating federal
transfers. To prevent these transfers from happening in the eve of elec-
tions, the article 73 of the Law 9504/97 prevents the national government
from approving new funding 3 months before an election. The same law
forbids usage of public property for campaigning, hiring and firing of
public workers, concession of free non-programatic gifts from the public
purse and other actions suggestive of usage of the public machine for
electoral purposes. Similarly, to prevent preferential targeting of edu-
cation funds, the FUNDEF and FUNDEB programs created formulaic
rules regulating cross-city allocation of funds for education.
Graph 2.6 show evidence on grant requests according to the timing of
elections. During the years with either mayoral or presidential elections,
grant requests significantly increase early in the year and take a dip dur-
ing the 3 month window forbidding new spending. This pattern doesn’t
repeat itself during the surrounding non-electoral years, when there are
few grant requests in the beginning of the year, and they accumulate
throughout the year.
By contrast, grant approvals follow a markedly different pattern:
graph 2.7 show evidence that a substantial part of grant approvals hap-
pens in the end of the year, when national budgets expire. If we apply
blindly the evidence from Liebman, Mahoney (2017) to this context, this
might indicate some inefficiency in allocation of grants. During years
with either mayoral or presidential elections, some grants are approved
midway through the year, right before the 3-month window established
in the law. Grant approvals fall partially during the 3-month window,
and pick up again by the end of the year. In contrast, in the years sur-
rounding the electoral year, there are virtually no grant approvals during
the middle of the year, and most approvals happen by the end of the year.
This suggests that the law might be only partially effective in restricting
new grants during the 3-month window, and that it is not fully effective
in preventing electoral budget cycles.
2.1.4 Allocation of federal grants
This thesis considers data on the universe of matching grants from the
Brazilian national government to municipalities. Among the national
government’s transfers to local governments, these are a subset of the
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discretionary transfers (awarded at the national government’s discretion)
where the grants, once conceded, are administered by municipal govern-
ments and where municipalities are required to copay for the project.
These grants are indexed to specific capital investment projects as
explained below. Moreover, they seem to be an important tool for local
governments to be able to make capital expenditures: for the average
city in 2009, 89% of all of the municipality’s revenues - inclusive of local
taxes, and intergovernmental transfers - went into payments for person-
nel, pensions and materials for day to day operations, with small space
leftover for capital expenditures. These matching grants, in turn, are
an important tool for municipalities to execute such capital expenditure
projects. The rest of this section explains how these grants are awarded
to city governments.
Every four years, the federal level Executive branch proposes, and
the federal Legislature approves, a Multi-Year Plan (Plano Pluri-Anual).
These plans specify long term policy goals, including programs/actions
specifying the types of public goods that will be considered for grants -
for example, including programs/actions for provision of hospitals, or for
investing in rural sanitation.
Once these programs are set in the Multi-Year Plans, the yearly
budget (LOA) is approved in the national legislature, specifying the al-
location of funds for each program in that year. For our purposes, this
means that in each year, each ministry in the Executive branch has a
particular set of programs/actions - say, a program/action for construc-
tion of hospitals -, each of them with a pre-specified budget to allocate
in funds for local governments.
Municipal governments, then, can request grants from a particular
program, using a central website - SICONV - taking grant requests for
all programs from all ministries. The online request must include a de-
scription of the project to be implemented with the grant, and indicate
the municipality’s need for the project and capacity to complete it. If
the grant happens to be approved, officially, the municipality cannot use
the grant for expenses unrelated to the project. Beyond this, the mu-
nicipality includes in its online request the amount of money requested
from the national government and a matching fund the municipality will
invest in the project with own resources - typically, a small share of
the overall project’s budget. Finally, municipalities include timetables of
21
project implementation, and at some moment before the approval of the
request, the municipality must submit online an expense plan, indicating
the prices and quantities of services and goods to be purchased with the
grant.
These requests seem to be of non-trivial cost. Not only they require
a wealth of information to be submitted online, but also, a substantial
share of cities do not apply for grants. More precisely, for the 6 largest
ministries, in the average year, an average of 49.9% of cities do not apply
for grants. For the overall set of ministries, for the average year, an
average of 85% of cities do not make grant requests. This suggests making
grant requests is not something of trivial costs, nor prohibitive. At the
same time, as expected, it indicates that cities make requests more often
to ministries with budgets to approve requests.
Once the request is submitted, the ministry initiates the approval
process. Bureaucrats review whether the grant request is consistent with
the goals of the program the request was submitted to, whether the
municipality has the capacity to implement the project and whether the
city looks like it’s requesting more money than needed. Depending on
this, the ministry can either accept the grant request, reject it, or request
amendments. In the data, while we see many amendments, I do not
observe any changes in amounts requested by cities.
Cities do not seem to perfectly anticipate approvals: in particular,
while there are 507889 requests made throughout 2009-16, only 81799
requests were approved (or 16.1% of the requests made). For the cities
who actually get grant requests approved, the median approval process
takes 145 days. This varies considerably, however, with the 25 percentile
of duration till approval of 77 days and the 75-th percentile of 213 days.
Less than 3% of projects take more than 10 months till approval, and
the histogram 2.1 shows the sharp drop in approval rates 10 months
after the date of proposal. The reason for that is that 95% of requests
get approved in the year they were made, typically by the end of the year
(see figure 2.7), and few requests are submitted in January-February (see
figure 2.6).
Once a grant is approved, the municipality implements the project.
The national government sends money to a joint account with the muni-
cipality, the municipality sends its matching funds to the same account,
and every expenditure needs to be reported online and right after the ex-
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penditure, in a way that the central government can audit. The median
approved grant is completed within 2 years and 8 months (more precisely,
971 days) after accounting for deadline extensions. This naturally has
some variation: the 25th percentile of time-to-completion is of 720 days -
or approximately 2 years - while the 75th percentile of time-to-completion
is of 1308 days - approximately 3 years and 8 months.
Finally, after the project is completed, there is a final audit stage.
The ministry first chooses whether to audit the project implementation
- on average, 37% of the approved grants are audited. Once the audit
is finalized, the project accounts can be either “approved”, “approved
with reservations” or “rejected”. Mayors might appeal the outcomes -
typically, appeals only happen after rejected accounts -, and the ministry
might revise the audit outcomes or leave it unchanged - most often,
outcomes are not revised.
2.2 Data
The main data source used in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis is the ad-
ministrative data from SICONV. As mentioned above, SICONV is the
online system kept by the national government, where municipalities can
request grants from different programs, where bureaucrats in the min-
istries review the grants, grants are accepted, and where the ministry
monitors bills and expenses made with grants. The system started oper-
ating in the middle of 2008, and from 2012 onwards, all ministries were
required to send their previous administrative data to SICONV, and to
use SICONV for all future grant requests.
The website for SICONV provides open microdata on several stages
of grant approval. In particular, for this thesis, I use, first of all, the
data on grant requests - including data on values requested, values of
matching funds - and the programs and ministries the requests are as-
sociated with. I also use data on the bureaucratic approval process -
including data on the occurrence of different parts of the review of the
grant request, on ministries’ requests for amendments by municipalities,
and timing until approval. Finally, I use data on grants approved, and
post implementation audits by the ministries in charge of the grants.
While results for final amounts spent on grants are considered, the data
on this is incomplete - partially, because many of the projects (specially
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the ones approved towards the end of the sample period) are still being
implemented.
From this data, I also classify, for one of the exercises, grants for
disaster prevention and relief. I define these to be the grants conceded
by Ministe´rio da Integrac¸a˜o Nacional under budgetary programs 1027,
1029 and 2040. These grants consist of 39.28% of the grants requested
from this ministry, and 18.21% of the grants approved by this ministry -
during the sample period, the ministry has approved 11% of the grants
requested.
Additional data on mayors’ political parties and their elections come
from the electoral court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE ). Data on
the identity of the ministers’ come from the webpages of the Office of
the President of the Republic and its section on previous presidents.
Ministers’ party affiliations come from CPDOC - FGV (when ministers
were politically active prior to 2010), from ministers’ webpages in the
Chamber of Deputies or Senate (when they were Congressmen prior to
becoming ministers) and from public news sources. I use this data to
build the measure of political connections used throughout this thesis,
by coding a mayor as connected to the ministry if the mayor and the
minister are in the same party.
City-level characteristics, including poverty shares in 2000, income
per capita per household in 2000 and population (rural, urban and total)
in 2007, come from IPEADATA.
Finally, information on registers of natural disasters by the Ministe´rio
da Integrac¸a˜o Nacional come from Sistema Integrado de Informac¸o˜es
sobre Desastres. In particular, I use it’s digital archive (Arquivo Digital),
where the ministry records officially recognized disasters or newspaper
articles mentioning disasters between 2009 and 2015.2 While this source
might be biased towards registering disasters in politically connected cit-
ies, this comes with the advantage of taking into account that disasters
might be happening not only due to natural events, but also due to poor
infrastructure, lack of local capacity to react to events, and things alike.
This database records 21689 cases of city-years facing natural dis-
asters during the sample period, affecting 4639 cities. Droughts account
for 55.3% of the events documented, floods account for 28.3% of events,
storms account for 10.8% of events, while the leftover 5.6% of events
2Data for 2016 is still unavailable.
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include events such as landslides, fires, dam ruptures and building col-
lapses, among others.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Share of cities connected with ministries
Share of cities connected between: 2009-15 2009-16 2003-16
Urban Planning .23 .35 .45
Tourism .41 .41 .52
Sports .03 .21 .21
Health .38 .44 .54
Agriculture .32 .39 .46
Int. Nacional .38 .48 .57
Avg. across all ministries .23 .30 .36
Connected to some ministry .86 .97 .99
Number of cities 5556
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Days till grant approval
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Figure 2.2: No. of ministries of each political party over time
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Figure 2.3: No. of ministries facing changes in party of minister
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Figure 2.4: Panel A: number/change in number of cities connected with
an average ministry. Panel B: number of cities connected with at least
one ministry
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Figure 2.5: Duration of connections between cities and average ministry
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Figure 2.6: Timing of grant requests and mayoral/presidential elections
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Figure 2.7: Timing of grant approvals and mayoral/presidential elections
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3. Political Connections and
Local Public Goods in Brazil:
Favouritism vs. Information
3.1 Introduction
When allocating public goods across regions, it is desirable for govern-
ments to target regions in an efficient manner - for instance, by maxim-
izing some social welfare function, or by sending public goods to regions
with high local demands. Despite this, in many contexts, public goods
and funds are instead allocated to “politically connected” regions. That
is, often, co-ethnics of the President get more roads (Burgess et al, 2015),
U.S. districts represented by important committee chairs get more pork
(for a review, see Evans, 2011), and in non-democratic countries, the re-
gions of birth of national leaders have higher economic activity (Hodler
and Raschky, 2015).
Particularly in democratic federations, we commonly see regional and
national level politicians sharing partisan affiliations. Despite the poten-
tial for these types of connections to be politicized and to drive the
allocation of grants across regions, with few exceptions (see Brollo and
Nannicini (2012) and Solle´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro (2008)), they have
been relatively understudied. With this in mind, how much do partisan
connections between lower level and upper level politicians drive the al-
location of grants at the national level? Secondly, are connections dis-
torting the allocation of public goods by creating favouritism, or are they
simply creating second best mechanisms for information transmission?
At least three difficulties hinder answers to these questions. First of
all, in democracies, there is often a limited amount of exogenous variation
in political connections, since political leaders are chosen endogenously.
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Even when there is exogenous variation to explore, this is typically re-
stricted to few switches in connections or small treatment and control
groups. Secondly, it is often hard to get measures of a comprehensive
set of public goods. Instead, most studies need to limit their analysis
to a small set of types of public goods, or aggregate across many differ-
ent types of public goods by looking at final expenditures or economic
performance. This either faces a problem of making unclear how com-
prehensive the problem is, or misses the possibility that different types of
public goods might not substitute for each other. Thirdly, and relatedly,
we often don’t observe good proxies for relative demands across regions,
nor proxies for ex-post welfare coming from many types of public goods
- such as sports courts or renovations of public squares. This in turn
prevents us from directly observing whether on the margin, the returns
from public good provision in connected cities are higher or lower than
in unconnected cities.
To deal with these difficulties, this chapter looks at the context of
allocation of grants from the Brazilian national government to municipal
governments. In this context, data availability and institutional features
allows me to address the issues raised above. First of all, decisions on
grant approvals are made by 27 different ministries in the national gov-
ernment, each in charge of different types of public goods - for instance,
the Health ministry often invests in sanitation, and overall infrastruc-
ture for medical treatment; the Urban Planning ministry often invests
in urban roads, housing, and small amounts in sanitation. The fact that
different ministries are involved in approving grants for mostly different
purposes means that a city can be politically connected with one min-
ister and not with another. That is, within a city, there is variation in
political connections across ministries. It also provides scope for many
switches in connections.
Moreover, these ministers are often picked among the ranks of several
different political parties, as a mechanism to build legislative majorities.
In particular, presidential and congressional elections take place simul-
taneously every four years, at the end of the second year of mayoral
terms. By then, new national coalitions form with little influence from
any given city, and new ministers come to power then. This implies that
a city’s political connections with given ministries often switch exogen-
ously midway through the mayoral term, and this variation can be used
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for identification.
Secondly, the national government gives access to data from the uni-
verse of grants requests by cities and approvals by all ministries to all
cities from 2009 to 2016. This allows me to obtain the effect of con-
nections for a large spectrum of different types of public goods being
provided, while not needing to aggregate across public goods that are
potentially not substitutable (such as hospitals and urban roads). This
setting allows for the detection of potentially welfare relevant effects of
connections that would not be detectable without disaggregated data on
different types of public goods: if all cities were connected to different
ministries and connections were relevant, it could be the case that all cit-
ies get the same amounts of total grants. Yet, because of their particular
connections to particular ministries, some cities would only get hospit-
als, and some other cities would only get roads, when it is possible that
from the view point of the second group of cities, the additional roads
don’t substitute for not getting hospitals. By observing disaggregated
data, the chapter is able to detect such effects of connections, and by
observing a broad cross section of public goods, the chapter is able to
present estimates that are representative across many different types of
public goods. Similarly, if only some cities get connections to obtain all
types of public goods, once again the setting allows for the identification
of the effect for each type of public good, which can then be summed up
to obtain a total effect over overall expenditures.
This in turn allows me to provide credible identification of the ef-
fect of partisan connections between lower and upper layers of a federal
government over allocation of grants. Figure 3.1 summarizes the iden-
tification strategy used here. Consider first Panel A, where I take as
an example the years between 2010-11, when the new presidential term
started. The ministry of Health switched from being occupied by the
PMDB party to being occupied by the PT party, while the ministry of
Urban Planning remained in the hands of the PP party. Due to this
ministerial switch, the city of Fortaleza, governed by a PT mayor from
2009-12, became connected with the ministry of Health, while remaining
unconnected with the ministry of Urban Planning. This allows me to
run, within a city, the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of
connections by comparing what happens to grants from the Health min-
istry to Fortaleza relative to grants from the Urban Planning ministry
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to the same city. Doing so allows me to control for all city-time varying
specific characteristics driving demands for grants from all ministries.
This simple difference-in-differences, however, might be confounded
by the fact that different ministries might be evolving differently over
time. Panel B, then, illustrates the strategy to deal with this issue: we
can use a placebo city, such as Belo Horizonte, which had a mayor from
the PSB party between 2009-12. Due to this, Belo Horizonte didn’t be-
come connected with either the ministry of Health nor with the Ministry
of Urban Planning between 2010-11. By running a placebo difference-in-
differences for Belo Horizonte, then, I’m able to clean out differences in
ministry-specific time effects from the estimate from the previous para-
graph.
The resulting triple-differences strategy then deduces the first differ-
ence in difference estimate from the placebo in the previous paragraph.
This can, then, be used to obtain the causal effect of political connec-
tions over grant allocation. Cities becoming politically connected with
a ministry due to a ministerial change request 15% more resources from
the ministry, and get 14.8% more resources approved. The share of grant
requests approved rises by 7%.
These results are consistent with favouritism in the allocation of
grants. That being said, the results can be due to many alternative
theories. The results could be driven by an ideological agreement ef-
fect, where a political party thinks the ministry of Health should focus
on sanitation investments, while another party thinks the ministry of
Health should focus on building hospitals. The shared party affiliations
between mayor and minister might just imply agreement on the types of
public goods to request and provide. Similarly, the results could be due
to an information effect, since political parties could be providing addi-
tional channels for the mayor to communicate with the minister about
local needs, or for the minister to communicate to the mayor what the
ministry is willing to approve. In either one of these last two cases, polit-
ical connections could have an effect over allocation of grants without
necessarily implying any distortion in allocation of funds.
To deal with this, I first analyse a subset of grants that are relatively
less ideological, and for which I observe comprehensive publicly known
shifters of local demands. More precisely, I look at a subset of post-
natural disaster prevention and relief grants. Post disaster relief is a
37
much less ideological issue, as political parties seem to agree on the need
to provide help to cities affected by natural disasters. Secondly, many of
the potential sources of differences in information about local demands
mentioned above can be controlled for and are known to be publicly
observed by the minister, since there is data available on which natural
disasters were recognized by the minister.
This, in turn, allows me to use the fact that natural disasters typically
affect many cities simultaneously to control for many of these differences
in local demands. In particular, I can look at the effect of changes in con-
nections due to ministerial switches only within the set of cities affected
by the same natural disaster. This allows me to control for a significant
share of the variation in local needs post disaster - if not for all of this
variation. Moreover, given that the ministry in charge of these grants
publicizes the cities who are recognized to have been affected by a given
disaster, this allows me to hold constant at least one important determ-
inant of the ministry’s willingness to approve grants - it’s recognition of
the disaster - that might have been private information in other contexts.
Even after controlling for a significant share of determinants of local
demands and of important parts of the ministry’s willingness to approve
grants, and considering cases where ideological agreement issues are un-
likely to drive results, cities becoming politically connected after a natural
disaster do not request more grants, but receive 17% more money than
other cities affected by the same natural disaster. Despite the extensive
controls for many of the sources of differences in needs, despite the fact
that information on needs is relatively public, and despite the lack of
prominence of ideological disagreement as a driver of grant allocations,
effects are, if anything, slightly larger than the baseline effects for all
grants.
These findings suggest favouritism is more likely to drive the effect
of connections over grant approvals, at least when it comes to post nat-
ural disaster prevention and relief grants. How much do these findings
generalize to other types of grants? First, by controlling for 3 different
measures of ideological distance between mayors and ministers, I show
that the effects of connections become, if anything, stronger once we con-
trol for ideological differences. While the effect of ideological differences
between mayors and ministers is often close to zero, when it has a sig-
nificant effect, it is positive, suggesting that conditional on the minister
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sending money to mayors outside his own party, the minister prefers to
send money to mayors who are ideologically distant from him - possibly,
to reduce political competition from similar parties. With this in mind,
the effects of connections are unlikely to be due to ideological proximity
- since ideological proximity doesn’t bring additional funds to a mayor
outside the minister’s party.
Similarly, while it is hard to obtain measures of performance, I can
provide evidence from indirect tests for whether differences in informa-
tion drive the effects of connections for non-disaster prevention and relief
grants. If the differences in information concern the mayors’ capacity
to implement projects specific to that ministry, then future ministers
can learn about mayors that were connected in the past at least by ob-
serving which of them received grants (and potentially through additional
sources). This would imply that mayors that are currently unconnected
but were connected in the past should also receive more grants. Instead,
unconnected mayors who were connected in the past receive no more
grants than mayors who were always unconnected. Moreover, the ef-
fect of current connections, if anything, becomes slightly stronger. This
suggests there is little scope for learning across ministers from different
parties about mayoral competence.
Similarly, if ministers have information about the quality of grants
from connected mayors, this information should potentially spillover to
the bureaucrats analysing the grants. Yet, the approval process of grants
from connected and unconnected mayors is very similar, up until the very
last stages: grants from connected and unconnected mayors are equally
likely to be analysed by bureaucrats, to face amendments, and take only
2 to 6 days shorter amount of time to be approved (with the typical grant
for unconnected cities taking approximately 5 months to be approved).
This suggests that the effects of partisan connections only happens at
the final stages of grant approval, and doesn’t reach the bureaucrats
reviewing the grants, and that whatever additional information ministers
have about connected mayors, they do not spill over to the bureaucrats
analysing the grants.
Finally, on the few performance measures I have available - audit
outcomes and time till completion - grants from connected cities and
unconnected cities are statistically and economically very similar. That
being said, it is hard to argue that I would have power to detect dif-
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ferences in audit outcomes given that there are very few grants with
irregularities detected in audits.
That is, current connections encourage the ministers to give more to
mayors, even for subsets of grants where information about local needs is
relatively public and can be controlled for. Moreover, connected mayors
get more despite there being little evidence of learning about mayors that
were connected in the past, there being little evidence of information on
connected mayors spilling over to the bureaucrats analysing the grants,
and relatively few observable differences in performance. Finally, there
is no evidence that the effects of connections are driven by differences
in ideological agreement on what types of public goods to provide. I
interpret this as evidence of favouritism in the allocation of public funds
across regions.
This chapter relates to three strands of literature. First, a group of
papers tries to understand the cost and benefits of social and political
connections in different environments. Fisman and Wang (2015) analyse
the costs of political connections on the enforcement of labor standards.
Xu (2017) and Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim (2015) show evidence, respect-
ively, on the costs and benefits of political connections in the selection of
bureaucrats and local governants. Fisman (2001) shows that in Indonesia
during Soeharto, firms’ political connections had strong implications for
their performance. Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that firms’ political
connections give them easier access to credit in Pakistan. Relative to this
literature, this chapter analyses the costs of connections in the context
of government grants and funds. Often, this is a harder case to analyse,
given the lack of measures of local demands. What this chapter does to
address this is to control for measures of local demands when available,
and to look at more indirect tests to generalise the findings to other types
of grants.
Secondly, this chapter relates to a broad literature on politicized al-
location of public funds. For the U.S., Evans (2011) provides a review of
evidence, and three recent references discussing politicized allocation of
public funds are Knight (2005), Kriner and Reeves (2015) and Dynes and
Huber (2015). For developing countries, see Franck and Rainer (2012),
Kramon and Posner (2013), Hodler and Raschky (2014), Burgess et al
(2015) and Kramon and Posner (2016). For two cases with settings
closely related to mine, see Solle´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) for
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grants in Spain and Brollo and Nannicinni (2012) for grants in Brazil.
Relative to this literature, I document a setting from a developing country
with considerable variation in connections due to switches in connections.
This chapter also manages to provide evidence for a comprehensive set
of different types of public goods without aggregation. Finally, I provide
new tests to distinguish between the possibility that connections might
be bringing information about the relative value of grants across regions,
or creating enforcement of better performance for grants.
The next section shows the main identification strategy for the ef-
fect of connections over the allocation of public funds, and presents the
results and robustness checks. The third section presents the results on
favouritism versus information, with evidence on (i) post natural disaster
prevention and relief grants, (ii) learning across ministries throughout the
mayoral term, (iii) evidence on the measures of performance available.
Finally, the last section concludes the chapter.
3.2 Political Connections and Allocation of
Local Public Goods
In this section, I show evidence on the effects of political connections
between mayors and ministers from the national government over the
allocation of public funds - where I define that a mayor is connected to
a minister if they’re both in the same party. In this section, I focus on
the effects of these connections both through changes in the ministerial
approval criterion, and through mayors deciding to request more or less
due to political connections. I discuss the separation between these two
channels in the structural estimates.
This section has the following structure: first, I show the results on the
effects of political connections over grant allocations. After this, I move to
the discussion of whether it is likely that results are driven by favouritism,
or whether it is likely that political connections are bringing differences
in partisan agreement, information or enforcement across cities.
3.2.1 Identification
In analysing the reduced form effects in this section, at least two chal-
lenges to identification need to be tackled. First of all, cities who need
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more grants might endogenously select more or less connected mayors,
so that the correlation between political connections and grants might
not reflect the causal effect of political connections discussed above.
Secondly, city-level time varying characteristics might affect the city’s
propensity to receive grants. In particular, a city’s demands for grants,
it’s importance and influence from the viewpoint of the national govern-
ment might change over time, and these might be correlated both with
connections and with grant allocations.
These concerns motivate the following triple differences research design.
Firstly, to control for endogenous mayoral selection, I use the fact that
ministries often change midway through the mayoral term - often due
to changes in the president’s and congressional terms - to explore vari-
ation in connections only due to national level changes, holding fixed the
mayoral term.
Secondly, I explore the fact that many ministries decide on the alloc-
ation of grants to look at variation in connections within cities, across
ministries. This strategy can be visualised in the top half of figure ??: say
that midway through the mayoral term, the Ministry of Health moved
from the party PMDB to the party PT. Meanwhile, say that the Ministry
of Urban Planning stayed in the hands of PP. We can then look at the
change in grants from the Ministry of Health to the city of Fortaleza,
governed by PT, relative to the change in grants from the Ministry of
Urban Planning to Fortaleza.
These differences in grants might reflect differences in time trends
across ministries. To control for this, the bottom half of figure ?? looks
at the same difference-in-differences from the previous paragraph, but
instead, with the placebo city of Belo Horizonte, governed by PSB.
This design is implemented with the following regression framework:
ycmt = βscmt + dcmT + dmt + dct + cmt
where c stands for a city, m stands for a ministry, t stands for an year,
and T stands for a mayoral term, and ycmt is a dependent variable under
consideration (either grant requests, or grant acceptance). The dummy
scmt indicates that the mayor’s party in city c at the time of his election is
the same as the party ahead of ministry m in time t - or that the mayor in
city c is aligned, or connected with the minister m (these terms are used
interchangeably). Standard errors are clustered at the ministry level and
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at the municipality level, following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011).
This strategy deals with the first identification concern - of endogen-
ous mayoral selection - by controlling for the city-ministry-mayoral term
effect dcmT , and by holding the mayor’s party fixed at his beginning of
term party. With this, this strategy estimates β only on the sample
of city-ministries that face some change in scmt only due to changes in
the minister’s party. The crucial identification assumption here is that
voters’ mayoral selection is not done in anticipation to changes at the
ministry level that typically happen around the third year of the may-
oral term. To check for the plausibility of this assumption, I further run
several placebo tests in section 4.2.2 to check whether the cities facing
changes in connectedness seem to have gains from connectedness before
the ministerial change.
This strategy also deals with the second concern by looking at vari-
ation across ministries, within a city. By doing so, I manage to control
for city-time specific effects dct, including the city’s overall demand for
grants from different ministries and the city’s importance and influence
over the overall national government, which might be correlated both
with connections and grants received.
Finally, by controlling for dmt, this strategy controls for any factors
shifting the ministerial’s budget over time, and overall demands in the
country for the ministry’s particular type of public good.
3.2.2 Main results
Table 3.1 displays estimates of the effect of political connections over
grant requests by cities, using the identification strategy described above.
While non-connected mayors request, on average, 0.42 proposals from
a given ministry, political connections increases the number of grants
requested from a given ministry by 0.066, an increase in 15.7% in the
number of grants requested. In the same way, the probability that a
given city requests a grant from a given ministry increases by 6.6%. The
3rd-5th columns, in turn, analyse semi-elasticities of monetary amounts
requested from a given ministry with respect to connections, by looking
at the log of dependent variables plus 1. Column 3 shows that the overall
grant size increases by 15% when a mayor becomes connected with the
ministry. The size of the grant financed by the ministry increases also
by 15%, while the size of the co-payment by the city increases by 12.2%.
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These larger grant requests do translate into larger amounts of grants
approved. Table 3.2 shows results of final grants obtained by a given city
(that is, cities that didn’t request any grant from a given ministry are
taken to receive zero grants). Relative to a baseline average number of
grants from a given ministry of 0.066 for non-connected mayors, connec-
ted mayors get 0.023 more grants, an increase of 34.8% in the number
of approved grants. In a similar way, the probability that a city gets a
grant approval from a given ministry increases by 22.9%. Columns 3-6
analyse semi-elasticities of monetary amounts approved with respect to
connections as before. When a mayor becomes politically connected with
a city, he obtains 14.8% larger grants approved. The monetary amounts
financed by the ministry increase by 14.7%, while the amounts co-paid
by the city increase by 11.4%. The final amounts of money spent from
the grant increase by 9.8%. While we likely cannot reject the hypothesis
that the effects over final amounts spent and the effects over total grant
size are the same, it is useful to highlight that we might not observe com-
pletely the amounts spent from grants approved after late 2015, since the
execution of these grants might not yet be finalized.
Table 3.3 shows the effects of political connections over grant ap-
provals on the sample of city-ministry-years that have some grant request.
While, on average, a non-connected mayor that made at least one grant
request has 0.433 grants approved, connected mayors have 0.11 higher
number of grants approved, an increase in 25.6% in the number of grants
approved. Similarly, the probability that at least one grant is approved
increases by 0.037, an increase of 11.7% relative to the probability that
an unconnected mayor gets at least one grant approved (2nd column).
While 20.1p.p. of the grants requested get approved for non-connected
mayors, 1.2p.p. more grants get approved for connected mayors, so that
connected mayors have 6% higher rate of request approval than uncon-
nected mayors. Columns 4-7 show semi-elasticities of grant sizes. Among
the cities making grant requests, connected cities get 53.1% larger grant
sizes (4th column), 52.9% larger monetary values financed by the min-
istry (5th column), 42.8% larger co-payments (6th column) and 40.6%
larger final amounts spent (7th column).
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3.2.3 Robustness
Endogenous ministerial choice: These results might be partially
driven by endogenous ministerial choice. In particular, it might be that
cities that particularly need larger grants from a given ministry are able
to pressure the national government to change the party ahead of that
ministry. To check for this possibility, I check whether the results still
hold in a subset of cities that are likely not to have strong influence over
the national government. In particular, table 3.4 shows (a summarized
subset of) the results for the subset of cities with less than median pop-
ulation size. Brazil has a population of almost 200 million individuals,
and cities with less than median population size have less than 10,677
inhabitants, so each of these individual cities are unlikely to have large
effects over the national government choice.
In fact, most results still hold for this subset of cities: politically con-
nected mayors make 16.2% larger number of grant requests (1st column)
and request 16% larger project values (2nd column). Among the cities
making grant requests, connected mayors also get 10% larger number of
grants approved (3rd column), get 21.4% larger grant sizes (4th column),
and have 15.2% larger amounts spent (5th column), though this last res-
ult is imprecisely estimated. We use these results as suggestive that it
is unlikely that endogenous ministerial choice drives the results from the
previous section.
Alternative control groups: A second concern for identification
is that the baseline results do include cities that are unconnected to all
ministries as part of the control group. If these cities follow substantially
different trends from cities that are connected with at least one ministry,
or cities whose mayors are in parties in the national government coalition,
this might bias the results under our identification strategy. To take
this into account, table 3.5 shows results including only cities that are
politically connected with at least one ministry.
Once again, the results are unaffected by the choice to exclude the
cities unconnected with all ministries. Politically connected mayors make
21.9% larger number of grant requests (1st column) and request 19.3%
larger grant amounts (2nd column). Among those who made some grant
request, politically connected mayors request 23.5% larger number of
grants (3rd column), 51.8% larger monetary amounts (4th column) and
43.7% larger amounts spent (5th column).
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Is this driven by a few parties only? A third concern might be
that the results might be driven only by a few political parties, as opposed
to being something systematic. In particular, it might be that the result
is completely driven by being in the president’s party. Table 3.6 shows
the results by political party - given the large number of parties, though,
I show the results for the 5 parties with most changes in alignment in
the sample, and group all other parties in the “others” group.
In fact, throughout most of the period, the presidency was under PT,
and surprisingly, we cannot estimate any significant effects for mayors
from PT. A few reasons for this might be due to the fact that PT occupies
several small ministries that allocate relatively few grants (political con-
nections seem to play less of a role in small ministries, results not shown);
that PT might be more willing to avoid favouring connected mayors as
an extra tool in building coalitions; or that PT might be benefited by
all ministries due to presidential influence. It is hard, however, to dis-
entangle between these alternatives. Quantitatively, we observe largest
effects for PT’s main coalition partners throughout 2009-2015, namely,
PMDB, PP and PSB. PSDB is a party that was outside the government
coalition (and unconnected with all ministries) between 2009-15, and who
got ahead of several ministries only in May 2016 with the impeachment
of President Rousseff. Typically, during the few months ahead of may-
oral races, the number of grant requests and approvals fall somewhat (see
figures 2.6 and 2.7), and this might explain why we see relatively little
effect from connections with PSDB. Overall, we can robustly reject the
hypothesis that the effects are jointly zero, while we can only reject the
hypothesis of no heterogeneous effects in 3 out of 5 of the regressions
displayed.
Common trends: Finally, there might be a concern that treatment
and control groups do not follow common trends throughout the may-
oral terms. If they don’t follow common trends, this becomes a serious
threat to the identification strategy. The typical test for this common
trends assumption is to check whether there are pre-trends. Doing so
in this setting, however, presents two difficulties: first, I have relatively
few periods per unit, so that it is hard to check whether there are long
running common trends between treated and control groups. Secondly,
in the current setting, we observe mayors both switching into and out of
connections, and doing so from the 2nd to the 4th year of the term. If we
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use the typical strategy of using leads and lags of treatment to estimate
differential pre-trends, we’d estimate the effects of leads on a different
sample from the effects of lags.
To get around this, first, define swsc,m to be the group of city-ministries
switching alliance in period s. In particular, I let swsc,m = 1 if the city-
ministry pair c,m wasn’t connected in period s−1 and becomes connected
in period s. Similarly, I let swsc,m = −1 if the city-ministry pair c,m was
connected in period s − 1 and stops being connected in period s, and
finally, I let swsc,m = 0 if connectedness doesn’t change. I then run the
following specification:
yc,m,t =
4∑
s=2
4∑
v=2
swsc,m1(t = v)βs,v + dc,m,T + dc,t + dm,t + c,m,t
More specifically, for the intuition in this specification, ignore at first the
differences in time trends across cities and ministries. Then, note that
βs,v has the following interpretation: it is the growth in the outcome
yc,m,t between period v and period 1 for the groups of city-ministry pairs
switching alliances in period s, relative to the growth in yc,m,t between
periods v and 1 for the groups of city-ministry pairs not switching alli-
ances in any period. Adding the terms dc,t and dm,t then just changes
the interpretation to the triple differences previously described.
Also note that the coefficient βs,v, with v ≥ s, captures the effect
of becoming permanently connected after period s. With this, all coef-
ficients βs,v, with v ≥ s, represents post treatment effects, and those
with v < s represent pre-trends. Given that we’re estimating 9 different
coefficients in each equation, we focus on the joint significance of the
pre-trends coefficients (β3,2, β4,2, β4,3), and the joint significance of the
post-trends coefficients (β2,2, β2,3, β2,4, β3,3, β3,4, β4,4).
Table 3.7 shows common trends tests for grant requests. Clearly, the
effects of post trends are only significant for those city-ministry pairs
that change alliances by the 2nd year of the mayoral term. With some
exceptions, pre-trends coefficients are almost never significant. The joint
significance tests confirms this: while the pre-trends coefficients are not
jointly statistically different from zero, the post trends coefficients are
typically jointly statistically different from zero at a p-value of 10% (sim-
ilarly to the baseline regressions in table 3.1).
Table 3.8 shows the same common trends tests for grant approvals
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in the full sample. Now, it can be seen that post trends coefficients
are often significant for mayors switching alliances in the 2nd, 3rd and
4th year of the term, while pre-trends coefficients are only significant
for those mayors changing alliances in the 4th year of the term. Once
again, we cannot reject the hypothesis that all pre-trends coefficients are
jointly zero at conventional significance levels, while we can reject, for
most specifications, the null hypothesis that all post-trends coefficients
are jointly different from zero. A similar pattern shows up in table 3.9,
where we run the common trends test for grant approvals on the sample
of city-ministry-years with some grant request.
Finally, table 3.10 shows the same specifications as the main spe-
cification, but using the proposal level data. Indeed, given the sample
of proposals, politically connected mayors request larger project values,
with more financing by the ministry and with larger matching funds.
A given grant request also has a higher probability of being approved.
That being said, conditional on project approval, grants approved for
connected mayors are not larger than the grants approved for unconnec-
ted mayors, suggesting that the effect of political connections is on the
extensive margin - where connections lead to a larger share of approved
projects.
3.3 Favouritism vs. information
These results show that when ministers change and mayors become/stop
being politically connected with them, the allocation of grants for public
goods increase/decrease significantly. On one hand, this could be due to
favouritism: that is, that a politically connected mayor could get more
grants than unconnected mayors, even without inherent differences in
demands for public goods in the two cities.
There are, however, at least four alternative explanations for the find-
ings above suggesting that political connections could affect grant alloc-
ations without being harmful. First, political connections could proxy
for partisan agreement in what types of public goods to provide. In
particular, it could be that a given party believes the health ministry
should prioritize sanitation, while another party believes the health min-
istry should prioritize investments in mobile health units. The agreement
between the mayor and the minister on what to provide could be a driver
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of the effect of connections.
Secondly, partisan connections could serve as a tool for informal flows
of information. That is, the minister could use the party connections
to communicate better with mayors about what types of requests the
ministry is willing to accept. In a similar way, the mayors could use the
party connections to communicate better to ministers about local needs.
Thirdly, ministers might be better able to enforce effort by connected
mayors. This could serve as a mechanism to improve the welfare value of
connected mayors’ grant requests. This could, in turn, provide a reason
for a benevolent minister to allocate more grants to politically connected
mayors.
Finally, connected mayors might, overall, have grants with different
characteristics, and these characteristics might not be fully captured with
the structure of fixed effects included in the specifications above. The
next few exercises provide some evidence on these alternative explana-
tions.
3.3.1 Differences in ideology
A first potential driver of the effects of political connections is that politi-
cians in the same political party share political ideologies, and as a con-
sequence, tend to agree more often on the types of public goods to deliver.
To check for this possibility, I use the measures of ideology obtained
in the chapter 5 of this thesis and the measure by Power and Zucco
(2011) for the national congress in 2009. From these measures, I com-
pute the average party ideology in the Chamber of Deputies averaged
across 2008-2016. Based on these, I compute the euclidean ideological
distance between the mayors’ parties and the ministers’ parties, running
the following specification:
ycmt = βscmt + γIcmt + dcmT + dmt + dct + cmt
where Icmt is the Euclidean distance between the mayor’s ideology in city
c, time t (as measured by the ideology of his party) and the ministry’s
ideology in ministry m, time t.
Table 3.11 shows the result using an estimate of a two dimensional
ideology measure from the structural model in chapter 5, but assuming
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there is no pressure from the government on the government coalition.1 If
anything, the effects of connections become slightly stronger: becoming
politically connected increases the number of requests made by 22.6%
of the baseline average, and increases the amount of funds requested
by 25%. Similarly, increases the number of grants approved by 50%
of the baseline average, and the amount of money approved by 22.8%.
Consistently with this, mayors that are ideologically more distant from
ministers are, if anything, more likely to get more grants.
These results are robust to different measures of ideological distance
between the mayor and the minister. Table 3.12 use an estimate of a two
dimensional ideology measure from the full structural model in chapter
5, and 3.13 use a unidimensional measure of ideology from Power and
Zucco (2011). The results are largely unaltered.
Finally, many of these results might reflect measurement error of ideo-
logies. With this in mind, I run the regression using ideologies measured
as usual from roll call voting data, instrumenting ideological distance
jointly with the two-dimensional measure from the structural model and
with the measure from Power and Zucco (2011). Once again, the results
remain largely unaltered.
This suggests that ideological differences are not a driver of the effect
of political connections over the allocation of public funds across regions.
Instead, very often, ideological distance between mayors and ministers
often have zero effects over the allocation of grants, and when there are
significant effects, they are positive. This suggests that, if anything,
conditional on giving money to unconnected mayors, ministers prefer to
give money to political parties that are ideologically distant from them.
Potentially, this might be a mechanism to avoid political competition
from political parties that are ideologically near the minister’s party, and
might steal the minister’s party’s votes.
3.3.2 Partisan agreement and information: evid-
ence from natural disaster prevention and re-
lief grants
To check whether the effects are driven by differences in partisan agree-
ment or in information, the first exercise here considers the case of dis-
1This is the usual ideology measure based on roll-call votes.
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aster prevention and relief grants, focusing specially on grants after nat-
ural disasters. These grants are given by the Ministe´rio da Integrac¸a˜o
Nacional, one of the ministries that has most conceded grants during
this period. Not only these constitute a substantial share of the grants
requested and conceded by this ministry, but this is also an economic-
ally important case to analyse. According to the Perfil dos Munic´ıpios
Brasileiros 2013 from the national statistics institute IBGE,2 between
2008-13, 1543 cities faced gradual floods leading to 1,406,713 individuals
displaced, while 1574 cities faced flash floods leading to 777,546 displaced
individuals. Yet, 48% of the municipalities do not have the instruments
surveyed aimed at dealing with natural disasters.3 With this in mind,
grants and overall assistance by the national government might be an
important way for cities cope with these events.
Compared to the rest of grants analysed in the paper, there is less
disagreement across parties on types of grants needed. First of all, polit-
ical parties seem to agree on the need to help regions affected by natural
disasters. Secondly, the city’s needs for a project are relatively technical:
for instance, after droughts, it might be relatively clear whether the city
needs a grant to buy a water truck.
In addition, many differences in information can be controlled for
when looking at these types of grants. Given that many natural dis-
asters affect many cities simultaneously, this allows me to control for one
important determinant of local demands for these grants by looking only
at variation within the set of cities affected by a given natural disaster.
Also, given that the Ministe´rio da Integrac¸a˜o Nacional publishes data on
which cities it recognized to have faced a disaster, at least one important
factor in the ministry’s willingness to allocate grants - the recognition of
the disaster - is public and controlled for once I look only at a group of
cities who were recognized to have faced the same disaster. Finally, given
that some cities face many natural disasters, this allows me to control
for the cities’ typical exposure and reaction to disasters.
As a consequence, this exercise analyses a setting in which the extra
information and partisan agreement brought by political connections are
relatively less important in driving the results. If political connections
2This database surveys municipalities’ administrative capacities.
3See Pesquisa de Informac¸o˜es Ba´sicas Municipais: Perfil dos
Munic´ıpios Brasileiros 2013, tables 20, 21 and graph 44. In
ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Perfil Municipios/2013/munic2013.pdf .
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affect resource allocation only by providing additional partisan agreement
and information transmission, it would be expected that the effect of
political connections over grant allocation would become smaller as the
attention is restricted to the post disaster grants analysed here. Instead,
if political connections affect the allocation of post natural disaster grants
by as much or more than they affect overall grants, it would be harder
to claim that political connections affect grant allocation by bringing
additional information and partisan agreement.
To evaluate the effect of connections over post disaster grants, I first
group records by the ministry as a disaster event by assuming that events
of the same type,4 recorded by the ministry to have happened in the same
day and in the same state are the same event. That is, if I observe two
cities in a given state facing a drought in the same day, I record this as
a single event.
I then build a database of event-cities e, c, and record the number
of disaster prevention and relief grants obtained by the cities up to two
years before the disaster and up to two years after the disaster. With
this in hands, I look at the following specification:
ycer =βprescer1(r < 0) + βpostscer1(r ≥ 0)+
+ γpreocer1(r < 0) + γpostocer1(r ≥ 0)dceT + der + dcr + cer
where c stands for a city, e stands for a disaster event, r stands for the
year relative to the disaster date (that is, r = −2 when the year is 2
years before the disaster’s year, r = 0 at the disaster date, and then on).
Once again, T stands for the mayoral term. The variable ycer stands
for variables relating to disaster grants obtained by city c, r years after
event e has happened. As before, scer captures whether the mayor from
city c is in the same party as the minister from Ministe´rio da Integrac¸a˜o
Nacional (the ministry in charge of disaster grants) r periods after the
event e. The variable oc,e,r captures the number of other ministries the
mayor from city c is connected with, r periods after event e.
By controlling for der, I control for how the disaster e affects the group
of cities facing it over time, effectively capturing exposure to the disaster
4Events are grouped by COBRADE, and classified by Ministe´rio da Integrac¸a˜o
Nacional, into 3 digit code event (for instance, at the 3-digit level, events can be
classified as long droughts, short droughts, forest fires and low air humidity - all
classified as droughts at the 2 digit level).
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and intensity of the disaster affecting a group of cities. This controls
both for an important shifter of local demands - namely, the intensity of
the disaster throughout the years - and for the ministry’s recognition of
the disaster for this group of cities. As a consequence, this controls for
many of the factors that mayors and ministers might inform each other
about.
By further controlling for dcr, the strategy controls for the city’s capa-
city to react to disasters, the city’s typical exposure to natural disasters,
and a number of (not all, though) time varying city characteristics that
might create omitted variable bias. Finally, by controlling for dceT , I al-
low for the city to be permanently different from other cities affected by
the disaster e, prominently, controlling for factors such as proximity to
geographic features affecting the city-specific disaster intensity. At the
same time, the fact that this effect is only constant within a mayoral
term guarantees that I only use variation in connections due to minis-
terial changes. While these controls might not capture all factors that
cities and the ministry need to inform each other about, they capture
many important shifters of local demands and the ministry’s recognition
of the disaster.
The coefficient βpost captures, then, the effect of changes in connec-
tions due to ministerial changes over disaster response grants (or, disaster
grants after the disaster has happened). I focus on this coefficient for the
rest of this section.
Note that, due to the control for dcr, this specification only uses cities
facing more than one disaster that affected many cities. While for most
regressions, this is not too restrictive, at times, this reduces the sample
considerably. With this in mind, I also run specifications replacing dcr by
dc×1(r ≥ 0): that is, instead of controlling for the full disaster response
by a given city, I allow the city to respond to disasters only by having a
pre and post response. This allows me to keep looking only at disasters
affecting many cities, while still allowing me to keep cities that faced only
one such disaster.
Table 3.15 shows results for this specification for grant requests. In
fact, mayors who become politically connected to the Ministe´rio da In-
tegrac¸a˜o Nacional do not request more grants neither before nor after
the disasters.
While connected mayors are not requesting more grants after the
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disaster, table 3.16 shows that after disasters, mayors becoming politic-
ally connected get more than double the number of requests approved,
doubled probability that a single request is approved, 17% higher ap-
proved project sizes, 17% higher financing from the ministry and 13.3%
higher matching grants.
We can also look only at the cities who made some proposal r peri-
ods after the event e. The results are presented in table 3.17. While the
more demanding specification controling for dcr has large estimated ef-
fects, they are imprecise due to the small sample size - to control for dcr,
the specification needs to keep only cities facing mroe than one disaster
affecting many cities. Under the more parsimonious specification, con-
trolling only for dc1(r ≥ 0), mayors becoming politically connected get,
once again, more than double the number of requests approved, and more
than double the probability of getting at least one request approved. The
share of grant requests approved also more than doubles. Project sizes
and financing by the ministry increase by approximately 131%, while
matching funds increase by 96%.
In this sense, at least when looking at disaster prevention and re-
sponse grants, the estimated effects of political connections are quant-
itatively similar to (if not slightly larger than) the effect estimated for
overall grants. This is the case despite the fact that there is less margin
for partisan disagreements to drive the effect of connections for these
grants. Similarly, this is the case despite the fact that I control for many
factors that could drive differences in information between connected and
unconnected mayors: namely, 1) many factors shifting local demands for
these grants, and 2) an important factor in the approval decision by the
ministry, the recognition that the city faced the disaster.
3.3.3 Partisan agreement and information: minis-
terial learning
How much does this finding of favouritism generalize to other types of
grants from other ministries? That is, when looking at other types of
grants, information to play more of a role?
While the lack of performance measures for most grants prevents me
from fully answering this question, I can check whether current ministers
learn information from past ministers. In particular, if ministers know
better which connected mayors are competent to deliver projects from
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that ministry, past grant concessions should indicate to current ministers
that a particular mayor is competent. With this in mind, we can check
whether mayors that are currently unconnected but were connected in
the past request more and whether they get more grants. More precisely,
I run:
ycmt = βscmt + βpastscm(0)−(t−1)(1− smt) + dcmT + dct + dmt + cmt
where scm(0)−(t−1) indicates whether the mayor in period t was connected
in any of the previous years of his current term. With this in hands, β still
indicates the effect of current connections, while βpast indicates the effect
of past connections for a mayor given that he is currently unconnected.
Table 3.18 show the results for the effects of past connections over
the currently unconnected in terms of grant requests. The results suggest
that the effect of current connections becomes stronger: mayors becoming
connected due to national level changes increase their number of requests
by 15% relative to baseline, the probability of at least one request by 10%
relative to baseline, the size of project requested by 20.3%, the amount of
money requested from the ministry by 20.3%, and the amount of money
to copay by 15.4%. At the same time, past connections never have a
statistically significant effect over current grant requests.
Table 3.19 shows results for the effects of past connections when cur-
rently unconnected over grants approved. Once again, the effects of
current connections become, if anything, stronger: current connections
increase the number of grants received by 40.9% relative to baseline,
increase the probability of getting at least one grant by 27.1% relative
to baseline, the share of grant requests approved by 6.5% relative to
baseline, the amounts of money approved for the project by 17.6% and
the amounts coming from the ministry by 17.5%. Once again, past con-
nections have no statistically significant effect over the unconnected, and
the point estimates suggest an effect of past connections amounting to
at most 1/3 of the effect of current connections.
This suggests that current ministers aren’t learning from past minis-
ters about the competence of mayors to deliver ministry-specific projects.
If the effects of connections were driven by information, and learning
about mayoral competence could happen across ministers from different
parties - say, by observing past grant allocations - this would imply that
connected mayors receive more money due to information effects, and
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they keep receiving more money after they lose connections. Instead,
there is no evidence of this in the data.
3.3.4 Differences in enforcement
An alternative explanation for the results is that political connections
might bring extra sources of enforcement of effort by the mayors. If
this is the case, ministries could be justified to approve more grants to
connected mayors.
While I cannot provide evidence on all forms of enforcement of effort, I
can provide evidence on at least two important dimensions of effort: first,
I can check whether ministers in fact audit connected mayors more often
or less often. This is one tool the ministry can use to discipline mayors,
and they might need to use it less often on connected mayors if connected
mayors are expected to be more disciplined. Secondly, I can check the
actual audit outcomes to see whether connected mayors are more likely
to spend the money according to plan and without corruption. Finally I
can provide evidence on whether connected mayors take different times
to complete their projects.
Table 3.20 runs the following specification using the data at the level
of approved grant requests, looking at audits data:
yicmt = scmtβ + dcmT + dct + dmt + icmt
Once again, while there are 81799 grants approved during the sample
period, the specification above only uses observations from city-ministry
pairs that have more than one grant approved within the mayoral term.
The results show, first of all, how often grant requests are audited and
how often they show irregularities. In fact, among unconnected mayors,
59.1% of them never get audited. For around 10.5% of the audited grants,
we don’t observe any results because audits are still under way. For 87.5%
of the audited projects from unconnected mayors, the accounts are either
approved or approved with reservations. Only 2% of the audits reject the
project’s reports due to irregularities - and 65% of these rejected reports
face appeals from mayors, requesting the result to be reviewed. That is,
among unconnected mayors, while there is a reasonable chance of being
audited, only a very small fraction of audits report irregularities.
Moreover, connected and unconnected mayors do not face differences
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in their audit probabilities. The results show not only that the differences
in audit probabilities are not statistically significant, but also that they
are quantitatively small and precisely estimated: under these standard
errors, a 2.6p.p. (or 5%) difference in audit probabilities would have been
detected as statistically significant. This show that while there might be
other methods for ministers to differentially enforce effort from connec-
ted and unconnected mayors, audits are not being used as a method to
differentially enforce effort from connected and unconnected mayors.
Similarly, there are no statistically significant differences between con-
nected and unconnected mayors in the probabilities that the audit gets
finished, that the audit rejects the mayoral accounts, nor that the audited
accounts are accepted. All that can be observed is a 1p.p. (or 3.2% of
audits) difference in probabilities of accounts accepted with reservations,
significant only at the 10% level. I interpret this as showing that there
are only small and non-robust differences between connected and uncon-
nected mayors in terms of probabilities of irregularities detected.
Table 3.21 looks at results on time to completion of a project, us-
ing the same specifications used for the audit results. The first column
shows that while on average, non connected mayors take 1071 days to
complete a project, mayors becoming politically connected at the time
of request take 16 days less to complete their projects. These results are
not statistically significant, and estimated precisely. These results could
be due to connected mayors getting approvals for projects that are more
complex and take longer to complete. With this in mind, columns 2 and
3 look instead at time to completion relative to other projects in the
same budgetary program. 5 Once again, the results indicate that mayors
becoming politically connected do not take longer or shorter times to
complete their projects than the average time it takes to complete the
type of project they are implementing.
3.3.5 Overall differences in grant characteristics
Are the grants requested by connected mayors inherently different? This
section shows evidence on inherent differences in grant requests as meas-
ured by the bureaucratic procedures the grant requests go through.
Table 3.22 provides evidence on this using the same specification as
5While on column 2, the sample keeps all projects, column 3 only keeps budget
programs that approved more than one project.
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above, in the data of all grant requests. The evidence is largely mixed
here. There are no statistically significant differences in the probability
that the ministry analyses the grants of connected and unconnected may-
ors, and the point estimates are small and precisely estimated. There are
also no statistically significant differences in the probability of requests
for amendments nor in the number of amendments made to the grant re-
quest. Naturally, connected mayors still get the work-plan for their grant
requests approved more often - a necessary step for a grant to be even-
tually approved. While there are statistically significant differences in
the time till grant approval, these differences are relatively small: among
those with approved projects, connected mayors get projects approved 6
days quicker than unconnected mayors, which represents an improvement
of 4.1% in the time till approval.
3.4 Conclusion
This section has documented a strong and robust effect of political con-
nections over the allocation of funds to finance local public goods in
Brazil: mayors becoming politically connected due to a ministerial change
get 14.8% more money approved for local public goods. To which extent
does this represent a distortion in the allocation of public goods? More
precisely, is this driven by favouritism, or is it due to political connections
allowing for information transmission, political agreement, enforcement
of effort, or inherently different grant requests?
I first showed that in a particular case of disaster prevention and relief
grants, political connections still increase the amount of money received
after a disaster by 17%. That is, even after controlling for many of the
factors generating differences in information or partisan agreement for a
particular type of grant, the magnitude of the effect of political connec-
tions doesn’t change, or even slightly increases. With this in mind, it
is unlikely that the effects of political connections over the allocation of
grants are only due to differences in information or partisan agreement.
To some extent, this result extends to other grants: if there were dif-
ferences in information about, for instance, the mayoral competence at
delivering the projects from a given ministry, there should be learning
over time, and mayors who are currently unconnected but were connected
in the past should also get more grants. Yet, there is no evidence that
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this happens, and instead, the effects of current connections become, if
anything, stronger.
I also showed evidence that, to the extent that differences in enforce-
ment should be reflected in audit outcomes and time to completion, there
is no evidence suggesting that political connections bring differences in
enforcement. Similarly, there is scarce evidence on inherent differences
in grant requests from connected and unconnected mayors - other than
the fact that connected mayors request more money, and get approvals
more often.
I take this as evidence that political connections affect grant alloca-
tions and that, to some extent, this must reflect favouritism.
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Table 3.6: Matching grants by ministry-municipality-year, per party
# Requests Request $ # Grants Appr. $ Spent
same partycmTt, PMDB 0.070 0.115 0.099 0.581 0.512
(0.035)* (0.086) (0.024)*** (0.129)*** (0.100)***
same partycmTt, PSDB -0.023 0.106 0.185 0.590 -0.391
(0.035) (0.177) (0.072)** (0.405) (0.340)
same partycmTt, PT 0.039 -0.025 0.062 -0.087 -0.034
(0.044) (0.059) (0.039) (0.328) (0.287)
same partycmTt, PP 0.144 0.869 0.236 0.965 0.870
(0.098) (0.382)** (0.077)*** (0.348)** (0.293)***
same partycmTt, PSB 0.231 0.745 0.144 1.390 0.978
(0.092)** (0.257)*** (0.047)*** (0.330)*** (0.253)***
same partycmTt, Others 0.070 0.276 0.155 1.171 0.230
(0.036)* (0.139)* (0.059)** (0.439)** (0.547)
N 1,148,238 1,148,238 137,936 137,936 137,936
P-val., joint signif. 0.080 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-val., no heter. 0.069 0.020 0.201 0.116 0.049
Avg. y, unconnected 0.420 2427822.35 0.433 667853.33 324090.18
Sample All All Some prop. Some prop. Some prop.
Municip.-year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Ministry-year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Mun.-min.-term FE YES YES YES YES YES
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Common trends: Grant requests
# Requests > 0 requests Log $ Log $, Ministry Log $, Copay
Change connect., 2nd yr.
Year 2 0.094 0.005 0.099 0.097 0.098
(0.049)* (0.006) (0.078) (0.077) (0.065)
Year 3 0.175 0.027 0.399 0.398 0.313
(0.076)** (0.011)** (0.159)** (0.159)** (0.126)**
Year 4 0.181 0.024 0.364 0.363 0.298
(0.081)** (0.009)*** (0.128)*** (0.127)*** (0.108)**
Change connect, 3rd yr.
Year 2 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018
(0.039) (0.006) (0.085) (0.084) (0.074)
Year 3 0.089 0.013 0.196 0.196 0.167
(0.056) (0.011) (0.160) (0.160) (0.134)
Year 4 0.116 0.017 0.257 0.256 0.213
(0.062)* (0.013) (0.179) (0.178) (0.146)
Change connect, 4th yr.
Year 2 0.026 0.005 0.068 0.068 0.058
(0.019) (0.003) (0.045) (0.045) (0.035)
Year 3 0.029 0.001 0.021 0.021 0.039
(0.017)* (0.006) (0.079) (0.079) (0.058)
Year 4 0.048 0.008 0.121 0.120 0.110
(0.019)** (0.006) (0.076) (0.075) (0.057)*
R2 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69
N 1,148,238 1,148,238 1,148,238 1,148,238 1,148,238
P-value, pre-trends 0.401 0.183 0.170 0.169 0.223
P-value, post-trends 0.085 0.088 0.067 0.068 0.040
Avg. y, unconnected 0.420 0.151 2427822.35 2315877.64 113189.98
Municip.-year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Ministry-year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Mun.-min.-term FE YES YES YES YES YES
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Common trends: Grant approvals
# Grants > 0 grant Share approv. Log $ Log $, ministry Log $, copay
Change connect, 2nd yr.
Year 2 0.027 0.016 0.213 0.211 0.175 0.201
(0.013)* (0.008)** (0.104)* (0.104)* (0.083)** (0.105)*
Year 3 0.042 0.024 0.318 0.317 0.248 0.277
(0.020)** (0.011)** (0.153)** (0.152)** (0.120)** (0.142)*
Year 4 0.048 0.026 0.352 0.350 0.270 0.336
(0.023)** (0.012)** (0.166)** (0.166)** (0.129)** (0.175)*
Change connect, 3rd yr.
Year 2 0.009 0.007 0.087 0.086 0.070 0.097
(0.017) (0.006) (0.078) (0.077) (0.064) (0.086)
Year 3 0.036 0.019 0.250 0.248 0.192 0.181
(0.020)* (0.011)* (0.148) (0.147) (0.115) (0.111)
Year 4 0.044 0.023 0.303 0.301 0.235 0.249
(0.019)** (0.010)** (0.130)** (0.129)** (0.103)** (0.108)**
Change connect, 4th yr.
Year 2 0.011 0.006 0.074 0.073 0.054 0.080
(0.008) (0.004) (0.052) (0.051) (0.040) (0.049)
Year 3 0.015 0.007 0.092 0.091 0.072 0.104
(0.007)** (0.004)* (0.053)* (0.052)* (0.040)* (0.052)*
Year 4 0.022 0.010 0.132 0.132 0.101 0.104
(0.011)* (0.005)* (0.074)* (0.073)* (0.052)* (0.049)**
R2 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.50
N 1,148,238 1,148,238 1,148,238 1,148,238 1,148,238 1,148,238
P-value, pre-trends 0.130 0.335 0.338 0.339 0.234 0.202
P-value, post-trends 0.121 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.034 0.072
Avg. y, unconnected 0.066 0.048 211198.31 192111.14 19299.50 103003.24
Municip.-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ministry-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mun.-min.-term FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: Common trends: grant approvals among those requesting
# Grants > 0 grant Share approv. Log $ Log $, ministry Log $, copay spent
Change connect, 2nd yr.
Year 2 0.103 0.061 0.020 0.845 0.838 0.723 0.866
(0.063) (0.027)** (0.017) (0.361)** (0.356)** (0.303)** (0.281)***
Year 3 0.217 0.096 0.046 1.328 1.318 1.080 1.525
(0.050)*** (0.021)*** (0.015)*** (0.288)*** (0.286)*** (0.227)*** (0.228)***
Year 4 0.195 0.099 0.019 1.382 1.367 1.152 1.560
(0.047)*** (0.028)*** (0.019) (0.361)*** (0.359)*** (0.281)*** (0.296)***
Change connect, 3rd yr.
Year 2 0.004 0.018 0.013 0.221 0.219 0.181 0.267
(0.050) (0.014) (0.009) (0.189) (0.185) (0.170) (0.228)
Year 3 0.125 0.051 0.020 0.710 0.706 0.581 0.558
(0.037)*** (0.018)*** (0.011)* (0.241)*** (0.238)*** (0.203)*** (0.191)***
Year 4 0.147 0.051 0.011 0.742 0.737 0.608 0.749
(0.043)*** (0.019)** (0.011) (0.252)*** (0.248)*** (0.218)** (0.216)***
Change connect, 4th yr.
Year 2 0.057 0.032 0.027 0.414 0.411 0.310 0.391
(0.031)* (0.016)* (0.010)** (0.211)* (0.209)* (0.184) (0.169)**
Year 3 0.065 0.037 0.024 0.465 0.462 0.344 0.553
(0.034)* (0.017)** (0.011)** (0.229)* (0.226)* (0.176)* (0.177)***
Year 4 0.107 0.046 0.036 0.634 0.633 0.461 0.529
(0.029)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)** (0.196)*** (0.196)*** (0.131)*** (0.177)***
R2 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
N 137,936 137,936 137,936 137,936 137,936 137,936 137,936
P-value, pre-trends 0.214 0.177 0.045 0.198 0.196 0.272 0.039
P-value, post-trends 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Avg. y, unconnected 0.433 0.316 0.201 211198.31 192111.14 19299.50 103003.24
Municip.-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ministry-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mun.-min.-term FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.15: Disaster grants by ministry-municipality-year: grant requests
# Requests > 0 Requests Log $ Log $, ministry Log $, Copay
scer× pre 0.129 0.018 0.301 0.300 0.246
(0.101) (0.019) (0.270) (0.270) (0.203)
scer× post 0.018 0.002 0.027 0.027 0.012
(0.046) (0.011) (0.158) (0.157) (0.115)
ocer× pre 0.002 0.008 0.101 0.101 0.071
(0.015) (0.003)** (0.047)** (0.047)** (0.034)**
ocer×post 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.007
(0.006) (0.002) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016)
R2 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74
N 62,595 62,595 62,595 62,595 62,595
Avg. y, unconnected, pre-disast. 0.704 0.260 6957760.748 6574199.812 383560.936
Avg. y, unconnected, post-disast. 0.370 0.153 8804951.192 8304860.934 500090.258
Municip.-post disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Event-yr. from disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Munic.-event FE YES YES YES YES YES
# Requests > 0 Requests Log $ Log $, ministry Log $, Copay
scer×pre 0.175 0.004 0.142 0.142 0.138
(0.140) (0.024) (0.335) (0.334) (0.247)
scer×post -0.027 0.004 0.045 0.044 0.022
(0.057) (0.013) (0.186) (0.186) (0.132)
ocer×pre 0.007 0.006 0.073 0.073 0.051
(0.016) (0.003)* (0.048) (0.047) (0.035)
ocer×post -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(0.009) (0.002) (0.036) (0.036) (0.024)
R2 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82
N 56,083 56,083 56,083 56,083 56,083
Avg. y, unconnected, pre-disast. 0.704 0.260 6957760.748 6574199.812 383560.936
Avg. y, unconnected, post-disast. 0.370 0.153 8804951.192 8304860.934 500090.258
Municip.-yr from disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Event-yr. from disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Munic.-event FE YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 3.16: Disaster grants by ministry-municipality-year: grant ap-
provals
# Grants > 0 Grant Log $ Log $, Ministry Log $, Copay
scer×pre 0.014 0.018 0.246 0.245 0.178
(0.011) (0.009)* (0.126)* (0.126)* (0.094)*
scer×post 0.014 0.011 0.165 0.164 0.131
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.054)*** (0.053)*** (0.042)***
ocer×pre 0.002 0.002 0.023 0.023 0.015
(0.001) (0.001)* (0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
ocer×post -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
R2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
N 62,595 62,595 62,595 62,595 62,595
Avg. y, unconnected, pre-disast. 0.021 0.019 109849.309 101236.903 8612.406
Avg. y, unconnected, post-disast. 0.013 0.012 106206.990 99164.114 7042.876
Municip.-post disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Event-yr. from disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Munic.-event FE YES YES YES YES YES
# Grants > 0 Grant Log $ Log $, Ministry Log $, Copay
scer×pre 0.018 0.019 0.255 0.255 0.181
(0.012) (0.010)** (0.128)** (0.128)** (0.096)*
scer×post 0.015 0.012 0.170 0.170 0.133
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.062)*** (0.062)*** (0.047)***
ocer×pre 0.003 0.003 0.036 0.036 0.025
(0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.011)**
ocer×post 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
R2 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75
N 56,083 56,083 56,083 56,083 56,083
Avg. y, unconnected, pre-disast. 0.021 0.019 109849.309 101236.903 8612.406
Avg. y, unconnected, post-disast. 0.013 0.012 106206.990 99164.114 7042.876
Municip.-yr from disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Event-yr. from disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Munic.-event FE YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 3.17: Disaster grants by ministry-municipality-year: grant ap-
provals among those requesting
# Grants > 0 Grants % Approv Log $ Log $, Ministry Log $, Copay
scer×pre -0.043 0.002 0.003 -0.067 -0.065 -0.088
(0.060) (0.044) (0.014) (0.572) (0.570) (0.431)
scer×post 0.108 0.093 0.053 1.311 1.313 0.959
(0.040)*** (0.036)** (0.022)** (0.501)*** (0.498)*** (0.386)**
ocer×pre -0.031 -0.033 -0.011 -0.456 -0.453 -0.368
(0.022) (0.019)* (0.009) (0.260)* (0.258)* (0.206)*
scer×post -0.016 -0.018 -0.004 -0.262 -0.261 -0.214
(0.014) (0.011)* (0.006) (0.150)* (0.149)* (0.117)*
R2 0.70 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74
N 5,435 5,435 5,435 5,435 5,435 5,435
Avg. y, unconnected, pre-disast. 0.083 0.073 0.035 109849.309 101236.903 8612.406
Avg. y, unconnected, post-disast. 0.085 0.075 0.040 106206.990 99164.114 7042.876
Municip.-post disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Event-yr. from disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Munic.-event FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
# Grants > 0 Grants % Approv Log $ Log $, Ministry Log $, Copay
scer×pre -0.004 -0.001 0.010 -0.107 -0.110 -0.058
(0.051) (0.048) (0.014) (0.703) (0.700) (0.550)
scer×post 0.246 0.173 0.155 2.612 2.643 1.818
(0.200) (0.164) (0.119) (2.320) (2.308) (1.828)
ocer×pre 0.002 -0.008 -0.007 -0.089 -0.088 -0.068
(0.017) (0.017) (0.006) (0.230) (0.228) (0.177)
ocer×post 0.018 0.006 0.000 0.080 0.080 0.048
(0.014) (0.012) (0.004) (0.169) (0.168) (0.131)
R2 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92
N 3,499 3,499 3,499 3,499 3,499 3,499
Avg. y, unconnected, pre-disast. 0.083 0.073 0.035 109849.309 101236.903 8612.406
Avg. y, unconnected, post-disast. 0.085 0.075 0.040 106206.990 99164.114 7042.876
Municip.-yr from disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Event-yr. from disast. FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Munic.-event FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 3.21: Grants requests data: time to completion
Time to compl. Time relat. to avg Time relat. to avg
same party -16.023 -1.875 -0.906
(21.323) (13.014) (13.448)
R2 0.67 0.59 0.60
N 51,562 51,562 45,590
Avg. y, unconnected 1071.228 1.294 1.397
Sample Approved Approved Appr., similar grants
Municip.-year FE YES YES YES
Ministry-year FE YES YES YES
Mun.-min.-term FE YES YES YES
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 3.22: Grants requests data: bureaucratic process
Proj. analysed Workplan appr. Ammend # Ammend. Duration Duration
same party 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.017 -2.435 -6.056
(0.005) (0.003)** (0.005) (0.011) (0.954)** (3.439)*
R2 0.55 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.62
N 480,779 480,779 480,779 480,779 480,779 51,562
Avg. y, unconnected 0.481 0.185 0.244 0.480 335.436 148.478
Sample All All All All All Appr. req.
Municip.-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ministry-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mun.-min.-term FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Identification strategy
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4. The Welfare Costs of
Political Connections
4.1 Introduction
A large body of evidence suggests public funds are often misallocated
across regions: in particular, connected regions are often favoured and
receive more funds than unconnected regions (the previous chapter of this
thesis documents this for the Brazilian setting, further references include
Hodler and Raschky (2015), Burgess et al (2015), Brollo and Nannicinni
(2012)). Given these types of allocation often generate disagreements
and conflicts between regions, this often brings demands for rules forcing
uniformity and equality in policy making, and for non-partisan alloca-
tions.
Yet, these policies are often costly: it is unclear that non-partisan act-
ors could be made accountable to people, and it is possible that different
regions have different needs for funds that are hard to be captured by
rules. With this in mind, what are the aggregate social welfare costs of
political connections? Are they large enough to justify potentially costly
policy interventions such as the ones above?
The answer to this question relies on, first of all, knowing how much
connected cities gain and unconnected cities lose from connections-based
allocations. In particular, this implies that we need to know, first of all,
whether the social returns to public funds are decreasing, constant, or
increasing - including both the returns of public funds in terms of local
welfare, and any source of concavity of the welfare function due to in-
equality aversion. After all, take two cities that, without partisanship,
would receive the same amount of funds and get same welfare from it.
If the returns to public funds are decreasing, then the losses due to par-
tisanship for unconnected cities end up being larger than the gains from
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partisanship for connected cities, and the welfare losses are large. If re-
turns are constant, the losses for unconnected cities are similar to the
gains for connected cities, and the welfare losses are small. Second of all,
we need to know the degree of heterogeneity in returns to public funds
across cities.
If we knew that returns to funds were equal across regions, the shape
of returns to public funds, and society’s demands for equality across re-
gions, this would be a trivial problem: it becomes a matter of simply
computing how much connected cities gain and unconnected cities lose
in terms of public funds, and aggregating welfare with a known welfare
function. Yet, we often don’t directly observe regions’ relative demands
for public funds, nor have clear measures of society’s distaste for inequal-
ity. Even more, for many types of public goods - such as sports courts
or public squares -, there are few direct measures of welfare that we can
use to understand some of the relevant welfare parameters.
To answer this question, this chapter starts by building a model of
grant requests by cities and approvals by ministries in a national gov-
ernment. Ministries behave as social planners who care about (i) the
returns to grant size, (ii) unobservable differences in returns across cit-
ies/ministries, and (iii) who attach an extra welfare weight to politically
connected cities - which I’ll refer to as the ministerial bias. Cities then
anticipate the ministry’s propensity to accept a grant request, and de-
cide on requests based on this. This model provides a way to translate
the partial equilibrium effects of connections - namely, the differences
between connected cities and unconnected cities holding fixed the set of
cities that are connected - into an understanding of the amount of pub-
lic funds connected cities gain vs. unconnected cities lose from political
connections.
I argue that given knowledge of the model’s parameters, one useful
stance to take is to estimate the welfare losses from the viewpoint of a
benchmark planner who fully agrees with the ministry, except for not
favouring connected cities. This is informative, first of all, of how much
a non-partisan/technocratic minister loses from political connections: if
these losses turn out to be small, it is unlikely that a non-partisan govern-
ment would want to prevent partisanship at the cost of creating conflict
with potential political allies.
This benchmark planner also provides a lower bound on the welfare
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costs of partisan governments to society. The reason for that is that
if society doesn’t care for political connections, but happens to be fully
aligned with the ministry in all other factors, then the benchmark planner
is tautologically providing us the social costs of political connections.
If society, instead, has additional reasons to diverge from the national
government, then the losses of delegating choices to a partisan national
government must be larger.
With this benchmark planner serving as the welfare criterion, I then
show that the gap in resources between connected and unconnected cities
is typically not sufficient to answer the question of aggregate welfare
losses. More precisely, I show that in the model, we can justify a given
difference in resources between connected and unconnected cities with a
model with (i) decreasing returns to grant size and large biases towards
connected cities - when the welfare losses from connections would be
large -, or (ii) with a model of close to constant returns to grant size and
small biases to connected cities - when the welfare losses from connections
would be small.
To see this, consider a ministry’s with concave returns to grant size.
As it becomes biased towards connected cities, connected cities increase
their grant requests. Given marginal returns are decreasing, the returns
for the ministry of approving a grant to this connected city fall, and
cities cannot increase their request further without losing chances that
the ministry will approve their request. Consequently, to justify a given
difference in requests and approvals between connected and unconnected
regions with concave returns, we need relatively large biases towards
connected cities. As more funds go to connected cities, this increases the
shadow cost of funds for the ministry, who gets then a lower marginal
benefit of approving grants to unconnected cities. The first panel of figure
4.1 displays this intuition graphically, together with the fact that under
concave returns, the loss in welfare for unconnected cities (the yellow
area) turns out to be larger than the gain in welfare for connected cities
(the green area).
Assume instead that the returns to grant size are close to linear.
Once the ministry becomes even slightly biased towards connected cit-
ies, connected cities can increase their grant requests, and because the
marginal returns to grant size are close to constant, connected cities
can keep increasing the size of their request without marginal returns
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falling, and without losing much in terms of probability of approval of
the grant request. As a consequence, when marginal returns are close to
constant (non-decreasing), we can justify large gaps in resources between
connected and unconnected cities even with small biases towards connec-
ted cities. Yet, the welfare losses from the viewpoint of the benchmark
planner here are small, since the returns to funds for connected and un-
connected cities are approximately the same. The second panel of figure
4.1 illustrastes this graphically, also showing that the loss in welfare for
unconnected cities (the yellow area) is close to the gain in welfare for
connected cities (the green area).
The key challenge, then, is to identify the ministerial bias towards
connected cities and the concavity of ministerial returns to funds sep-
arately. I do so by exploring rich available data on grant requests from
Brazilian municipalities and approvals of these requests by national level
ministries between 2009-16. As the intuition above suggests, when the
returns to grant size are concave, larger grant requests reduce the prob-
ability that the ministry will accept it; while if returns are linear, larger
grant requests won’t have an effect over the probability that the ministry
will accept a request. Estimating this response of probability of approval
to project size, jointly with the effect of connections over the probability
of approval, is then what allows me to answer the question of interest.
With this in hands, I show that in fact, the ministerial returns to grant
size are close to linear, and biases towards connected cities are relatively
small. As a consequence, the welfare costs of political connections for
the benchmark ministry - that is, when political connections are the only
source of distortion in the allocation of public funds across regions - are
of the order of 0.24% of the typical ministerial budget for grants.
This chapter is related to the literature on the effects of political
connections over the allocation of public funds across regions (see Evans
(2011), Knight (2005), Kriner and Reeves (2015) and Dynes and Huber
(2015) for the U.S.; Franck and Rainer (2012), Kramon and Posner
(2013), Hodler and Raschky (2014), Burgess et al (2015) and Kramon and
Posner (2016) review evidence from developing countries; Solle´-Olle´ and
Sorribas-Navarro (2008) for grants in Spain and Brollo and Nannicinni
(2012) for grants in Brazil). This chapter offers methods to aggregate
the welfare losses associated with these connections-based allocations
In a related setting, Finan and Mazzocco (2017) study the consequences
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of congressmen’s electoral incentives over the allocation of pork across re-
gions, and evaluate the welfare consequences of such electoral incentives
using a structural model of pork allocation, politicians’ decisions to run
for re-election, and voters’ choice to re-elect politicians. In their setting,
maximizing welfare implies (i) sending more money to poorer regions and
with higher estimated welfare weights, and (ii) reducing leakage in public
funds as estimated in their structural model. Given their model’s com-
plexity, they need to estimate the model for only 4 regions. Relative to
this, this chapter first provides a simpler model, with the potential to es-
timate welfare for an arbitrary number of cities (here, 5500 cities) while,
as in Finan and Mazzocco (2017), allowing for flexible heterogeneity in
the welfare weights across regions. Secondly, this chapter allows for the
fact that we don’t have good knowledge of the structure of the welfare
function, instead providing an estimate of a plausible lower bound on
the welfare costs of political connections. On one hand, this allows me
to be more agnostic about details of the model that are hard to know,
and allows me to express uncertainty in the welfare losses due to polit-
ical connections due to lack of knowledge of the welfare function; on the
other hand, the lack of knowledge of the welfare function gives a low
lower bound on the costs of political connections in my setting.
This chapter also relates to a literature on fiscal federalism, in partic-
ular, on the difficulties of non-uniform central policy making (see Oates
(1972), Persson and Tabellini (1996), Lockwood (2002), Besley and Coate
(2003), Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2005), Kessler (2014), Hoffmann et
al (2017)). Relative to this literature, I provide methods to estimate
costs of central government discretion (here, discretion awarded to min-
istries), and the resulting non-uniform policy making. In particular, here,
I estimate one cost of such discretion, associated with connections-based
allocations by central governments.
4.2 Model
In this section, I build a structural model where a ministry chooses to
allocate grants as a planner, and gives higher welfare weights to grant
requests coming from connected cities. Anticipating this, cities decide
whether to turn their potential grants into grant requests depending on
whether the probability of approval is high enough. I use this model
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to evaluate equilibrium effects of removing connections, and of imposing
policies constraining the ministry, and discuss what can be learned from
the model in terms of welfare.
4.2.1 Set-up
Assume that a continuum of cities c have, each of them, a finite number
of potential grants i to request from a given ministry m. Each grant has
a size gi, where g
m
i is funded by the ministry and g
c
i = gi − gmi is funded
by the city.
If grant i is requested by the city, the ministry can either accept the
request (yi = 1), or reject it (yi = 0). I normalize the payoffs from re-
jecting a request to 0, and assume that if the ministry accepts a request,
it gets a utilitarian welfare component of κ˜siθiu(gi). In particular, si
denotes whether the request came from a politically connected city, κ˜ is
the extra welfare weight on connected cities, θi indexes other differences
in welfare weights and local demands for the project, and u(gi) denotes
how the ministry’s welfare increases with the project size. At the same
time, the ministry has a budget constraint for a given year (determined
by the legislative bargaining process between the executive and the legis-
lature) of funds that expire after that year. This imposes on the ministry
a shadow cost of funds λm. With this in mind, the ministry’s payoff from
all requests is given by:∫
riyi[ κ˜
si︸︷︷︸
Favouritism
θiu(gi)− λmgmi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Remainder
]di
where ri = 1 denotes that the request of potential grant i was made. In
particular, as seen above, we can interpret the ministerial payoff as a mix
of favouritism towards connected areas, and a remainder, capturing all
other residual reasons motivating acceptance of grants by the ministry.
Anticipating the ministry’s decision, cities decide whether to make
requests (ri = 1) or not (ri = 0), the size of the grant gi, and the
amounts financed by the ministry and the city, gmi , g
c
i . To incorporate
the real-world feature that there are constraints on how much cities need
to finance themselves, I assume that cities face a constraint that
gci
gi
≥ γ.
This assumption is consistent with the data, where values requested are
always exactly equal to the values approved.
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When the city gets its request approved, it gets a payoff of iv(gi).
Given the city’s budget constraint, the shadow cost of the funds spent
by the city on the project are given by λcg
c
i . When the city makes N
requests from ministry m, the cost from each request made is given by
λcFcmt(N) - constant across requests, but not necessarily across cities,
ministries and time.
To allow for the fact that many requests made are never accepted, I
assume that the city cannot fully anticipate the ministry’s decision. In
particular, I assume that the city only knows that θi = θKiθUi, where
θKi is known to the city and θUi is unknown to the city. In particu-
lar, I assume that log θUi ∼ Hθ(log θUi), and that θUi is independent of
i, Fcmt, θKi: this assumption captures the idea that the city cannot use
the variables it observes to predict θUi.
1
4.2.2 Welfare
Given that I only have information on the ministry’s decisions and on
the city’s decisions, it is hard to evaluate society’s welfare directly. With
this in mind, I argue instead for the following indirect approach: first, I
assume that connections are unrelated to welfare. This is consistent with
the interpretation of the reduced form evidence that connections create
favouritism.2
Still, this doesn’t fully define citizen’s welfare. Assume then, at first,
that citizens welfare is given by the ministry’s remainder θiu(gi)− λmgmi
- so that, other than due to connections, the ministerial welfare is fully
aligned with society’s welfare. If this is the case, once the government’s
primitives are estimated, we could easily estimate the welfare costs of
political connections. We could also use this assumption to compute the
welfare effects of policy counterfactuals imposing caps on transfers by
ministries to given cities.
We could have instead that society’s welfare is unrelated to the min-
istry’s remainder. If this is the case, the ministerial discretion creates
1For a micro-foundation for this assumption, assume that the city observes a
signal zi|θi (in particular, let zi be a vector including i, Fcmt and extra inform-
ation). We could take log θi = E[log θi|zi] + log θUi, with E[log θUi|zi] = 0, and
log θKi = E[log θi|zi]. Further assumptions on the distribution of the signal, in turn,
guarantee θUi independent of zi, and hence of θKi, i, Fcmt.
2The important part of this assumption is that connections affect society’s welfare
by less than it affects ministry’s welfare. While this assumption could be relaxed, I
maintain it throughout to simplify the exposition of the exercise.
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even more distortions than under the assumption in the previous para-
graph. Similarly, there would be even higher welfare gains from the policy
counterfactual constraining the ministry.
With this in mind, the assumption that the ministry’s remainder is
fully aligned with welfare allows us to compute the welfare losses of polit-
ical connections when this is the only distortion in the ministerial choices
of allocation of funds across cities. Similarly, under this assumption, we
get a plausible lower bound on the welfare gains from policies imposing
constraints on the ministry’s possible allocations.
I proceed, then, assuming that society’s welfare is given by θiu(gi)−
λmg
m
i .
4.2.3 Model solution
General solution: This model’s solution can be easily characterized
using backward induction. In the last stage, the ministry approves a
grant request i if:
κ˜siθKiθUi ≥ λmg
m
i
u(gi)
≡ θMG
Anticipating this, a given city c makes a request on potential grant i if
the fixed cost of requesting this grant is lower than the value function
from that grant. In particular, this means that a request is made if:
λcFcmt(N) ≤ λcV
(
i
λc
, γ, θKi
)
≡ λc max
θMG,gi,gmi
[1−H(log θMG − log θKi − siκ)]
[
iv(gi)
λc
− gi + gmi
]
s.t. gmi ≤ (1− γ)gi
gmi =
θMGu(gi)
λc
where κ = log κ˜. That is, the problem yielding the value function V (·)
is one where the city maximizes the expected value of getting a project
approved. It is convenient to write this value function normalized by λc
as above, so that V (·) can be interpreted as a money equivalent utility
function for the city.
If the solution to the city’s problem is interior, it can be characterized
by first order conditions. In the case of cities not bound by the constraint
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on
gci
gi
≥ γ, we get that:
1 =
iv
′(gi)
λc
+
θMGu′(gi)
λm
1−H(·)
h(·) g
m
i =
iv(gi)
λc
− θ
MGu(gi)
λm
− gi
The first equation is intuitive: given a choice of a probability of approval
(implicit in the choice of θMG), the project size is chosen to maximize
the utilitarian welfare of the city and the ministry at the margin between
approving or not the project.
The second equation, in turn, characterizes the city’s trade off when
choosing its own probability of approval for a given project size gi. If the
city tries to get a marginal increase the probability of approval, it gets a
payoff of iv
λc
− gmi , equivalent to the payoff on the right hand side of the
second equation above. On the other hand, to increase the probability of
approval by δ while holding the project size gi constant, the city needs to
decrease gmi by δ
1
h(·)g
m
i . This increases the share of costs paid by the city
when the project is approved, which happens with probability 1−H(·).
More generally, for constrained or unconstrained cities, the city will
choose project sizes and payments by the ministry according to choice
functions:
gi
(
i
λc
, log
(
θKi
λm
)
, γ
)
; gmi
(
i
λc
, log
(
θKi
λm
)
, γ
)
Particular case: To gain some intuition on the model’s implications,
consider the case where the city fully knows θ, so that θUi can, without
loss of generality, be normalized to 1. Similarly, assume for simplicity
that γ = 0. In such a case, the city fully anticipates that the project will
be approved if κ˜siθKi ≥ λmg
m
i
u(gi)
, and chooses optimally to set θMG = κ˜siθKi.
Consequently, conditionally on making a request, the city will choose the
maximum gmi consistent with approval, given by:
gmi = min
{
gi,
κ˜siθKiu(gi)
λm
}
At the same time, the city will choose the project’s scale to maximize its
payoff, given the choice of gmi as above. Note that if the city anticipates
gi <
κ˜siθKiu(gi)
λm
, the city can get its request approved without any pay-
ments, so that the city has incentives to increase project size. The city
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will do so up to the point where gi ≥ κ˜siθKiu(gi)λm .3 Consequently, we can
take gmi =
κ˜siθKiu
′(gi)
λm
.
As a consequence, the city will choose its project size to solve the
following first order condition:4
iv
′(gi)
λc
+
κ˜siθKiu
′(gi)
λm
= 1
From this, it is easy to verify the effect of connections over gi: connections
act to increase the level κ faced by the city. A direct application of the
implicit function theorem yields the following result:
Proposition 1 Assume v
λc
+ θu
λm
is concave in gi for all , θ. Then,
connections increase gi. The effect of connections is higher (i) the larger
is κi, and (ii) the less
v
λc
+ θu
λm
is concave.
Proof. Apply the implicit function theorem to the equation above for
gi(κ).
This result is intuitive. Clearly, as κ increases, the national govern-
ment becomes more willing to approve a grant from a connected city,
without changing its willingness to approve grants to unconnected cities.
Given this, connected cities anticipate they can ask for more while still
getting an approval.
Similarly, consider a government with a concave objective function
u. By now, we know that the ministry pays gmi =
κ˜siθKiu(gi)
λm
, and that
connected cities have larger projects gi (as mentioned in the previous
paragraph). But then, this implies that when a connected city increases
gi, it gets less of an increase in g
m
i than an unconnected city would get
by increasing gi. As a consequence, connected cities, on the margin,
pay for a higher share of marginal increases in gi. When u(gi) becomes
less concave, this difference between connected and unconnected cities
becomes smaller, and connected cities become more willing to increase
gi. This implies, in turn, that when u is less concave, the difference
between connected and unconnected cities becomes smaller.
Finally, the city requests a grant if Fcmt(N) ≤ V . Clearly, given that
V is increasing in θKi, we can express the decision of the city to make a
request as θKi ≥ T
(
i
λc
)
/κ˜si .
3This is possible as long as limgi→∞ u
′(gi) < 1.
4One way to understand this solution is to note that, with full knowledge, the
optimal choice of θMG by the city is θMG = κ˜siθKi.
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Now, let welfare from a given grant be given by θKiu(gi)
λm
− gmi : notice
that this is the welfare function discussed previously, but normalized by
λm so that we express welfare in monetary units. Then, we can write the
welfare function from any given allocation as:
M
∫ {
q
∫ ∞
T
κ˜
θKiu(gi)
λm
− gmi dHθK + (1− q)
∫ ∞
T
θKiu(gi)
λm
− gmi dHθK
}
dH 
λc
where q is the share of potential projects coming from connected mu-
nicipalities and M is the mass of potential projects. Given that gmi =
κ˜aiθKiu(gi)
λm
, we obtain in turn that the welfare function from the allocation
set by the ministries can be expressed as:
1− κ˜
κ˜
qME[gmi yiri|si = 1]
I re-state this result, in turn, in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The welfare loss from connections, as a share of total
resources from the ministry, is given by:
1− κ˜
κ˜
R
where R =
qME[gmi yiri|si=1]
ME[gmi yiri]
is the share of the ministry’s approved re-
sources going to connected cities.
This results highlights a crucial identification problem: any given differ-
ences in resources allocated to connected vs. unconnected cities can be
driven either by high levels of κ, or by low values of κ with low concavity
of v
λc
+ θu
λm
. That is, we can explain any given difference in resources
allocated either with high favouritism in κ, or with low favouritism but
high scalability of projects from the viewpoint of cities and ministries.
Despite this, in this model with perfect knowledge by the city, the
welfare losses only depend on κ˜ and on the share of resources going to
connected cities. In particular, if connections are the only source of
distortions in the ministry’s decision, and κ˜→ 1, the welfare losses from
connections go to zero.5
In this sense, it is possible that we have low welfare losses due to
connections with large differences in approvals to connected and uncon-
nected mayors. The small welfare losses would happen if κ˜ is small, and
5Note that R < 1, while 1−κ˜κ˜ goes to 0.
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we could still get large differences in approvals by compensating the low
κ˜ with functions u and v that are sufficiently close to linear.
The identification challenge, then, is, first of all, to be able to dif-
ferentiate between the shape of u and κ˜. Additionally, given that many
cities do not request grants, this suggests the presence of fixed costs of
making requests; given that many requests are not approved, this sug-
gests that cities cannot fully anticipate whether the ministry will approve
grants or not. The second challenge, then, is to estimate the full model,
allowing for cities that cannot fully anticipate ministerial decisions, and
to compute welfare losses in this more general model.
General case: How do these results apply to the general case where
the cities don’t know everything in the ministry’s objective function?
Relatively straight-forward algebra shows that the welfare function at
a given , Fi, θKi, with given connections si and making requests is given
by:
1− κ˜si
κ˜
gmi
[
1−H
(
log
θMG
θKiκ˜si
)]
+ gmi
θKi
θMG
∫ ∞
θMG
θKiκ˜
si
1−H(θUi)dθUi
The first term is the same term obtained under perfect information:
namely, the welfare loss is 1−κ˜
κ˜
times the amount of resources the ministry
approves towards connected cities. Aggregating this expression across
i, Fi, θKi, si, we get that welfare is given by:
1− κ˜
κ˜
qME[gmi yiri|si = 1] + E
[
rig
m
i
θKi
θMG
∫ ∞
θMG
θKiκ˜
si
1−H(θUi)dθUi
]
The first term appears just as it did under perfect information: among
the connected cities, κ˜ creates a distortion because connected cities get
approvals even with relatively low values of θu(gi). This implies a loss of
1−κ˜
κ˜
of the budget allocated to connected cities.
The second term is new, and only appears under imperfect inform-
ation: under perfect information, there are only requests when the city
is certain that the ministry will approve the grant, so that when ri = 1,
1 − H = 0. When there is perfect information, on the other hand,
θKi
θMG
∫
1 −HdθU is the virtual income the ministry gets from approving
projects with benefits θKiθUi > θ
MG at a cost proportional to θMG. This
term, then creates, relative to an environment without connections, a
gain in virtual income earned from connected cities as long as θˆ
MG
κ˜
falls
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with κ, and a loss in virtual income earned from unconnected cities.
Identifying this extra source of distortion requires identification of
H(θUi), θKi, θ
MG and κ. Conditionally on these, we know welfare losses.
On the other hand, the effect of connections over resources allocated still
depend, even conditionally on these parameters, on the concavity of u(gi).
4.3 Identification
To identify this model in the data, I need to argue how the model relates
to observables. In a nutshell, the exercise does this by turning the ap-
proval decision by the ministry into a binary choice model, and by turn-
ing the extensive margin of grant requests into an ordered discrete choice
problem. To do so, first of all, I need the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Let βλm(t), βθm(t) and β
θ
c (t) be time polynomials. Then,
(i) log λm = Xmβ
λm(t)
(ii) log θKi = Xmβ
θ
m(t) +Xcβ
θ
c (t) + dcmT
The first part of the assumption is relatively simple: it says that the
shadow cost of funds from the ministry is a ministry-time specific effect.
Given that the models estimated turn out to be non-linear, though, the
estimation becomes unstable if we add, as in the linear model, ministry-
time dummies (which account for 216 ministry-time effects).
The second part of the assumption is more restrictive: it requires
that everything observed by the city about the ministry’s approval cri-
terion can be captured by ministry-time effects, city-time effects and a
ministry-city-mayoral term fixed effect.6 This assumption is similar to
the assumption used in the reduced form part of the paper, and guar-
antees that I use the same source of variation to identify the effects of
political connections.
That being said, this assumption implies that once the observables
are controlled for, the only source of variation in gi and g
m
i comes from i,
the rules on copayment γ and from mistakes.7 While in many contexts,
this could be a strong restriction on the data, here, it turns out that in
fact, gi and g
m
i are highly correlated, and it isn’t too restrictive to assume
that i and γ explain almost all the variation in gi and g
m
i .
6See the appendix for one microfoundation for this assumption.
7While optimization mistakes are not directly in the model, the microfoundation
for assumption 1 makes it clear where these mistakes could be coming from.
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The second implication of this assumption is that conditional on these
observables, there are no other unobservables driving both ministerial ap-
provals and self-selection into making grant requests. This is a restrictive
assumption, and with this in mind, I discuss later what are the require-
ments to identify a more general model with selection on unobservables
and a testable implication for this assumption.
For now, I stick with this assumption, and note that if I let Zcmt =
(scmt, Xm, Xc), assumption 1 guarantees that:
E[yi| log gi, log gmi ,Zcmt, dcmT , ri = 1] =E[yi| log gi, log gmi ,Zcmt, dcmT ]
=1−HθU
(
log gmi −log u(gi)−κscmt
+Xcβc(t)+Xmβm(t)+dcmT
)
where κ = log(κ˜) and the time trends are sums of the time trends in
the assumption 1. Assumption 1 also guarantees that conditionally on
the observables above, gi, g
m
i are exogenous to the unobservables driving
approvals: after all, the only unobservables driving approvals under as-
sumption 1 are given by θUi, the terms unknown by cities at the time
they decide on gi, g
m
i . Further approximate log u(gi) =
∑N
j=1
ωUj
j
(log gi)
j
(so that we’re approximating gi as a polynomial in log gi, and taking the
order of the polynomial to infinity as the sample grows).
Under these, identification would be immediate if I could control for
the fixed effects dcmT : first, let ωU(gi) =
u′(gi)
u(gi)
gi be the elasticity of the
government’s payoff with respect to gi. Then, note that the marginal
effects of log gi are given by hθU (·)ωU(gi). Similarly, the marginal effect
of log gmi is given by −h(·). But then, the negative of the ratio of these
marginal effects is simply ωU(gi) (which is equal to
∑N
j=1 ωUj(log gi)
j−1
under the previous polynomial approximation). For an alternative inter-
pretation, we can identify u(gi) by looking at the following: if we move
log gi by a small ψ, and move log g
m
i in a way that keeps the probabil-
ity of approval constant, the movement in log gmi necessary to do so is
ωU(gi)ψ.
The same intuition applies to the identification of κ: if we move a
city-ministry pair from connected to unconnected across years, and move
log gmi back to keep the probability of approval constant, the movement
in log gmi necessary to do so is given by κ.
The things left-over to deal with in identifying this model are (i)
dealing with time effects, and (ii) taking into account that I cannot
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explicitly control for dcmT due to the incidental parameters problem.
That being said, insights due to Manski (1988) allow for the estima-
tion of this model with fixed effects and without functional form as-
sumptions on HθU . More precisely, order the grant requests according
to some order - say, date of request -, let ∆xi = xi+1 − xi and let
lcmt = κscmt + Xcβc(t) + Xmβm(t) + dcmT = log κ˜si + log θKi. Then,
Manski (1988) shows that:
E[∆yi|∆ log gi,∆ log gmi ,∆scmt, log gi, log gmi , scmt, Xm, Xc] > 0
↔ ∆lcmt < 0
and equivalent expressions hold when the expectation is strictly lower
than zero. But from this, it is immediate to get the following proposition,
which I use to estimate this part of the model:
Proposition 3 Under assumption 1,
E[∆yi|∆ log gmi ,∆ log gi,∆Zcmt, log gmi , log gi,Zcmt] =
[−∆ log gmi + ∆ log u(gi) + κ∆scmt −Xc∆βc(t)−Xm∆βm(t)]
×m(∆ log gmi ,∆ log gi,∆Zcmt, log gmi , log gi,Zcmt)
where m(·) > 0.
Note how this proposition formalizes the intuition above: by guaranteeing
that m(·) > 0, we guarantee that the only way to keep the probability
of approval constant (or, to equate the expectation in the proposition to
0) is by having a movement within a city-ministry pair in the variables
that is compensated by a movement in ∆ log gmi . Furthermore, if m(·)
can be approximated appropriately by a polynomial in the variables, the
model above can be estimated by a simple non-linear least squares. In
monte-carlo simulations, the point estimates for the main parameters of
interest are correct on average even when I assume that m is linear in
variables, so I proceed by taking this linear approximation for m.
From this, it is straight-forward to identify v(gi). In particular, note
that by focusing on cities that are unconstrained by the minimum copay-
ment rule, we can re-write the first order condition of the city as:
1−H(·) = h(·)
{
gi
gmi
[
1
ωV (gi)
− 1
]
+ 1− ωU(gi)
ωV (gi)
}
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Note that 1−H is simply the probability of approval of a project. Sim-
ilarly, ωU was just identified in the previous proposition. To identify ωV ,
all there is left-over is to identify h(·). Note, however, that h(·) is (minus)
the marginal effect of gmi over the probability of approval. The difficulty
in identifying this marginal effect, however, is that (1) we haven’t yet
identified the distribution of θU nor the distribution of fixed effects, and
(2) identifying the distribution of θU + dcmT is not enough to compute
this marginal effect. That being said, I can use here the insights from
Hoderlein and White (2012) to identify these marginal effects from the
same expectation identified in the last proposition. This in turn yields
the following result:
Proposition 4 Define the following terms:
A = E[yi+1|∆ log gmi ,∆ log gi,∆Zcmt, log gmi , log gi,Zcmt]
B = − ∂
∂ψ
E[∆yi|∆ log gmi = ψ,∆ log gi = 0,∆Zcmt = 0, log gmi , log gi,Zcmt]|ψ=0
= m(0, 0, 0, log gmi , log gi,Zcmt)
where m(·) is as defined in proposition 3. Then, let ωV (gi) = v′(gi)v(gi) gi be
the elasticity of the city’s utility with respect to project size. Then, under
assumption 1, we have that:
ωV (gi+1) = E
B
[
1− gmi+1
gi+1
ωU(gi+1)
]
A
gmi+1
gi+1
+B
[
1− gmi+1
gi+1
] | log gi+1

It is useful to discuss the intuition behind the terms A and B: the term
A is simply the expectation of the probability of approval of the grant
request i+1. The term B is more involved: first, consider the expectation
in B: it’s the expected change in probability of approval given the level of
the variables, and given that the only variable moving across requests is
log gmi , which moves by ψ. Intuitively, when ψ is small, this expectation
should be close to the marginal effect of gmi times ψ - that is, −h(·)ψ.
Then, taking derivatives with respect to ψ yields the desired marginal
effects.8
8The insight due to Hoderlein and White (2012) is that when taking the derivative
with respect to ψ, the expectation should move both because of the marginal effect of
gmi and because of the change in the distribution of fixed effects. This second effect,
though, goes to zero when ψ is small.
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Another interpretation from B is from the following: say that we’re
able to estimate the expectation in proposition 3 and in B. Then, in a
parametric setting with linear effects of the variables, B is the coefficient
on ∆ log gmi . In a non-parametric setting, this coefficient varies with
the value of ∆ log gmi . What the proof guarantees is that we need to
look at this coefficient when ψ = 0. Note that given that the previous
proposition provided a method to estimate this expectation inside B, so
getting an estimate for B is immediate once we have the estimates from
proposition 3.
Once A and B are known, we know all the terms in the first order
conditions for the city. The leftover work, then, is just a matter of solving
for ωV (gi) given A (or 1−H), B (or h), g
m
i
gi
and ωU from before. This will
be a function of gmi , gi and all other observables. I then take expectations
conditional on gi to get ωV (gi).
The final object to be estimated here is the extensive margin of grant
requests - that is, to obtain an estimable model for the number of requests
a city makes. Here, I proceed in an almost reduced form way: first, order
the city projects in decreasing order in terms of i. Then, note that if we
linearize the city’s value function, we get that the city makes the grant
request i iff:
Fcmt(N) ≤ η1lcmt + η2(log i − log λc) + η3γct
where lcmt = κscmt + Xcβc(t) + Xmβm(t) + dcmT is the latent variable
shifting the probability of approval of a city’s requests (leaving aside the
terms gi, g
m
i which are exogenous and don’t enter the city’s value function,
naturally), and where γct is only allowed to vary at the city-time level
because the rules in place only allow for variation at the city-time level.
The following assumption, then, disciplines the exercise a bit further:
Assumption 2 (i) Fcmt(N) = Xcβ
F
c (t)+Xmβ
F
m(t)+d
F
cmT +F (N)+F
r
cmt
(ii) F (N) is an increasing function
(iii) F rcmt|~cmtλc = HF
(
F rcmt|~cmtλc
)
(iv) log λc = Xcβ
λ
c (t)
The first part of the assumption plays the following roles: firstly, it re-
stricts, for the sake of estimation, how does the fixed cost of making
requests vary across cities. Secondly, for the purposes of counterfactuals,
it imposes the restriction that connections do not affect the fixed cost of
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making requests - by doing so, variation in connections can be used as
shifters of the probability of getting a grant request accepted, which is
useful to compute equilibrium effects.
The second part of the assumption is relatively simpler, and it is help-
ful to guarantee that cities request a finite number of grants, and that
there is a positive probability of requesting any number of grants. The
third part of the assumption, finally, disciplines the joint distribution of
F rcmt and the vector ~cmt including the values of i for all of the city’s
potential grants. The final assumption just states that the city’s shadow
cost of funds varies at the city-time level, but not across ministries, con-
sistently with a city’s budget constraint.
This assumption is useful to guarantee that the city will make the first
N grant requests (with highest i values) iff, for the N -th grant request
iN , it is true that:
F rcmt ≤ η1lcmt + η2(log iN − log λc) + η3γct −XcβFc (t)−XmβFm(t)− dFcmt − F (N)
which in turn tells us that:
Pr(N ≥ n|·) =
∫
HF
(
η1lcmt+η2(log in−log λc)+η3γct
−XcβFc (t)−XmβFm(t)−dFcmt−F (n)
)
dHin
(
in
λc
)
=Mn
(
η1lcmt + η3γct −Xcβc(t)−Xmβm(t)− dFcmt − F (n)
)
so that, to estimate the extensive margin of grant requests, all that is
needed to be done is to estimate separate binary choice models for the
probability that grant requests exceed n.9 Once again, if we normalize
η3 = −1,10 the coefficient η1 can be estimated as in proposition 3, and
marginal effects of lcmt can be estimated as suggested in proposition
4. These results are, in turn, sufficient to compute counterfactuals as
described below.
9Note that if the function Mn was independent of n, this would be the usual
ordered choice model. Given, however, that the city’s value function depends on in -
so that the city chooses to request potential grants that it finds most valuable -, the
distribution of the relevant shock changes with n.
10In expected value, the constraint on minimum contributions has a negative ef-
fect over the city’s value function. As usual, in discrete choice problems, either a
variance normalization or a coefficient normalization is necessary. Here, a coefficient
normalization is more convenient.
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4.4 Results
Table 4.1 presents results on the estimated parameters of the model,
assuming that log u(gi) = ωU log gi. The model estimates an almost
linear objective function for the national government, with ωU = 0.966.
Given this, by itself, can lead to large differences in resources approved for
connected cities, the estimates of κ˜ suggest that the extra welfare weight
ministries put on connected cities is of 1.7%. Taking log v(gi) = ωV log gi,
I obtain that in contrast to the ministry’s objective function, the city’s
objective function is considerably more concave, with ωV = 0.413.
Given the point estimates, it is immediate to do the welfare exer-
cise applying the formula from the simplified model with the estimated
parameters. Given that ministries spend 14.3% of their resources on
connected cities, that formula implies that if connections are the only
distortion in the ministerial allocation decision, the welfare losses from
connections are of 1−κ˜
κ˜
R = 0.24% of each ministry’s budget, or 1.7% of
the resources sent to connected cities.
4.4.1 Extensions
Unobservable components anticipated by the city: A concern
about the basic results above is that they might be capturing endogenous
choices of gi, g
m
i . In particular, there might be omitted request specific
variables that increase the probability of approval and the requested pro-
ject size gi. If this was the case, the model would tend to overestimate
ωU , and the high estimated ωU might lead to low estimated κ˜. This could
be driving the small estimates for welfare effects of connections.
This alternative could be formalized in the structural model with a
slight change in assumption 1 as follows:
Assumption 3 (i) log λm = Xmβ
λm
m (t)
(ii) log θKi = Xmβ
θ
m(t) +Xcβ
θ
c (t) + dcmT + θ
r
Ki
Under this assumption, identification of the structural model becomes
considerably harder: first of all, self-selection into grant requests changes
the observed expectation of approvals as in typical sample selection mod-
els. To deal with this, it would be necessary to have an excluded vari-
able affecting self-selection into grant requests without affecting grant
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approvals.11 Second of all, gi, g
m
i become endogenous, so that it would
also be necessary to observe instruments for both these variables that
are independent of θrKi, θUi. While the rule on minimum matching shares
could serve as one instrument, it would still be necessary to observe a
second instrument. Finally, it would be necessary to deal with the fact
that the final model is a panel binary choice model with sample selection
- implying the need to deal with the fixed effects dcmT and fixed effects in
the sample selection equation, and the need to estimate a double index
model for approvals.
Even with propositions on identification of such a model, it is infeas-
ible to credibly identify such a model in this applied context. What is
possible to do, though, is to test assumption 3 relative to assumption 1.
To see this, say that we select the sample with gi ≤ g¯ (or gi ≥ g¯). Say
that then, I estimate the structural model under assumption 1. Under
assumption 1, this amounts to random selection, based only on i, observ-
ables, γ and mistakes. This in turn implies that the estimated structural
coefficients would not change under assumption 1. Under assumption 3,
on the other hand, this amounts to selection on unobservables, biasing
the estimated coefficients. Hence, one test of assumption 1 relative to
assumption 3 is to estimate the original structural model on subsamples
selected on the basis of gi (and the same logic applies to selection based
on gmi ).
Table 4.2 provides the results from this exercise, looking at samples
below and above the median gi, g
m
i and
gmi
gi
. In fact, results are stable
across samples: the government’s objective function is estimated to have
a coefficient ωU of at most 0.983 and at least 0.964. Similarly, the minis-
terial extra weight on connected cities is estimated to be of at most 3.6%
and at least 1.1%. The implicit welfare loss of connections are estimated
to be between 0.15 to 0.49% of the average ministry’s budget. I interpret
this evidence as suggesting that selection based on variables relating to
grant requests do not bias the estimation of the approval equation.
Heterogeneity and scale effects in ministerial utility func-
tions: A second concern with the basic estimates is that results might
be driven by heterogeneity in scale effects. In particular, the estimates
11Typical choices would be here some policy moving the fixed costs of requests,
which are unavailable in this context, or usage of connections at time of request vs.
at time of approval, which have a correlation of 0.87, limiting the power to use this
to identify the model.
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use variation in gi, g
m
i coming from all cities – irrespectively of city size,
income, or connections. If small and large cities face similar marginal ef-
fects of gi, g
m
i over their probability of approval, this would be captured
by the model as a close to linear u(gi) function. This might not neces-
sarily be the case, given that it might take larger project sizes in larger
cities (or poorer cities) for marginal product of gi over u(gi) to in fact
decrease significantly.
To take this into account, I allow, first of all, for heterogeneous return
log u(gi) = (ωU0 +ω
Pop
U0 log pop+ω
Inc
U0 log inc) log gi, allowing for the mar-
ginal returns of gi to depend on a city’s population and income. Secondly,
I allow for scale effects by specifying u(gi) = ωU0 log gi + ωU1(log gi)
2.
With this, if ωU0 > 1 and ωU1 < 0, we guarantee that the govern-
ment’s payoff function u is initially convex and then concave in gi. Fi-
nally, I estimate a third specification where I allow for both scale and
heterogeneous returns, according to log u(gi) = (ωU0 + ω
Pop
U0 log pop +
ωIncU0 log inc) log gi + ωU1(log gi)
2.
The results are presented in table 4.3. I present the coefficients ωU ,
κ, κ˜, the average ωU(gi) evaluated at the gi requested in the data, and
the estimated welfare loss of connections using the expression from the
full information model. In all three columns, the average ωU(gi) barely
changes and shows that cities face, on the margin, a ministerial objective
function that is very close to linear.
Not surprisingly, the coefficients κ, κ˜ indicate that connected cities get
an extra welfare weight of between 1.7%− 1.9%. As a consequence, the
welfare loss of connections when this is the only distortion is of 0.23%−
0.27% of the ministry’s budget.
4.5 Conclusion
The political connectedness of regions distort the allocation of public
funds across in many countries. That being said, often there are few
measures of welfare received by different regions of a country to evaluate
directly these welfare losses. This chapter discusses how to find lower
bounds on the welfare costs of these distortions. While in some contexts,
this lower bound could be enough to guarantee that the welfare costs
of connections are high, in the context of Brazil between 2009-16, we
cannot rule out the possibility that the welfare costs of connections-based
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allocations are small, either because of constant/increasing returns to
grant size and small concerns for inequality across regions.
The welfare measurement here also suggests that putting in place
non-partisan ministries might not be an cost effective policy tool at pre-
venting partisanship in the allocation of funds: such a non-partisan min-
istry would not lose much from becoming partisan. Moreover, given that
political parties are often in charge of deciding on the allocation of public
funds in Brazil as part of an effort of coalition formation at the national
level, non-partisan ministries could create substantial costs in terms of
gridlock and government.
Future research further highlighting upper bounds on the welfare costs
of connections-based allocations would be useful for this research agenda.
Intuitively, this would require evidence that partisan ministers allocate
funds well on certain margins. It is unclear, though, whether this can be
done without further welfare measures. Relatedly, research highlighting
the benefits of ministerial flexibility might be useful to understand the
costs of policies aimed at reducing the role for political connections in
the allocation of public funds.
Tables
Table 4.1: Structural model: Basic specification
Parameter (1)
ωU 0.966
(0.011)
κ 0.017
(0.011)
1−κ˜
κ
R -0.24%
Sample All
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Table 4.3: Structural model: heterogeneity and scale effects
Parameter (1) (2) (3)
ωU0 0.965 1.047 1.184
(0.011) (0.042) (0.104)
ωU0 ∗ log(pop) 0.008 0.013
(0.005) (0.005)
ωU0 ∗ log(inc) -0.008 -0.012
(0.007) (0.009)
ωU1 -0.003 -0.008
(0.001) (0.004)
()
()
()
κ 0.018 0.019 0.017
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Avg. ωU 0.965 0.966 0.967
κ˜ 1.018 1.019 1.017
Welfare loss 0.25% 0.27% 0.23%
Sample All All All
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Figures
Figure 4.1: When are the welfare costs of political connections
large/small: graphical intuition
Large bias, concave ministerial returns
gi
Mg.utility
Mg cost of request
Mg. benefit, benchmark planner
Ministry’s mg. benefit, unconnected city
Ministry’s mg. benefit, connected city
Losses for unconnected
Gains for connected
Small bias, almost linear ministerial returns
gi
Mg. utility
Mg. Cost of request
Mg. Benefit, benchmark planner
Ministry’s mg. benefit, unconnected city
Ministry’s mg. benefit, connected city
Losses for unconnected
Gains for connected
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5. Ideology, governing
coalitions, and checks and
balances in the Brazilian
national government
5.1 Introduction
In most democracies, institutions often create checks and balances, to en-
sure that policy making reflects the preferences of many elected officials,
and not just the wills of the executive. Yet, in many democracies, the
executive can govern not only by making policy concessions, but also by
forming coalitions only with those with similar ideologies, or with those
who are easy to buy with cabinet appointments, pork, and particularistic
benefits. In these cases, it is not clear whether checks and balances are
effective at restricting the executive.
With this in mind, to which extent does the executive form coalitions
including only ideologically close legislators, or legislators whose votes
are easy to buy? Secondly, to which extent do congressmen manage to
check the executive’s will, by approving bills the legislature likes but the
executive dislikes?
This chapter answers this question by, first of all, building a model
of coalition formation where the executive forms a governing coalition to
influence legislators’ votes in congress. The model provides a framework
to understand how votes in congress depend on congressmen’s ideologies,
intensity of policy concerns, and on a “pressure” term, quantifying the
extent to which the executive manages to get legislators in the govern-
ment coalition to vote more favourably in exchange for particularistic
benefits. I take this framework to data, where I observe congressmen
107
voting both in periods when they are in the government coalition, and
when they are in the opposition. Given estimates fitting only data on
votes in Congress conditional on membership in the governing coalition,
then, the model provides testable implications for (i) factors leading the
executive to exert more or less pressure on legislators, (ii) the role of
ideological proximity and “ease to buy” of a legislator in determining
which legislators get included in the coalition, and (iii) allows for coun-
terfactuals to understand how much the executive is effective at changing
votes in the legislature.
More precisely, I study a model where an executive offers to a group
of legislators - the coalition - some particularistic transfer such as cabinet
appointments, pork, election campaigning infrastructure, among others.
In exchange for this, the legislators in the coalition, who also care about
ideological payoffs coming from a large number of bills to be approved,
need to agree to vote more favourably to the executive.
The model provides, first of all, a voting equation that is a simple
extension of usual empirical models of ideological voting (see below for
a review). It incorporates the usual ideological motivations to vote for
each bill, plus a “pressure” term that the executive imposes on coalition
members to guarantee they vote in a more aligned way. As expected, the
model predicts that when legislators in the coalition (i) get more aligned
ideologically with the president, (ii) have less intense policy preferences,
(iii) are easier to buy, votes get closer to the president’s ideal.
The first main challenge in taking this to data is that it is hard to
distinguish between the causal effect of being in the coalition - that is,
the effect of the executive exerting pressure on a legislator in the coali-
tion to vote in a given way - from self-selection into the coalition - due
to permanent ideological differences between coalition and opposition le-
gislators. To deal with this, this chapter looks at the Brazilian setting,
where there are more than 20 parties in Congress throughout the sample
period, many of which start in the opposition and switch to spend a few
years in the government coalition, and vice versa. With this in hands, by
looking at the set of congressmen in the opposition in a given moment, I
can identify both (i) unobservable ideological differences across legislators
on any D dimensional ideological space, by detecting which legislators
tend to vote together and which ones tend to vote differently, and simil-
arly (ii) how these ideological differences interact with bill characteristics,
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which determine which subgroups of legislators tend to oppose the bill
and which ones tend to approve the bill. With these estimates in hands,
then, I can identify the effect of being in the government coalition by
looking at how a legislator votes differently on a given bill when he is
inside and outside the coalition, holding fixed his ideological profile.
The key identifying assumption behind this is that (i) legislators’
ideologies are stable over time, and (ii) the coalition is not changing
endogenously because of unobserved changes in the expected bills to be
voted on. On the first assumption, at least at the party level, even
as new legislators come up, the average ideologies of political parties
as measured by traditional roll call voting methods change very little
over the sample period. This lends credibility to the first assumption.
Moreover, a key advantage of the structural voting model is that it allows
for the identification of (i) many unobservable dimensions of ideology and
(ii) together with it, many observable policy differences, and this allows
for me to control for many unobservable factors that legislators and the
executive might be anticipating when deciding to form a coalition.
The second main challenge in taking this to data involves the fact
that traditional models of roll call voting in the legislature have many
parameters to be estimated: with L legislators voting on B bills and D
ideology dimensions, the model needs to estimate DL ideology paramet-
ers, and B(D + 1) bill characteristics, relying on both large B and large
L for asymptotic properties. The empirical model suggested here fur-
ther adds B government pressure parameters interacted with observable
characteristics (a legislator being in the coalition) to be estimated, re-
quiring a total of DL+B(D+2) parameters to be estimated. The paper
then develops an EM algorithm that allows for quick convergence to local
maxima of the likelihood function (see Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977)
for the general proof of properties of the EM algorithm; Imai, Lo and
Olmstead (2015) use an application of this algorithm to obtain Bayesian
estimates of ideology; I instead focus on classical maximum likelihood).
I then apply this model to data on the Brazilian Chamber of Depu-
ties. This context is one where the question above is particularly relevant:
there are political parties (such as PMDB, PP and PSB) that have been
in coalitions lead by both relatively more left-wing and more right-wing
governments, raising doubts about how much they care about ideological
concerns. There is also a common concern that popular presidents can
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enact policies with few checks and balances: they can propose “provi-
sional laws” (“Medidas Proviso´rias”) that comes into effect for a short
time span up until the legislature holds a vote, potentially changing the
status quo before a vote. Throughout my sample period (2008-16), 569
bills were proposed in total, and 252 of them were provisional laws by
the executive that came into effect before a vote by the legislature.
The results from the structural model with a 2-dimensional ideology
space model in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies show that the ideology
estimates from the model correlate strongly with the measure of left-
right wing ideology based on surveys by Power and Zucco (2011) asking
legislators about their policy position. Surprisingly, this is captured not
by the dimension of ideology that most explains the voting data, but
only by the second dimension of ideology. This suggests the model is
able to capture well not only the determinants of voting we would expect
to observe from other sources, but also other less obvious determinants
of congressional votes.
The model also suggests that legislators face some pressure from
the executive to vote differently from their ideology. Legislators faced
most pressure in the beginning of my sample (2008-10): for half of the
bills voted during this period, the government’s pressure changed more
than 20% of the votes from legislators in the government coalition. The
amount of pressure fades over the years, and in 2015-16, in 90% of the
bills, the pressure exerted by the government changed less than 10% of
the votes from the coalition members.
Given the voting model, I then show that the theoretical implications
of the theory of coalition formation are largely seen in the data. I start
by running a linearised version of the first order condition for the execut-
ive, determining which bills should face more pressure for approval and
rejection. The first order condition, determining pressure as a function of
(i) a proxy of the president’s ideology, (ii) the number of favourable votes
to the bill by the opposition, and (iii) the sensitivity of the coalition to
pressure (as identified by the voting model), explains around 20% of the
variation of government pressure in the data.
The model also predicts that when forming a coalition, the presid-
ent likes to have parties that are ideologically similar. That being said,
when the president includes in the coalition parties that are ideologically
far away, the president prefers legislators that are sensitive to pressure
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so that he can change their votes. When the president includes in the
coalition parties that are ideologically close-by, the president prefers le-
gislators that are insensitive to pressure, since this reduces chance dis-
agreements with the president.
These implications are largely met by the data. In fact, up until
May 2016, PT was in the presidency, and the ideology estimates from
the model suggest there are few parties that are ideologically similar to
them. As a consequence, they formed a coalition with parties that were
close to them in the first dimension of ideology, but were far away in the
second dimension of ideology. Consistently with the theory, the estim-
ated sensitivity to pressure among coalition members is higher than the
sensitivity to pressure among the opposition legislators. After May 2016,
PMDB gets to the presidency, and the ideology estimates suggest there
are many parties that are ideologically similar to them. As a consequence,
they form a coalition with political parties that are more similar to them
on both dimensions. Consistently with the model, during this period,
the sensitivity to pressure of coalition members is smaller than the sens-
itivity to pressure of opposition members. This overall pattern is also
consistent with the fact that we observe more pressure on legislators in
the early years of the sample, and less pressure on legislators in the later
years.
Finally, the data suggests that this pattern of coalition formation
and pressure over legislators have strong implications for policy. Before
May 2016, 12.8% of the bills disliked by the executive were not approved
due to pressure. Similarly, 10.8% of the bills liked by the executive
became approved as a consequence of pressure. While the number of
bills in my sample after May 2016 is small, in this period, there are no
detectable bills that the executive disliked, and that they stopped from
being approved by applying pressure on coalition members. Similarly,
10.4% of the bills liked by the executive were approved as a consequence
of executive pressure on coalition members.
This suggests that when the executive has legislators who are ideo-
logically close to them, they can form coalitions with like-minded legis-
lators, approving policies without pressuring them to switch their votes.
When the executive has to form a coalition with ideologically distant le-
gislators, on the other hand, they rely on legislators that are sensitive to
pressure, and pressure them to switch their votes on a significant number
111
of bills. Despite this, the legislature still manages to check the execut-
ive a substantial number of times: before May 2016, even with pressure,
66.7% of the bills disliked by the executive were still approved. After
May 2016, 81.6% of the bills disliked by the executive were approved.
This chapter contributes to a large literature on coalition formation
in governments. Merlo (1997) and Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003)
estimate models of legislative bargaining to understand determinants bar-
gaining power of political parties, of the time until government formation,
and the size/duration of government coalitions. Adachi and Watanabe
(2008) estimate a model of coalition formation in Japan, with implica-
tions for parties’ bargaining power and the value of pork intensive vs.
“prestige” intensive cabinet positions. More recently, a set of papers also
moved to estimate models of the composition of governing coalitions:
Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) discuss the implications of mayoral vs.
legislators’ gender. Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015) discuss the ethnic
representativity of governing coalitions in Africa, when facing threats of
coups and rebellions. This chapter, instead, focuses on the ideological
composition of coalitions, an important feature in most models of legis-
lative bargaining and coalition formation. This chapter further provides
implications of the process of coalition formation for policy making, in
particular, for the outcomes of votes in the legislature.
Methodologically, this chapter also relates to a large literature on es-
timation of ideology from roll call votes in legislatures (see Poole and
Rosenthal (1985), (1991), Clinton, Jackman and River (2004), Imai, Lo,
Olmstead (2016). This chapter is closest to the literature on party pres-
sure (see Krehbiel (1993), Snyder and Groseclose (2000), Jenkins (2000),
McCarthy, Poole and Rosenthal (2001), Snyder and Groseclose (2001),
Nokken and Poole (2004)), and to the literature documenting the dif-
ficulty of capturing ideology from roll call votes in contexts with coali-
tion governments (see Zucco (2009), (2013), Spirling and McLean (2007),
Power and Zucco (2012), Hix and Noury (2016)). Relative to this liter-
ature, this chapter provides methods to separate between ideology and
coalition effects - allowing me to test theories of coalition formation and
to analyse counterfactuals.
Dewan and Spirling (2011) provide a theory for government vs. op-
position differences in voting in Westminster style politics, and Cox and
McCubbins (2005) provides a theory for differences between majority vs.
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minority party in the U.S. Congress. This chapter complements this lit-
erature understanding differences between government and opposition by
focusing on legislators switching from government to opposition within
and across a given presidential term. It then argues that a model where
the executive forms a coalition in the legislature to govern is helpful to un-
derstand the data, in particular to understand which parties/legislators
join the government coalition, and the implications of this for roll call
votes.
The next section shows the model of coalition formation, character-
ising voting, the ideological composition of the coalition, and comparative
statics. The third section discusses the data used. The fourth section
discusses how to identify and estimate the roll call voting model. The
fifth section presents (i) reduced form results on the importance of the
government coalition for votes, (ii) describes the estimates of the struc-
tural voting model, (iii) uses these estimates to test whether the shape
of coalitions is consistent with the theory’s prediction and to compute
counterfactual voting outcomes without the coalition. The last section
concludes.
5.2 Model
5.2.1 Set-up
A set of legislators l = 1, ..., L vote over a many bills b - taken here
to be a continuum of bills, for convenience. Each legislator has ideology
x˜l ∈ RD, and can vote “yea” or “nay” on each bill. If the bill is approved,
it delivers a payoff associated with position xby (for “yea”), while if the bill
is rejected, it delivers a payoff associated with position xbn (for “nay”).
Legislators care about policy and about particularistic benefits given
by the executive tl - such as cabinet positions, pork, governmental help
with elections and campaign finance, and other benefits which are po-
tentially specific to legislator l. For simplicity, I assume that legislators
have quasi-linear payoffs in the particularistic benefits tl, so that given a
net policy payoff u˜bly − u˜bln in favour of “yea”, legislators’ final payoffs
are given by tl+
∫
(2vlb−1)(u˜bly− u˜bln)db, where vlb = 1 indicates a “yea”
vote, and vlb = −1 indicates a “nay” vote.1 I assume legislators’ payoff
1This specification for vlb simplifies the exposition of the empirical implementation
of the model.
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from “yea” is given by u˜bly = ubly + ˜bly = −αl(xby − x˜l)T (xby − x˜l) + ˜bly,
where αl stands for how much legislator l cares about policy vis-a-vis
particularistic benefits. The payoff from “nay” is analogous to this. I
let ˜bly − ˜bln = ab + bl, where ab stands for overall pressures for all le-
gislators to vote in favour of a bill - such as pressure from lobbies in
favour of that bill, or overall agreement across legislators. I’ll assume lb
is statistically independent across l, b, and conditional on b, lb ∼ Φ(0, 1)
and is statistically independent across l.
It is useful to re-express the legislators’ net payoff from a “yea” as:
u˜bl = u˜bly − u˜bln = ab + cTb xl + bl
where xl = αl[1, x˜l], and the different components of cb are different
combinations of xbly, xbln. As usual, ab can be interpreted as an overall
favourability of the bill for all legislators. The terms cb can be interpreted
as whether the bill shifts legislation to the “right” or to the “left” (which
I’ll call the bill’s polarization): if cb > 0, only legislators with xl > 0
will become more propense to vote for it, if cb < 0, only legislators with
xl < 0 will become more propense to vote for it.
The president anticipates this, and chooses (i) which legislators to
include in the government’s coalition, (ii) how much tl to offer them,
and (iii) what votes vlb to demand from each legislator. The president
dislikes higher levels of tl - for instance, because the president would
like to appoint cabinet positions, or wouldn’t like to use public funds
for pork as much as legislators want - and has quasi-linear preferences
in tl. The president also cares about the overall support for the bill in
the government coalition V GOVb =
∑
l∈C(2vlb−1) and for the overall sup-
port for the bill in the opposition V OPPb =
∑
l /∈C(2vlb − 1), according to
P (V GOVb , V
OPP
b , u
P
b + bP ), where u
P
b + bp indexes the president’s pref-
erences for the bill.2 I’ll assume that P (V GOVb , V
OPP
b , u) is increasing in
V GOVb when u > 0, decreasing in V
GOV
b when u < 0. I will also assume
that ∂
2P (Vb,u)
∂V GOVb ∂u
≥ 0.
This encompasses a broad range of possible preferences for the pres-
ident: it allows for a president who wants to only approve or reject some
bills if Pb = u
P
b + bP once V
GOV
b + V
OPP
b > T , and Pb = 0 otherwise.
2The only restriction this imposes is that the president’s payoffs from bills varies
according to a single bill-specific index, and this index in turn depends on the multiple
dimensions of the president’s ideology.
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It also allows for the possibility of a president who tries to buy super-
majorities for a bill as a way of preventing the opposition from trying
to buy back some legislators after the coalition formation process, as in
Snyder and Groseclose (1996). It is important to take such factors into
account in the Brazilian context, given the prevalence of supermajority
coalitions in Congress. For this, I allow the returns to V GOVb to take a
flexible functional form.
It is also potentially important to allow for V GOVb not to be perfectly
substitutable for V OPPb . By doing so, I allow for a broad range of po-
tentially plausible scenarios: for instance, votes in the opposition might
bring more resources to buy back legislators from the government co-
alition in a Snyder and Groseclose (1996) framework, and it would be
reasonable to expect then that V OPPb doesn’t substitute V
GOV
b perfectly.
I can also allow for a president who might care for support for a bill as
a way of signalling, for instance, that it can effectively pressure and in-
fluence legislators in the coalition. In such cases, it is natural to assume
that V OPPb - insensitive to pressure inside the coalition - will not contain
the same information as V GOVb - sensitive to pressure inside the coalition
-, and consequently, V GOVb , V
OPP
b won’t be perfect substitutes.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The president observes x˜l for each legislator, and chooses (i) which
legislators to form a coalition with, (ii) tl and (iii) which votes vlb
to demand from each legislator (conditional on realized preferences
and bills).
2. Legislators accept/reject to be included in the government coalition
3. Legislators choose how to vote on each bill after lb, xby and xbn are
realized.
4. Benefits tl get delivered to each legislator
I assume that the president has commitment to deliver tl according to
rules pre-specified in the first period of the game. While this assumption
might be strong, it stands as a simplification of a model where presidents
and legislators interact repeatedly, and where presidents either deliver
benefits over time, or where presidents’ political parties want to establish
a reputation of keeping promises with future coalition partners.
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Discussion of assumptions
Three assumptions are worth discussing. First, the solution to the model
is the same irrespectively of whether we assume lb to be privately ob-
served by legislators or publicly observed by everyone. In particular, I’ll
show that the solution to the relaxed problem ignoring incentive con-
straints for legislators - and only including participation constraints by
legislators - can be implemented in an incentive compatible way, even
without communication on lb, as long as the number of legislators is
large enough for the uncertainty on the exact realizations of lb to be
ignored.
Secondly, the model assumes that bill characteristics (in particular,
xby, xbn) are exogenous to the president and to the government coalition.
In the model, this stands for a process where in each of a continuum
of days, shocks happen allowing a given legislator (or the president) to
bring a bill to the floor, and shocks to the proposer’s perception of what
will be approved that day drive the bill offered (such as signals about
the values of lb for all legislators, and consequently shocks about which
legislators are pivotal). For the empirical estimation of the model, that
won’t be a big issue, since the method will control for bill effects. For
policy counterfactuals, the results should be interpreted as the effect of
the government coalition over which bills are approved/rejected, holding
fixed the set of bills proposed.
A third assumption in the model is that legislators vote sincerely ac-
cording to their policy payoffs, while the president explicitly cares about
the bill passing. Given that legislators have a binary choice in the model,
pivotality considerations in this model do not change their vote. That
being said, governments might demand more or concede more to legis-
lators they expect to be pivotal. This, instead, is partially captured by
variation in αl - the legislator’s care for policy payoffs.
5.2.2 Voting within a coalition
Given a government coalition, what are the transfers tl and votes vlb?
To understand this, I start by solving the following relaxed problem,
where the president designs tl and vote rules to maximize his total payoff,
subject to a participation constraint by the members of the coalition.
Note that, in particular, this ignores incentive constraints for legislators
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to vote according to the voting rule vlb suggested by the government.
Let C be the set of legislators in a given coalition. This problem can be
written as the choice of votes for legislators in the coalition to solve:
max
∫
P (V GOVb , V
OPP
b , u
P
b + bP )db−
∑
l∈C
tl
s.t. tl +
∫
(2vlb − 1)[ab + cTb xl + lb]db ≥
max
zb∈{−1,1}
∫
(2zb − 1)[ab + cTb xl + lb]db ∀ l ∈ C∑
l∈C
(2vlb − 1) = V GOVb ∀ b
where the right hand side of the constraint (in the last line in the expres-
sion above) represents the outside option of legislators: to not get any
transfers from the government, and vote according to their ideology.
In this problem, as usual, the constraints bind, yielding an expression
for the transfers to each legislator. We can use this to replace for tl in
the president’s objective function. This allows the president to choose
votes vlb to maximize:
max
∫
P (V GOVb , V
OPP
b , u
P
b + bP )db
+
∑
l
∫
2(vlb − v∗lb)[ab + cTb xl + lb]db
s.t.
∑
l∈C
(2vlb − 1) = V GOVb ∀ b
where v∗lb is the legislator’s l optimal vote for bill b outside the coalition.
The problem is then separable across bills. Letting λb be the Lagrange
multiplier on the constraint, we obtain that the optimal vote demand vlb
by the president is given by:
ab + cbxl + lb + λb ≥ 0↔ vlb = 1
That is: whenever the president wants to increase the number of votes
for a bill, it requires congressmen to vote according to their preferences
plus a uniform bill level pressure λb > 0. Similarly, when the president
wants to reject a bill, it imposes a uniform bill level negative pressure
λb < 0.
A few properties of this pressure coefficient are immediate to verify:
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λb > 0 only when the legislature would reject the bill if legislators were
to vote only according to their ideology. Similarly, λb < 0 only when the
legislature would approve the bill if legislators were to vote only according
to their ideology.
Finally, if the president’s choice of V GOVb is interior, the president
chooses the number of votes V GOVb to solve the following FOC:
PV G(V
GOV
b , V
OPP
b , u
P
b + bP ) = λb (5.1)
where PV G stands for the derivative of P with respect to V
GOV
b . That is:
we can interpret λb as the marginal cost of demanding an extra vote Vb
from legislators in the government coalition. The president then equates
λb to his marginal benefit of an extra vote in the bill b.
While this characterizes the solution to the relaxed problem, this
ignores incentive constraints for the legislators to vote according to the
demands of the executive. The next proposition, then, indicates that this
can be implemented in an incentive compatible way for legislators:
Proposition 1 Legislators vote in favour of the bill iff:
ab + cbxl + λb1(l ∈ C) + lb ≥ 0
and otherwise vote against the bill. Equation 5.1 determines the number
of votes for a given bill, and as a function of votes, when the number of
legislators grows large, λb is determined implicitly by
LExl [Φ(ab + c
T
b xl + λb)] = Vb
As the number of legislators grows large, λb is a deterministic function of
ab, cb, xl, u
P
b + bP , C (crucially, it doesn’t depend on legislator level shocks
lb).
Finally, the government can implement this voting rule in an incentive
compatible way by promising transfers tl that satisfy the participation
constraint if and only if legislators have:∫
vlbλbdb ≥ Tl
and promising zero transfers if legislators’ votes don’t satisfy the con-
straint above, where Tl is a number on the interval (−
∫ |λb|db, ∫ |λb|db).
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This proposition is useful for a number of purposes: first, it shows that
the relaxed problem’s solution indeed satisfies incentive constraints: this
is broadly consistent with the ideas in Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007),
who show that by linking decisions across independent problems (here,
different bills), principals get to extract truthful reports about private
information (lb) from the agents (the legislators). Here, the mechanism
takes a particularly simple form: let legislators vote, but promise to give
them the benefits of being in government only if they vote sufficiently
often in the direction the president wants them to vote, and specially so
in more important bills for the president (with higher levels of pressure
λb).
Secondly, the proposition characterises the voting patterns by legis-
lators in a way that will be useful for empirical implementation: votes
depend on ideologies xl, bill characteristics ab, cb, and a government pres-
sure term λb that is exogenous to residuals in a voting equation as long
as coalitions are exogenous to these residuals. Crucially, this specifies a
voting model that is a simple extension of voting models in the literature
(such as Poole and Rosenthal (1985),(1991), Clinton, Jackman and River
(2004), Imai, Lo, Olmstead (2016)): it includes the usual ideology terms,
and an extra term for government pressure. This empirical model is sim-
ilar to Snyder and Groseclose (2000)’s model of uniform party pressure
(across legislators), with the differences that in the current setting, (i) it
is reasonable to assume one-sided pressure from the government coalition,
without equivalent countervailing pressures from the opposition, and (ii)
that we might have pressure also for bills that are sure to pass, or sure
not to pass. Consequently, the source of variation identifying this model
is different from Snyder and Groseclose (2000)’s source of variation.
The next result summarises comparative statics results about which
bills get approved and rejected. For this, parametrise legislators’ prefer-
ences as:
u˜bl = κ[c
T
b xl + ab + lb] +
ψ
1− ψ [u
P
b + bP ]
That is, I’m first parametrizing legislators’ preferences as κ[cTb xl+ab+lb]
so that κ changes the intensity of legislators’ preferences. Then, I’m
expressing legislators preferences as a convex combination of these re-
parametrised legislator’s preferences and the president’s preferences (nor-
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malized by 1
1−ψ ). For ψ → 0, we converge to the original legislator’s
preferences, and for ψ → 1, the legislator’s preferences become the pres-
ident’s preferences. I’ll say that the preferences of the coalition move
in the direction of the president’s preferences if ψ increases. I’ll say le-
gislator’s preferences become less important when κ decreases. I’ll say
the president likes a bill if uPb + bP > 0, and say he dislikes the bill
otherwise. Finally, I’ll let the president’s preferences be parametrized by
ψP [u
P
b + bP ], and I’ll say that the president’s preferences become more
important when ψP rises. With this in hands, we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 2 Assume the optimal V GOVb is interior. If the president
likes the bill (dislikes the bill), the number of votes V GOVb on a bill in-
creases (decreases) when
• The preferences of the coalition move in the direction of the pres-
ident (ψ increases)
• The president’s preferences become more important (ψP increases)
• If the legislator’s preferences become less important (κ falls)
This result is intuitive. If either the legislator’s preferences become less
important, or they become more aligned with those of the president, the
direct loss faced by the legislator when he is pressured to vote according
to the president’s preferences is smaller, and the president finds it less
costly to include the legislator into the coalition while demanding the
legislator to vote together with the president.
This proposition highlights how the shape of the coalition might have
strong implications for whether the executive enacts policies represent-
ing the preferences of many elected officials. The president might end
up simply approving his preferred policies by either forming a coalition
with legislators with very similar interests and excluding legislators who
diverge from him. Similarly, the president might end up simply approv-
ing his preferred policies by electing legislators that have small κ, whose
votes are “easier to buy”.
Once this is done, we can move to analysing who gets into the coali-
tion.
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5.2.3 Coalition formation
We start this section by formally characterizing the problem of which
legislators to include in a government coalition, and useful properties
of the choice of coalition formation for the empirical exercise. We then
move to analyse a particular case of the model, to understand the trade-
offs involved in coalition formation. The next proposition formalizes the
government’s coalition formation problem:
Proposition 3 The decision to include legislator l in the coalition de-
pends on xl = αl[1, x˜l], on xP , the distribution of xl, and the distribution
of parameters across bills (in particular, it doesn’t depend on particular
realizations of lb).
If V GOVb , V
OPP
b are perfect substitutes for the president, the marginal
effect over the president’s payoff from replacing a legislator with ideology
xl in the coalition by one with ideology xl + νω (with ν → 0) is:∫
2(vlb − v∗lb)cbωdb
where vlb is the legislator’s vote under optimal government pressure, v
∗
lb
is the legislator’s vote outside the government coalition.
The proposition characterizes a few important issues: first of all, the co-
alition is built to create support for many bills simultaneously, as high-
lighted in the previous proposition. As a consequence of this, the coalition
doesn’t depend on bill specific draws of shocks lb, Pb, but instead, only
on the legislator’s ideology, on xP , and on the distribution of ab, a
P
b , cb.
As a consequence, for the empirical implementation of proposition 1, the
model would suggest that conditionally on xl and ab, cb, we can treat
the presence of a legislator in the coalition as exogenous to bl - see the
identification section for more on the plausibility of this.
The second result in the proposition characterises a comparative static
result: namely, would the president like to replace a coalition member
with a given ideology by one with a different ideology? The answer to
this question depends on something akin to a “correlation” between vote
differences inside and outside the coalition, and cb. Intuitively, consider
a one dimensional policy case: say that the president is more likely to
press for approval when cb > 0 (so that vlb − v∗lb > 0 in this case), and
to press for rejection when cb < 0. If this is the case, (vlb − v∗lb)cb > 0,
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and the president gains by replacing legislators xl with legislators xl+νω
when ω > 0, since these legislators will be less likely to be pressured to
change their vote in response to entering the government coalition, and
hence, they would be cheaper to incorporate into the coalition.
To clarify the implications of this for the process of coalition form-
ation and for the policies approved and rejected, we move to analyse a
particular example of the model above.
5.2.4 Example
In this section, I highlight the implications of the model with particu-
lar examples of the model above. Throughout, I’ll consider a case of
a president and legislators who face two types of bills: one type of bill
is the usual left-right type of bill - such as redistribution or abortion -,
where legislators have different ideologies. The second type of bill is a
bill where the president disagrees with all legislators - in the context I’m
analysing, this can be a bill decreasing the size of the budget for pork
projects, bills for pension reforms or bills for fiscal contractions. In other
contexts, these could also include bills increasing executive power and
reducing the legislature’s power, or an impeachment vote where most of
the legislature agrees on the impeachment. The president then needs to
decide whether to include legislators of given ideologies x˜l, or to include
legislators who care less about policy and whose votes are more easily
bought (with lower αl).
More formally, consider a 2-dimensional policy case where the pres-
ident has utility P (Vb, u) = u if Vb > T , and P (Vb, u) = 0 otherwise,
with uPb = [c
1
b , c
2
b ]
T [x1P , x
2
P ], with x
1
P , x
2
P > 0. That is, the president has
preferences similar to legislators, and is right wing in both ideology di-
mensions. There are two types of bills: a share q of the bills are of type 1
with c1b ∈ R, c2b = 0, while 1− q of the bills have type 2, with c1b = 0 and
c2b = 1. Both types of bills have ab = 0, so that on average the president
wants to approve both types of bills. For simplicity, I’ll assume Pb = 0.
With this, the president will choose for all bills type 2 either λb = 0, or
λb > 0 with Vb = T . For all bills type 1, the president either choose
λb = 0, and when it chooses λb 6= 0, we’ll have λb > 0 with Vb = T for
c1b > 0, and λb < 0 with Vb = T for c
1
b < 0.
Legislators, on the other hand, always have x˜2l = −1, and x˜1l taking
values on the real line - so that aside from the pressure of the coalition,
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legislators always want to reject bill type 2; and on bill type 1, legislators
have different ideologies.
I’ll say the legislator/president is right wing if x˜1l > 0 (or x
1
P > 0),
and that the legislator is left wing if the opposite is true. Finally, if
c1b > 0, right wing legislators gain from the bill and left wing legislators
lose from it, so I’ll say that in this case, the bill moves policy to the right.
Analogously, if c1b < 0, I’ll say the bill moves policy to the left.
With this in hands, we can ask whether holding fixed the size of
the coalition, whether the president prefers to include in the coalition
legislators with whom he agrees more or less (with higher or lower values
of x1l ). Similarly, we can check whether the president prefers to include
in the coalition legislators with lower or higher care for policy (lower or
higher αl). This becomes a simple application of the previous proposition
to this particular case. The following proposition analyses this.
Proposition 4 For all possible coalitions, the president always gains by
replacing a legislator with lower x˜1l with a legislator with higher x˜
1
l .
Holding fixed the ideology of the legislator at x˜1l > x¯(q), the president
gains by replacing a legislator with lower αl by one with higher αl.
Holding fixed the ideology of the legislator at x˜1l < x¯(q), the president
loses by replacing a legislator with lower αl by one with higher αl. x¯(q) >
0 and is decreasing in q.
This proposition shows, in this particular case, the trade-offs involved in
choosing who is part of the government coalition. Because the president
never pressures for rejection of a bill with c1b > 0, and never pressures
for approval of a bill with c1b < 0, right wing legislators (with x
1
l > 0)
are less likely to have their votes reversed by government pressure than
left wing legislators. As a consequence, right wing legislators have less to
lose from joining the coalition, and are cheaper to included in a coalition
by a right wing president.
The results are more subtle when it comes to the inclusion of more
vs. less policy motivated politicians (higher vs. lower αl). When the
legislator cares more about policy overall, he cares more both about bills
where there is agreement with the president (here, the right-left wing
margin), and about bills where there is disagreement with the president
(here, the second dimension of policy). Because of this, there is a cost
of including legislators who care about policy, related to pressuring them
to vote with the government on the bills where they disagree with the
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president (bills type 2 for all legislators, and bills type 1 for the left wing
legislators). As a consequence, a right wing president would prefer to
include left wing legislators in the coalition who care less about policy
than those who care more about policy.
For right wing legislators, on the other hand, caring more about policy
payoffs (higher αl) implies more disagreement with the president on bills
type 2, and less disagreement with the president on bills type 1 - due to
a lower number of cases where lb reverses the legislator’s preferences on
bills type 1. For legislators who are closer to the center (xl ∈ [0, x¯(q)]),
the rise in αl doesn’t fully prevent disagreements with the president in
bills type 1 (due to lb shocks), and increase disagreement on bills type 2.
Consequently, an increase in αl for these legislators is still costly for the
president. For sufficiently right wing legislators (xl > x¯(q)), an increase
in αl is more effective at preventing disagreements on bill type 1, and
consequently, including policy motivated extreme right legislators on a
right wing president’s government is valuable to the president.
This proposition, then, brings about the following conflict: if legis-
lators of different ideology have different degrees of policy motivation αl,
the president might need to choose between those that are ideologically
aligned and those that are “easy to buy” because they have low policy
motivation (low αl). That is:
Corollary 1 The president faces a trade off between including moderate
legislators aligned with him (x1l ∈ [0, x¯(q)]) who have high policy motiva-
tion (high αl) versus unaligned legislators (x
1
l < 0) who have low policy
motivation (low αl).
5.3 Context and data
I look at data on roll calls in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies between
January 2008 until December 2016 (53rd to 55th Congress). Each con-
gress has 513 deputies, in a period that includes the second term of
Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva’s presidency, the first term of Dilma Rousseff’s
government, the second term of Dilma Rousseff’s government until her
impeachment, and the first one year and 7 months of Michel Temer’s
government. I keep elected deputies who started their term within 4
months of the beginning of the congress, and eliminate from the sample
the vice-deputies (“suplentes”) replacing deputies after the beginning of
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the congressional term.3
I focus on five types of votes: “constitutional amendments” are votes
to add or replace legislation in the constitution. Its approval requires
two votes by the Chamber of Deputies and two votes by the senate, each
with a 3/5 supermajority. “Supplemental laws” (leis complementares)
are bills regulating specific policy matters allowed by the constitution,
requiring an absolute majority for its approval (that is, it requires a ‘yea’
vote by 257 deputies). “Ordinary laws” (leis ordina´rias) include votes
on typical legislation, requiring a simple majority for its approval (that
is, it requires a ‘yea’ vote by strictly more than 1/2 of the deputies who
show up for the vote). “Provisional laws” (medidas proviso´rias) are laws
enacted by the executive presumably under emergency situations. As
soon as the executive enacts these bills, they are valid for 60 days even
without a vote by the legislature (and potentially extended for further
60 days). The validity of these bills for longer time periods depends on
legislative approval by simple majority. Finally, a “transformation law”
(projeto de lei de conversa˜o) are bills changing provisional laws, also
requiring approval by a simple majority. Crucially, I eliminate votes on
procedural requirements from the data (such as votes on the order of
voting and things alike), and focus only on “yea”/“nay” votes for each
bill. Some bills faced several votes in the Chamber of Deputies. I keep
only the last date the bill is voted on.
I focus on deputies who have at least 50 “yea” or “nay” votes. As
will be made clear, the methods to estimate the model require both large
number of deputies and bills for consistency; for deputies with few votes,
their ideology estimates are unlikely to be well estimated. This eliminates
28 of the legislators included in the sample, or 0.45% of the deputy-bill
pairs leftover. For a similar reason, I drop bills that have less than 50
voting deputies. This eliminates 0.82% of the leftover deputy-bill pairs.
Also, as is standard in the literature, I focus on bills with on which
there is enough disagreement between congressmen, and eliminate bills
with more than 95% or less than 5% ‘yes’ votes among the non-absent
deputies. These votes are unlikely to be informative about parameters of
the model since they would be justified as high ab votes, where the likeli-
hood function becomes flat and uninformative about other model para-
3This leaves 509 deputies in legislature 53 (2007-2010), 512 deputies in legislature
54 (2011-2015) and 511 deputies in legislature 55 (2015-17).
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meters. Additionally, it’s likely that these votes represent other forms
of vote trading between the government coalition and opposition and in-
formal norms that are unlikely to be captured by the model presented
above.
Finally, I adopt the following definition for deputies who are members
of the government coalition: I look at deputies in political parties that
have at least one ministry.
Table 5.1 documents the number of deputies and bills analysed in each
legislature, and throughout the sample. Throughout 2007-2017, 740 bills
are kept in the sample. Given that many deputies are re-elected, a total
of 963 deputies throughout the 53rd-55th congresses are kept in sample.
5.4 Identification and estimation
5.4.1 Identification
Proposition 1 shows that a legislator votes “yea” if:
ab + c
T
b xl + λb1(l ∈ C) + lb ≥ 0
Can we identify from legislators’ votes in each bill the values of ab, c
T
b , λb
and xl? At first, note that we could always change the mean of xl across
legislators, simultaneously change ab, and get the same latent variable
above. To avoid this identification problem, I impose E[xl] = 0. Also,
as usual in these models, cTb xl = c
T
b AA
−1xl (where A is any D × D
matrix), so without restrictions on xl, the model is unidentified. Usual
restrictions in this model, which are adopted here, are to impose that
(i) the different dimensions of xl are orthogonal to each other (so that
different ideology components represent separate components that do not
predict each other), and (ii) that V ar(xl) =
1
L
∑
l x
2
l = 1.
Under these (or similar) restrictions, a large literature has evaluated
this model with λb = 0: in particular, Poole (2000) shows that the rank of
xl is identified in a single dimensional ideology model, and Peress (2012)
shows the more general model is non-parametrically identified.
Identification is slightly more nuanced here: if we observed the same
governing coalition throughout the sample period, this model would be
impossible to be identified. In particular, let the parameters of the model
be given by ab, c
T
b , λb, xl, and let µ = E[xl|l ∈ C] − E[xl|l /∈ C]. This
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creates the same voting probabilities as a model with parameters ab, c
T
b ,
x˜l = xl − δµ1(l ∈ C) and λ˜b = λb + δcTb µ. That is, without variation
in the members of the government coalition, it is impossible to separate
between the pressure effect of being inside the government coalition λb
from differences in ideology between the members of the government
coalition and the members in opposition.
If we observe exogenous variation in the members of the government
coalition - that is, if the distribution of lb doesn’t change when a legis-
lator moves in and out of the government coalition (or, lb is statistically
independent of being in the government coalition) -, things are different.
We could use the results in Peress (2012) on the sample of legislators
out of the government coalition (permanently or temporarily) to identify
these legislators’ ideology and bill effects cb, ab. Under the assumption
that there is always a large enough set of legislators in the opposition,
cb, ab can be estimated for all bills. As a consequence, this allow us to
know ab + c
T
b xl for legislators who switch into and out of the government
coalition. Based on this, we could identify λb from the set of legislators
switching in and out of the government coalition, from a binary choice
model of legislators’ votes for bill b on ab+c
T
b xl and on 1(l ∈ C). Finally,
once we know λb, we can identify xl for legislators who are permanently
inside the government’s coalition from a binary choice model of votes
from a given legislator l on variables ab+λb, c
T
b (restricting the coefficient
on ab + λb to be one). The coefficients on c
T
b , then, are the government
coalition’s legislators’ ideology.
Crucially, this argument for identification relies on independence of
legislators’ participation in the government coalition and lb. How plaus-
ible is this? Crucially, the key challenge is that changes in legislator’s
preferences for future bills might drive the formation of a coalition. The
identification of the model comes from assuming that changes in cb, ab
over future bills, together with fixed xl for each legislator, does well
enough to capture changes in demands for bills, so by controlling for
these effects, we should be controlling for legislator’s expected changes
in preferences driving the formation of a coalition. Given that the model
is specified for a multidimensional ideology space xl ∈ RD, this doesn’t
seem like a very strong assumption: ultimately, with a large enough num-
ber of ideology dimensions, applications of ideology models like the above
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explain a substantial portion of the variation in the data.4
Beyond this, in the particular application of this chapter, the main
changes in governing coalitions during my sample period happen in Janu-
ary 2011, November 2013, January 2015, April 2015 and April-May 2016.
In January 2011 and 2015, the changes to government coalitions happen
due to new presidential terms and Congress’s composition. In November
2013, PSB leaves the government coalition to be able to launch its own
candidate for presidency, as supposed to supporting Dilma Rousseff. In
April 2015, PROS leaves the coalition because of a fight with the main
coalition partner, PMDB. Finally, in 2016, the impeachment - driven by
Dilma Rousseff’s lack of popularity, economic growth at -4.5% per year,
corruption scandals affecting legislators and members of Dilma’s party -
drove a large change in the government coalition. These changes over this
period seem to be less likely to be due to shocks to demands for/against
bills driving the formation of coalitions; and more related to changes in
the presidency and overall composition of the legislature.
With this in mind, I take as a baseline identification assumption that
conditional on ab, c
T
b , xl, changes in the coalition are exogenous to lb. I
rely on robustness checks presented later on to confirm this assumption.
It is worth it to mention a possible alternative identification strategy:
Snyder and Groseclose (2000) note that if the president only cares about
getting bills approved, the model predicts that whenever there is party
pressure, the aggregate vote shares should sum to Vb. Hence, if we knew
Vb, we could estimate ab, cb, xl from bills with aggregate vote shares far
from Vb, and then use these estimates to run a binary choice model of
votes for a bill b with aggregate vote share close to Vb on a constant, xl
and 1(l ∈ C) to recover ab, cb and λb.
A few issues motivate the different identification strategy presented
in this chapter: first, while the president might press for approval of a
bill, the president might also press for approval beyond what’s necessary
for approval as a signal of strength. In other words, we might not know
the shape of the function P (Vb, u
P
b ), and as a consequence, we might not
know the number of votes the president is targeting to obtain. If this is
the case, on bills with aggregate vote shares far from Vb, we might be
4In applications, estimates of ideology in the U.S. Congress, 1-dimensional ideo-
logies correctly classifies around 80% of votes (Poole and Rosenthal (1985)), and
changes in ideology within legislators add relatively little explanatory power to the
model (Poole and Rosenthal (1991)).
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capturing as ideological components something that is actually presiden-
tial pressure, and consequently, we might underestimate pressure on bills
close to Vb. Instead, I focus on the identification strategy using variation
in the members of the coalition, and verify ex-post whether close bills
have significantly higher pressure coefficients λb.
5.4.2 Estimation
At first, one could try to estimate this model by maximum likelihood.
Yet, with 963 deputies and 569 bills, this implies estimating 963D para-
meters for ideology of deputies, plus 569(D+2) parameters for bill effects
ab, cb, λb, with a latent variable that is not linear in parameters (since cb
shows up multiplying xl.
To deal with this, I estimate the model using the following EM al-
gorithm5. At round t of iteration, specify the log-likelihood function of
the data as if the latent variable u˜bl was observed. Under the normality
assumption on the residuals, the log-likelihood is:∑
l,b
κ− [1(vlb = 1, u˜bl > 0) + 1(vlb = −1, u˜bl < 0)](u˜bl − ab − λb1(l ∈ C)− cTb xl)2
(5.2)
Clearly the latent variable u˜bl isn’t observed. We then replace it by
its expectation conditional on the parameter estimates from round (t −
1), and conditional on vlb. Letting u
(t−1)
lb = a
(t−1)
b + λ
(t−1)
b 1(l ∈ C) +
[c
(t−1)
b ]
Tx
(t−1)
l , it can be shown that:
u˜
e,(t)
bl = E[u˜bl|a(t−1)b , λ(t−1)b , c(t−1)b , x(t−1)l , vlb] = u(t−1)lb + vlb
φ(vlbu
(t−1)
lb )
Φ(vlbu
(t−1)
lb )
(5.3)
In round (t), then, I estimate the parameters of the model by maxim-
izing the log-likelihood in 5.2, replacing the latent variable u˜bl by its
expectation in 5.3.
In summary, the algorithm proceeds as follows: at stage t
5See Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977) showing that the EM algorithm converges
to local maxima of the log-likelihood. Imai, Lo and Olmstead (2016) use the EM
algorithm to perform Bayesian estimation of an ideology model. Here, I present an
EM algorithm to perform classical estimation of the maximum likelihood estimate of
parameters.
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1. take initial guesses for the parameters
2. replace u˜bl in 5.2 by the expectation u˜
e,(t)
bl in 5.3
3. choose parameters to maximize 5.2
4. take these parameters as initial guesses for the parameters in the
next stage, and move to stage t+ 1
This algorithm is a particular case of Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977)’s
EM algorithm. They show that the following iterative procedure reaches
a local maximum of the likelihood function.
Given this, the problem becomes one of iteratively solving for the least
squares estimate of u˜
e,(t)
bl on the right hand side ab + λb1(l ∈ C) + cTb xl.
If we knew the value of ab, λb, we could run the non-linear regression of
u˜
e,(t)
bl − ab− λb1(l ∈ C) on cTb xl, and under the identification assumptions
above, this is well-known to yield the principal component estimates of
factor loadings and scores as estimates of cb, xl. At the same time, it is
easily verified that the least squares estimates for ab and λb yield:
ab + λb
∑
l 1(l ∈ C)
L
=
∑
l u˜
e,(t)
bl
L
ab + λb =
∑
l u˜
e,(t)
bl∑
l 1(l ∈ C)
− cTb
∑
l xl1(l ∈ C)∑
l 1(l ∈ C)
This suggests the following iterative procedure for the least squares prob-
lem in stage 3: start with initial guesses of cb, xl, compute ab, λb from the
system of equations above, and based on this ab, λb, take principal com-
ponents of u˜
e,(t)
bl − ab − λb1(l ∈ C). Take these new estimates of cb, xl,
and repeat. In simulations, within a few rounds of iteration - 3 to 5 -,
estimates become highly correlated across rounds.
The full procedure, while intricate, gives substantial gains in estima-
tion time: the full model is estimated in under 10 minutes in a dataset
of 547,947 observations. This is what allows me to estimate the full
model jointly. Additionally, even with a low number of iterations on the
EM procedure, parameters are highly correlated with the truth in Monte
Carlo simulations.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Government coalition and voting: reduced form
estimates
First, I provide correlations suggesting that legislators that join the co-
alition members tend to vote more often together with the president. To
show this, I run the following regression:
ylb = β1(l ∈ Cb) + δl + δb + lb
In the regression above, ylb is a dummy variable indicating when legislator
l voted in the same way as the president’s party for bill b. For robustness,
I define the president’s party’s vote as “yea” if at least m% of that party
voted “yea”, and as “nay” if at least m% voted “nay”, and look at
different thresholds m. Legislators in the president’s party are excluded
from the sample. The term δl is a legislator fixed effect, and δb is a
bill fixed effect. The variable 1(l ∈ Cb) indicates whether the legislator
l is in a political party that, at the time of the vote on bill b, had a
cabinet position. The coefficient of interest here is β. Standard errors
are clustered at the bill level and at the deputy level, as in Cameron,
Gelbach, Miller (2011).
Table 5.2 shows the results for this regression. Throughout the period,
conditional on legislator and bill effects, legislators switching into the gov-
ernment coalition at 10.8p.p. more likely to vote in the same way as a
majority of current president’s party (see the first two columns). This
result is robust to the choice of threshold: if we assume that the presid-
ent’s party only took a position if more than 85% of its members vote in
the same way, we still get that members of the government coalition are
12p.p. more likely to vote in the same way as the president’s party when
more than 85% of the president’s party agrees. Finally, while it might
be true that a part of the effect is driven by pressuring legislators in the
coalition to not be absent, this cannot explain the full correlation: even
if the additional legislators in the coalition voting for the bill were to
vote always with the president’s party, a back of the envelope calculation
suggests we’d still have that legislators joining the coalition vote together
131
with the president’s party 8.1p.p. more often.6
These results are not driven solely by groups of parties who vote
together only because of ideology (as opposed to government pressure)
entering and exiting the government coalition simultaneously. To show
this, I explore the fact that after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff
in May 2016, there was a significant number of parties switching into
and out of the government coalition, while another set of parties stayed
inside the government coalition throughout. I then estimate the following
regressions:
ylb = βpre1(l ∈ Cb)× Pre May 16 + βpost1(l ∈ Cb)× Post May 16
+δl + δb + lb
where ylb now measures whether legislator l votes in the same way as more
than m% of a reference party. I’ll look at results for the three largest
parties staying in the government coalition throughout the sample period
(PMDB, PP and PR), the three largest parties leaving the government
coalition after 2016 (PT, PDT and PCdoB), and the three largest parties
entering the government coalition (PSDB, DEM, PPS). Once again, I
exclude legislators in the reference party from the regression.
Take for instance the regression of a legislator voting with PSDB,
a party entering the government coalition in 2016. The coefficient βpre
captures whether joining a legislator joining the government coalition
prior to 2016 starts voting more often with PSDB. The coefficient βpost,
in turn, estimates whether a legislator joining the government coalition
after 2016 starts voting more often with PSDB. Hence, the difference
βpost − βpre stands for the difference in effects when PSDB is inside vs.
outside the government coalition.
Table 5.3 shows the results for this regression using a subset of parties
leaving the government coalition as reference parties (PT, PDT, PCdoB).
Before May 2016, a legislator joining the government coalition became
6This is a back of the envelope calculation similar to Lee (2009). Let the share
of congressmen not absent among the opposition be a, and let b be the share in the
opposition (among those not absent) voting together with the government’s party. Let
vA be the share among the government coalition voting with the government’s party
among those who are not absent neither in government nor in opposition. Let vB
be the share of coalition members voting together with the government among those
who turn out to vote only when they are in government (share a + 0.03). Using the
estimates in columns 1 and 3, the treatment effect vA− b = 0.108+ 0.03(b+0.108−vB)a >
0.081.
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4.9-6 p.p. more likely to vote with PT. After May 2016, when PT left
the government coalition, a legislator joining the government coalition
became 3.3-4.6 less likely to vote together with PT. Once again, the dif-
ference βpost − βpre is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Similar results show up for PDT and PCdoB. While congressmen joining
the government coalition often votes more often against PDT’s typical
position, this effect becomes stronger after May 2016. Finally, when it
comes to PCdoB, while before May 2016, congressmen joining the coali-
tion typically increase by 0.9-3.5p.p. how often they vote with PCdoB
(non-robustly), after May 2016, congressmen joining the coalition reduce
the share of times voting with PCdoB by 9.3-11.3p.p on average.
Table 5.4 shows the results for this regression using a subset of parties
joining the government as the reference parties. As expected, before May
2016, legislators joining the coalition became 2.5 to 3.5p.p. less likely to
vote with PDSB, -0.5 to 4.4p.p. less likely to vote with DEM, and 3.3 to
3.6p.p. less likely to vote with PPS. After May 2016, when these parties
join the governing coalition, legislators joining the coalition become 13.7
to 17.5p.p. more likely to vote with PSDB, 8.1 to 12.3 p.p. more likely
to vote with DEM, and 15.8 to 18.2 p.p more likely to vote with PPS.
Finally, table 5.5 shows results using a subset of parties that stayed
in the government coalition throughout the sample period (PMDB, PP,
PR). As expected, joining the government coalition increases the propensity
to vote with these parties both before and after 2016, with an effect ran-
ging from 8.4p.p. to 30.5 p.p.
These results suggests that joining the government’s coalition has a
strong correlation with a legislator’s vote. This correlation is not due to
parties moving together in and out of the government coalition: instead,
legislators who join the coalition start voting more similarly to parties
that stayed inside the coalition, and more similarly to parties concur-
rently joining the coalition. At the same time, they stop voting similarly
to parties that leave the government coalition.
Still, it is hard to know whether expected changes in the propensity of
different legislators to vote together that drive the formation of coalitions.
In particular, it is hard to guarantee here that there aren’t legislator-bill
specific effects driving the formation of coalitions and the similarity of
votes across legislators. In fact, most basic models of voting would predict
such legislator-bill specific effects (here, in cTb xl). Moreover, it is hard to
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use the current results to perform counterfactual exercises and evaluate
the question of interest without estimates of ideology for each legislator,
and estimates of government pressure.
5.5.2 Structural model
In this section, I present estimates of the structural model presented
above. I estimate the model with a two-dimensional ideology space for
legislators using the EM algorithm above. I start by describing the es-
timates obtained: I show that estimated ideologies are consistent with
at least one measure of ideology for political parties in Brazil, and which
bills face higher government pressure. I then move to check whether the
model’s predictions for (i) when does the government exert pressure, and
(ii) for who should be included in the government coalition. Finally, I
check the consequences of the estimates for policy, showing how often do
bills would get approved/rejected without pressure when the president
dislikes/likes the bill, and how much presidential pressure changes these
numbers.
Main estimates
Ideology estimates: How much do estimated ideology measures correl-
ate with alternative measures for ideology? I start by presenting evidence
of the correlation between mean estimated ideologies from the structural
model with a proxy for ideology of Brazilian political parties coming from
a survey of legislators by Power and Zucco (2011). More precisely, I use
the computed ideology from the model, compute average ideology for
each political party in a given year, and compare the results with the
cross sectional ideology measures from Power and Zucco (2011).
Graph 5.2 shows the results. While the first measure of ideology from
the structural model has only a week correlation with the survey measures
of ideology, the second dimension of ideology from the structural model is
strongly correlated with legislators’ self report of preferences. Moreover,
while legislators’ ideologies are constant over time by assumption in the
model, parties have different legislators in different congressional terms.
While this could imply that parties’ ideologies change across terms, the
evidence suggests little variation in average party ideology across terms in
the structural model. While a part of the result comes mechanically from
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the fact that legislators’ ideologies are assumed to be constant, there is
substantial turnover in the Brazilian congress across congressional terms,
so this result is not immediately obvious.
This result shows that the model is able to both capture measures
of ideology that are closely related to at least one alternative proxy of
ideology, and other unobservable drivers of legislators’ votes that might
not be as easily captured. At the same time, the results show that
capturing both these dimensions of ideology matter: figure 5.2 shows
that before 2016, coalitions were formed on the basis of legislators that
had were to the right on the first dimension of ideology, but that were
both left and right on the second dimension of ideology (which is more
closely related usual ideology proxies). After 2016, on the other hand, the
coalition includes parties of all types in the first dimension of ideology, but
only relatively right wing legislators in the second dimension of ideology.
This, in turn, highlights the advantages of the structural model: by
being able to capture a flexible space of ideologies from roll call data, the
model is able look at the effect of being in the government coalition and
being pressured to vote in a given way, while controlling for legislators’
propensity to vote together. This implicitly allows me to control for,
first of all, well known alternative proxies for ideology. Second of all,
this allows me to control for other ideological dimensions that are not
easily captured by usual ideology proxies, but that matter for voting and
coalition formation.
Government pressure estimates: When does the government ex-
ert pressure for legislators to vote? Given the estimates do not impose
that many of the pressure coefficients might be zero, there might be con-
siderable uncertainty on the estimation of λb. Moreover, a given λb has
different implications for a bill with ab = 0, cb = 0 (where legislators are
divided and the marginal effect of λb is large) vs. a bill with ab high
and cb = 0 (where legislators are mostly favourable to the bill, and the
marginal effect of λb is small). Given this, I present evidence here on the
expected number of votes turning from nay to yea due to government
pressure:
LExl
[
Φ(ab + c
T
b xl + λb1(l ∈ C)− Φ(ab + cTb xl)
]
and the expected number of votes reversed due to government pressure
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(the absolute value of the expression above).7
The evidence is consistent with some government pressure. Figure
shows the density of the number of votes/share of votes among voting
coalition members turning from nay to yea due to government pressure.
Together with this, table 5.6 shows summary statistics of the absolute
value of (i) expected number of votes reversed as a result of pressure
across bills, (ii) expected share of reversed votes among legislators in the
coalition voting for a bill. Throughout the sample period, the govern-
ment coalition has on average 282 legislators, and for a typical bill, 192
legislators in the government coalition cast a vote for a given bill on av-
erage. In 25.3% of these bills between 2008-2016, more than 30 votes
among the congressmen voting were expected to be reversed as a result
of government pressure on coalition members. In 9.5% of the bills, more
than 60 votes were expected to reverse as a result of government pres-
sure on coalition members. As a consequence, for 25% of the bills, more
than 17% of the members of the coalition voting for a bill got their votes
reversed by government pressure. For 10% of the bills, more than 29.6%
of the members of the coalition voting for a bill had their votes reversed
due to government pressure.
Table 5.7 documents how the government coalition’s pressure has
evolved over time. While the government managed to pressure coali-
tion members to vote with them up until 2010 - managing to reverse the
votes of more than 30% of coalition members in 25% of the bills -, this
pressure falls over time. In particular, in 2015-16, for 90% of the bills,
less than 10% of the votes of coalition members were reversed. Finally,
table 5.8 suggests that the types of bills facing higher pressure are spe-
cially provisional/supplemental laws. These are bills that the president
turns into temporary law before a vote by the legislature, and that the
president presumably considers to deal with urgent matters.
How can the model explain the estimated pressure levels? If we take
the model to mean that the government is only exerting pressure to
approve/reject bills (as opposed to pressuring legislators to signal that
the coalition is strong, or some other motivation), the model would
suggest that whenever the government exerts pressure, the bill is ap-
7The number of votes reversed due to government pressure for bill b is
∑
l |vlb−v∗lb|.
For a given bill b, if λb > 0, |vlb − v∗lb = vlb − v∗lb > 0 for all l, and
∑
l |vlb −
v∗lb| → LExl [vlb − v∗lb]. Similarly, if λb < 0, |vlb − v∗lb| = v∗lb − vlb > 0 for all l, and∑
l |vlb − v∗lb| → LExl [v∗lb − vlb].
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proved/rejected by close margins. Given that the model provides estim-
ates of government pressure on all bills (with close margins or lopsided
votes), we can see whether the distribution of pressure differs across lop-
sided votes vs. close votes. To do so, I’ll let a bill be a close vote bill if
the difference between the share voting yea and the share necessary for
approval is above −C and below C. I let C vary over years, so that in
each year, 10% of the bills are assumed to be close.8 With this, then, I
compute the density of pressure for bills classified as close votes, and the
same density for bills classified as lopsided votes.
Figure 5.3 shows evidence of this: while there are some differences in
the density of pressure for close votes and lopsided votes, it is very hard
to say that lopsided votes face no government pressure. This result is
consistent with presidents exerting pressure on the coalition not only to
get bills approved/rejected, but also to obtain large majorities in favour
of their position.
Does a more general preference function for the president help in ex-
plaining the patterns? The FOC suggests that the government’s decision
on λb depends on the president’s preferences for the bill u
P
b , the num-
ber of votes for the bill by the opposition, the number of votes by the
coalition, and the coalition’s sensitivity to pressure.
To make progress on this, I start by proxying the president’s prefer-
ences for the bill as his party’s average preference for the bill. For this,
I compute for each legislator in the president’s party its expected utility
given their votes:
E[ubl + |vbl] = ab + cTb xl + vlb
φ(vlb[ab + c
T
b xl + λb])
Φ(vlb[ab + cTb xl + λb])
and average this for all members of the president’s party.
With this in hands, I then linearise the president’s first order condition
around (V OPP , u˜Pb , λb) = (0, 0, 0), to obtain:
λb =
1
∂2P
∂(V GOV )2
∫
φ(ab + cTb xl)1(l ∈ C)dl − 1
×[
− ∂
2P
∂V GOV ∂V OPP
V OPP − ∂
2P
∂V GOVb ∂u
[uPb + bP ]−
∂P
∂V GOVb
]
8When adopting a fixed cutoff, most close vote bills happen in the last few years
of my sample, when pressure is overall lower for potentially other reasons.
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where the derivatives are evaluated at V GOV =
∫
Φ(ab+c
T
b xl)dl, V
OPP =
0 and at u˜Pb = 0. If V
GOV
b , V
OPP
b are perfect substitutes,
∂2P
∂(V GOV )2
=
∂2P
∂(V GOV )∂(V OPP )
. That being said, as argued above, this is not necessar-
ily the case: if the president cares about stopping the opposition from
buying votes away from the coalition, it isn’t clear that opposition votes
enter symmetrically to pro-government votes. Similarly, if the govern-
ment cares about signalling his capacity to pressure effectively and influ-
ence the legislators in the coalition, the government will naturally care
differently about voting behaviour in the coalition and in the opposition.
Can the model above be identified? For this, we can impose an as-
sumption that bP is independent ab, c
T
b , xl,1(l ∈ C): one way of justifying
this assumption is that the correlation between legislators’ preferences
and the president’s preferences is fully captured by correlation between
ab + c
T
b xl and u
P
b , and that the coalition will form not taking into ac-
count individual realizations of bP for individual bills, but instead, on
the distribution of bP . I discuss the possibility of endogenous bill para-
meters ab, cb (due to bill authoring and bills reaching the floor) later in
this section.
Once this is done, the model above can be estimated by non-linear
least squares, treating ∂
2P
∂(V GOV )2
, ∂
2P
∂V GOV ∂V OPP
, ∂
2P
∂(V GOV ∂u
and ∂P
∂V GOV
as para-
meters to be estimated. More precisely, we are identifying ∂
2P
∂(V GOV )2
from
variation in the set of legislators in the government coalition, which is
used to obtain variation in the sensitivity of the coalition to pressure∫
φ(ab + c
T
b xl)1(l ∈ C)dl. To identify ∂
2P
∂V GOV ∂V OPP
, I use variation in
the opposition’s votes, which are not influenced by the president’s efforts
to pressure its coalition. The term ∂
2P
∂Vb∂u
is identified from variation in
the party of the president and its preferences from bills (as proxied by
his party’s preferences for bills), as well as variation in bill characterist-
ics ab, cb that a given president likes and dislikes. Finally,
∂P
∂Vb
is set to
capture the mean level of pressure, something that is intuitive from the
president’s first order conditions. Given that in theory, these parameters
depend on
∫
Φ(ab + c
T
b xl)1(l ∈ C)dl, I estimate this model both on the
overall sample, and on subsamples of terciles of
∫
Φ(ab+ c
T
b xl)1(l ∈ C)dl.
I also estimate the model above, and the restricted version where the
president only cares about vote totals.
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Table 5.9 shows the results for this model.9 The first column estim-
ates a model forcing V GOVb , V
OPP
b to be perfect substitutes. The point
estimates suggests that the presidents returns to votes ∂
2P
∂V 2
are concave.
The second column illustrates why this result comes about: we can see
from the estimate for ∂P
∂V GOV ∂V OPP
that for the president, votes by the
opposition for the bill mildly reduce the returns to votes by the coalition
(suggesting they’re substitutes). At the same time, votes by the gov-
ernment face significant increasing returns, as seen from the estimate for
∂P
∂(V GOV )2
(suggesting V GOVb and V
OPP
b are not perfect substitutes). Given
that the first column uses the variation in votes from the opposition to
identify the coefficient for increasing/decreasing returns for votes inside
the government coalition, this drives the first column to significantly un-
derestimate the extent to which there are increasing returns to votes
inside the government coalition. The second column is able to prevent
this by looking at variation in votes from the government only coming
from changes in the government coalition, and separating this from vari-
ation in votes coming from the opposition. Doing so also significantly
increases the explanatory power of the model, indicating that the more
general version of the model is significantly better at explaining the data.
This distinction also has implications for the effects of the president’s
party preferences over pressure. The first column suggests that the pres-
ident’s party’s utility from the bill increases mildly the return to votes by
the coalition in ∂P
∂V GOV ∂u
. This result gets stronger in the second column.
The reason for this is relatively subtle: when there are increasing returns
to votes by the coalition, then as the coalition becomes more sensitive
to pressure, that increases the coalition’s voting in response to pressure,
and in turn the returns to votes by the coalition. Because the returns to
votes by the coalition are higher, a given change in the preferences for
the bill uPb has a higher impact over λb. Consequently, under increasing
returns to votes by the coalition, the impact of uPb over λb is higher when
the coalition is more sensitive to pressure. Analogously, when there are
decreasing returns to votes by the coalition, the impact of uPb over λb is
higher when the coalition is less sensitive to pressure. With this in mind,
9While I present standard errors clustered at the month level, the regression con-
tain estimated regressors. Instead, joint tests that all coefficients are zero are valid
(see Wooldridge (2002)), since the asymptotic distribution of the estimates does not
depend on the estimated regressors under the null hypothesis that all coefficients are
zero. Consequently, I keep the analysis to interpreting the magnitudes of coefficients
and R− 2 values.
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if the data suggests that λb is more sensitive to u
P
b when the coalition
is more sensitive to pressure, then if we mis-estimate ∂
2P
∂(V GOV )2
< 0, the
way the data will capture the interaction between uPb and sensitivity to
pressure by the coalition is by estimating ∂
2P
∂Vb∂u
to be small.
Columns 3-5 allow the coefficients to vary with
∫
Φ(ab+c
T
b xl)dl. Res-
ults suggest that the president’s party’s preferences for the bill have a
particularly high effect over the returns to votes when
∫
Φ(ab + c
T
b xl)dl
takes on intermediate values. For the bottom and highest tercile of∫
Φ(ab + c
T
b xl)1(l ∈ C)dl, the returns to votes for the president don’t
change too much in response to the president’s party’s preferences for
the bill.
This model uses considerable variation in bill-level parameters ab, cb to
identify the parameters of the model. Yet, despite this being unmodelled,
it is possible that the bill parameters are endogenous: this would be the
case if shocks to the president’s preferences for bills bring up different
bills.
To deal with this, I move to estimating the model excluding first the
bills proposed by the executive, and then excluding the bills proposed
by any member of the government coalition. If the results remain un-
changed, this lends credibility to the idea that the estimates above are
not driven by endogeneity of bill-level parameters, but instead by vari-
ation across bills in the typical preferences of the government coalition,
opposition and the president.
Table 5.10 shows the results. Columns (1) and (2) show the results
excluding bills authored by the executive. Once again, allowing the model
to have less than perfect substitution between government and opposition
votes improves the explanatory power of the model, and yields more
intuitive results, in line with the results above. That being said, the
explanatory power of the model is small, suggesting that for this subset
of bills, the model doesn’t explain a substantial part of the variation.
Columns (3) and (4) then move to exclude bills authored by a mem-
ber of the government coalition (either the executive or a legislator in
the coalition). Once again, allowing the model to have less than perfect
substitution between government and opposition votes improves the ex-
planatory power of the model substantially. It also yields results in line
with the results in the main first order condition. Moreover, the substan-
tial explanatory power of the model suggests that the FOC above helps
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in explaining the data on government pressure on bills authored by the
opposition.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the model is informat-
ive about the government’s decision to put pressure on legislators: the
president’s FOC has substantial explanatory power of the pressure coef-
ficients estimated from the voting model. It provides evidence that when
the government coalition’s legislators have more moderate policy pref-
erences (with mid-level
∫
Φ(ab + c
T
b xl)1(l ∈ C)dl), the government puts
pressure on legislators, specially when the president’s party cares a lot
about the policy, and when the coalition is sensitive to pressure. Finally,
this result seem to be robust to excluding bills authored by the executive,
and to looking only at bills authored by the opposition, suggesting that
endogenous bill parameter choices are not driving the results.
Who is included in the government coalition?
With this in mind, which legislators are included in the government co-
alition? Figure 5.4 shows a map of where political parties lie in the two
dimensional ideology space, and which parties were in and out of the
government coalition. Before the impeachment in May 2016, PT is on
the presidency, and besides PCdoB and PDT, most parties are relat-
ively far apart from PT on the ideological spectrum. As a consequence,
PT formed a coalition with political parties that were relatively closeby
on the first dimension, but far away on the second dimension of polit-
ics. After May 2016, PMDB starts occupying the presidency, and many
political parties have ideologies similar to PMDB. PMDB then forms a
coalition of political parties including parties very nearby them on both
dimensions, and including parties that were close on the second ideolo-
gical dimension (typical correlate with other measures of left-right wing
in Brazilian politics), but far away in other dimensions.
The model suggests that when a president forms a coalition with le-
gislators ideologically far away from them - such as PT in 2016 -, they’ll
prefer to form a coalition with legislators that are more sensitive to pres-
sure and who care less about policy. When the president, instead, forms
a coalition with legislators who are closeby, he prefers legislators who are
less sensitive to pressure and who care more about policy.
To check for this, I compute for each deputy measures of average
sensitivity to pressure: more precisely, I let the legislator’s sensitivity to
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pressure when he has no pressure be defined as∫
φ(ab + c
T
b xl)db
That is, this is the derivative of the legislator’s probability of voting yea
with respect to λb, evaluated at λb = 0, then averaged over all bills. I also
let the legislator’s sensitivity to pressure when he has his actual pressure
to be defined as: ∫
φ(ab + c
T
b xl + λb1(l ∈ C))db
Figure 5.5 shows the density of both measures of sensitivity to pressure
before and after May 2016. As can be seen, before 2016, during PT’s
government, the coalition’s legislators’ sensitivity to pressure when they
have no pressure is higher and substantially more dispersed than the
sensitivity to pressure for the opposition’s legislators (top left corner).
After May 2016, during the PMDB’s government, the result reverses,
and members of the coalition have significantly less sensitivity to pressure
than members of the opposition (top right corner). This is consistent with
the theoretical prediction that coalitions with far away legislators should
include legislators that are more sensitive to pressure, while coalitions
with closeby legislators should include legislators that are less sensitive
to pressure.
Interestingly, the bottom graphs show that the government, after se-
lecting legislators in this way, chooses to put enough pressure on the
coalition for their sensitivity to pressure to reduce. In this way, both pre
and post 2016, legislators in the government coalition are significantly
less sensitive to government pressure.
Consequences for policy
FInally, what are the consequences of the model for policy? In particular,
how often does the government get bills it likes approved and bills it
doesn’t like rejected? How different would the numbers be if there was
no government pressure?
To do so, first note that the model suggests that Pv = λb, so that
whenever the marginal utility to the president of an extra vote for the
bill is positive (and by assumption, the marginal utility to extra votes
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is then always positive for this bill), then λb > 0. Similarly, when the
marginal utility to the president of an extra vote for the bill is negative,
λb < 0. Hence, we can look at the number of bills approved when λb > 0,
and the number of bills rejected when λb < 0, and how different would
the numbers be if there was no government pressure.
Table 5.11 shows results on this. Consistently with the fact that pre
May 2016, the government formed a coalition based on pressure on ideo-
logically distant candidates, the government has a moderate effect over
policy approval: a congress without a government coalition would have
approved 79.5% of the bills the president dislikes (which are bills where
the president sets λb < 0). Due to government pressure, the government
reduces this number to 66.7% of bills it dislikes. Similarly, among bills
the president likes (with λb > 0), 75% would have been approved by
congress without pressure. The president manages to increase this to
85.5%.
Post 2016, the government forms a coalition of legislators with closeby
preferences and little sensitivity to pressure. As a consequence, it relies
on low pressure on legislators. Consistently with this, post 2016, 81.6% of
the bills that the president dislikes would have been approved, and this
number stays unchanged with presidential pressure. Similarly, among
bills the president likes, 37.9% of them would have been approved without
any pressure, the president manages to increase this to 48.3%.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented a model of coalition formation and voting in con-
gress to understand (i) what are the ideologies of legislators that the
president includes in the coalition, and (ii) what are the implications of
these coalitions for votes in congress. The results suggest that while a
president with many ideologically similar legislators wouldn’t be checked
anyway - so he doesn’t need to exert pressure, and if anything, focuses
on legislators that are less sensitive to it -, a president without many
legislators nearby can avoid some of the checks and balances by relying
on legislators that are more sensitive to pressure - or to “sell their votes”
in exchange for particularistic transfers associated with being part of the
government.
Despite this capacity to avoid checks and balances, throughout this
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sample period, the legislature has provided strong checks against the ex-
ecutive, often approving bills that the president dislikes, and not approv-
ing bills the president likes. Further research focusing on the interaction
between institutional rules and the coalitions arising in equilibrium would
provide important information on how these rules might affect the capa-
city of the legislature to check the executive. Similarly, further research
delving deeper into the process of bill proposals is important to under-
stand other margins through which the legislature does/does not check
the executive - the tools developed in this chapter for identification of
bill characteristics can be useful for this agenda.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 It is clear that the solution for votes above
satisfies the relaxed President’s problem. As a consequence, if it is op-
timal for legislators in the government coalition to vote in that manner,
then the voting equation above satisfies also the President’s problem with
incentive compatibility constraints.
Before showing this, though, it is useful to show that λb is a determ-
inistic function of ab, cb, xl, u
P
b + Pb and C (and in particular, doesn’t
depend on the values of lb when the number of legislators grow large.
To see this, note that whenever the constraint is binding, we have:
1
L
∑
vlb = Vb
By the central limit theorem, for a given bill, the left hand side converges
to Exl [Φ(ab + c
T
b xl + λb1(l ∈ C))]. As a consequence, conditional on Vb,
this pressure is a deterministic function of ab, c
T
b , xl, C. Using the FOC
from the president, then, the choice of Vb is given by:
Pv(Vb, u
P
b + bP ) = λb(ab, c
T
b , xl, C)
Consequently, λb is a deterministic function of ab, cb, xl, u
P
b Pb, C.
If a legislator decides to get the transfer tl (that satisfies his particip-
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ation constraint), he chooses votes to solve:
max
∫
(2vlb − 1)[ab + cTb xl + bl]db
s.t.
∫
vlbλbdb ≥ Tl
Treating vlb as a continuous variable, we can set up the Lagrangean for
this problem. Let µl be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. The
FOC in vlb is then given by:
ab + c
T
b xl + bl + µl
λb
2
≥ 0→ vlb = 1[∫
vlbλbdb− Tl
]
µl = 0
Note that the value of the left hand side of the constraint is at most∫ |λb|db (if legislators vote vlb = 1 when λb > 0, and vlb = −1 when
λb < 0, as the president wants). In the same way, the minimum value
of the constraint is − ∫ |λb|db (in case legislators vote in the opposite
direction of the pressure of the president in every vote the president
exerts pressure).
If µlλb = γ[ab+ c
T
b xl+ bl] for all b and this given legislator l, then the
first FOC above would reduce to µlλb ≥ 0, implying that the legislator
votes “yea” whenever λb > 0, and votes “nay” whenever λb < 0. As a
consequence, whenever the constraint was possible to satisfy, the legis-
lator would satisfy it. That would imply the lagrange multiplier µl is
zero. That being said, given b is continuously distributed, independent
of ab, cb, xl, and there is a continuum of bills, there is probability zero
that µlλb = γ[ab + c
T
b xl + bl] for all b.
As a consequence, with probability 1, the constraint would be binding
if Tl =
∫ |λb|db. Moreover, under this value of Tl, whenever λb > 0, the
legislator would have to vote “yea”, and whenever λb < 0, the legislator
would have to vote “nay”. Given lb is continuously distributed with
unbounded support and independent of ab, cb, xl, for this to happen, we’d
need to have µl →∞.
At the same time, if Tl = −
∫ |λb|db, then with probability Φ(ab +
cTb xl + µlλb/2) > 0, the legislator would vote “yea” with a given λb > 0,
and this would be enough to guarantee that the legislator satisfies the
constraint. As a consequence, with Tl = −
∫ |λb|db, the constraint is not
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binding, and has µl = 0.
Finally, note that conditional on b (and as a consequence, on uPb +bP ),
lb is statistically independent across legislators and normally distributed.
As a consequence, integrating on the values of lb, and then on all other
bill characteristics conditional on the determinants of λb, we get that:∫
vlbλbdb = E
[
Φ
(
ab + c
T
b xl +
µlλb
2
1(l ∈ C)
)
λb
]
(after all, conditional on the coalition and bill level parameters, λb is
uncorrelated with lb). This is continuous in µl, and as a consequence,
µl is continuous as a function of Tl. By the intermediate value theorem,
then, there exists a Tl ∈
(− ∫ |λb|db, ∫ |λb|db) such that µl = 2. For this
value of Tl, conditional on staying in the coalition, the legislator finds it
optimal to follow the voting rule suggested by the president’s problem.
Finally, we need to verify that the legislator prefers to vote together
with the coalition, satisfying the constraint above and receiving tl, rather
than voting according to his ideology, exiting the coalition and not receive
tl. This is guaranteed by the participation constraint. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Throughout the proof, I’ll assume the pres-
ident likes the bill (uPb + bp > 0), and consider the probability of having
the bill approved then. The proof for the probability of rejection when
the president likes the bill is analogous.
Under the FOC for Vb, the comparative statics with respect to a
parameter θ ∈ {ψ, κ} yields that:
∂Vb
∂θ
=
∂λb
∂θ
Pvv − ∂λb∂Vb
For the solution to be interior, the term in the denominator must be
negative, so that ∂λb
∂θ
fully determines the comparative statics above.
From proposition 1, when the number of legislators is high, λb is
implicitly given by:
LE
[
Φ
([
ab + c
T
b xl +
ψ
κ(1− ψ)ψP [u
P
b + bP ]
]
+ λb1(l ∈ C)
)]
= Vb
From this, it is immediate that when ψ increases, κ falls or ψP increases,
and the president likes the bill, λb decreases, so that
∂λb
∂ψ
< 0 and Vb rises
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with ψ.
For the comparative statics with respect to ψP , note that:
∂Vb
∂ψP
=
∂2P
∂Vb∂u
[uPb + bP ]− ∂λb∂ψP
−Pvv + ∂λb∂Vb
Once again, when the solution is interior, the denominator is positive. By
assumption, ∂
2P
∂V ∂u
> 0 and as derived above, ∂λ
∂ψP
< 0. As a consequence,
Vb rises with ψP when the president likes the bill. 
Proof of Proposition 3 Given the coalition, the president has payoff
given by:
max
{vlb}l,b
∫
P (Vb, u
P
b + bP )db+
∑
l
∫
2(vlb − v∗lb)[ab + cTb xl + lb]db
where v∗lb stands for the optimal vote of a legislator outside the coalition,
vlb is his vote inside the coalition.
Computing the expectations in the bill effects, we obtain that the
above can be re-written as:
Eb[P (V
∗
b , u
P
b + bP )]
+
∑
l∈C
{
2[Φ(ab+cTb xl+λb1(l∈C))−Φ(ab+cTb xl)][ab+cTb xl]
+φ(ab+cTb xl)−φ(ab+cTb xl+λb1(l∈C))
}
This in turn shows that the choice of coalition doesn’t depend on the
realizations of lb due to the large number of bills.
To evaluate the effect of replacing a legislator in the coalition, we can
use the envelope theorem to obtain that the effect of moving xl in the
direction ω. More precisely, the envelope theorem gives us the derivatives
with respect to each dimension of cTb , and rules for directional derivatives
are applied to give us: ∫
2(vlb − v∗lb)cTb ωdb
concluding the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4 Given the coalition, the president has payoff
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given by:
max
{vlb}l,b
∫
1
(∑
l
vlb > Vb
)
[aPb + c
T
b xP ]db+
∑
l
∫
2(vlb − v∗lb)[ab + cTb xl + lb]db
where v∗lb stands for the optimal vote of a legislator outside the coalition,
vlb is his vote inside the coalition. By the envelope theorem, the effect of
increasing x˜1l over the president’s payoff is:∫
2αl(vlb − v∗lb)c1bdb =2αlq+
{∫
(vlb1 − v∗lb1)c1bdb1|c1b > 0
}
+ 2αlq−
{∫
(vlb1 − v∗lb1)c1bdb1|c1b < 0
}
where b1 stands for bills of type 1, q+ is the probability of a bill type 1
with cb > 0, q− is the probability of a bill type 2 with cb < 0, and the
second expression follows from the assumption of the distribution of c1b .
Now, vlb − v∗lb = 2 if ab + cTb xl + λb > −lb > ab + cTb xl, vlb − v∗lb = −2 if
ab + c
T
b xl + λb < −lb < ab + cTb xl, and vlb − v∗lb = 0 otherwise. Because
x1P > 0, when c
1
b > 0 and ab = 0, the president gets positive utility
from bills type 1, so he’ll never exert negative pressure λb < 0. As a
consequence, vlb− v∗lb ≥ 0, and the first term is positive. Similarly, when
c1b < 0, the president gets negative utility from bills type 1, and never
exerts positive pressure. As a consequence, when c1b < 0, vbl − v∗lb ≤ 0,
and (vbl−v∗lb)c1b > 0. As a consequence, the term above is always positive,
and there is a gain of bringing into the coalition a legislator with higher
xl.
Similarly, we can use the envelope theorem to see the effect of bringing
in less ideologically attached legislators. The effect of increasing ideolo-
gical attachment is:∫
2(vlb − v∗lb)cTb x˜ldb =2q
{∫
(vlb1 − v∗lb1)c1b x˜1l db1
}
+ 2(1− q)
∫
(vlb2 − v∗lb2)c2b x˜2l db2
By assumption, x˜2l < 0, and c
2
b = 1 when the bill is type 2. As a
consequence, in these cases, the president only puts pressure for approval,
and vlb2−v∗lb2 ≥ 0. Hence, the last line is negative. As we discussed before,
(vlb1−v∗lb2)c1b > 0 when the president has x1P > 0. As a consequence, when
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x1l > 0, the first and second line are positive, and get larger the larger
is x1l (the first and second line go to ∞ when x1l → ∞ as long as there
is some government pressure in equilibrium). Similarly, when x1l < 0,
the first and second line are negative, and the overall derivative above is
negative. As a consequence, there exists a threshold x¯(q) > 0 such that
for x˜1l < x¯(q), the president’s payoff falls in the legislator’s care for policy
αl, while for x˜
1
l > x¯(q), the president’s payoff rises in the legislator’s care
for policy αl. Finally, it is immediate to see that x¯(q) is decreasing in q.

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Tables
Table 5.1: Sample of deputies/bills
Congress No. of deputies No. of bills
53 (2008-2010) 497 135
54 (2011-2014) 502 174
55 (2015-2016) 503 260
53-55th (2008-2016) 963 569
Table 5.2: Government coalition and absenteism
Vote with govt Vote with govt Absence
Coalition member 0.108 0.120 -0.030
(0.019)*** (0.020)*** (0.010)***
R2 0.35 0.36 0.15
N 215,116 192,005 352,515
Avg. y out of coalition 0.555 0.558 0.296
Threshold 50% 85%
Congressman FE YES YES YES
Bill FE YES YES YES
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Second dimension of ideology, structural model
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
Su
rv
ey
-b
as
ed
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f id
eo
log
y
Co
ali
tio
n 
m
em
be
rs
Op
po
sit
ion
 m
em
be
rs
Pr
e 
20
16
DE
M
PM
DB
PP
PP
S
PR
PR
B
PS
B
PS
DB
PT
B
PV
PC
do
B
PD
T
PS
C
PS
OL
PT
-2-1012
First dimension of ideology, structural model
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
Su
rv
ey
-b
as
ed
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f id
eo
log
y
Co
ali
tio
n 
m
em
be
rs
Op
po
sit
ion
 m
em
be
rs
Po
st 
20
16
DE
M
PM
DB
PP
PP
S
PR
PR
B
PS
B
PS
DB
PT
B
PV
PC
do
B
PD
T
PS
C
PS
OL
PT
-3-2-101
Second dimension of ideology, structural model
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
Su
rv
ey
-b
as
ed
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f id
eo
log
y
Co
ali
tio
n 
m
em
be
rs
Op
po
sit
ion
 m
em
be
rs
Po
st 
20
16
160
F
ig
u
re
5.
2:
D
en
si
ty
of
m
ea
su
re
s
of
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
p
re
ss
u
re
0.005.01.015.02
Density
-1
00
-5
0
0
50
10
0
Ch
an
ge
 in
 n
o.
 o
f y
ea
 vo
te
s a
s a
 re
su
lt o
f g
ov
t. 
pr
es
su
re
01234
Density
-.5
0
.5
Ch
an
ge
 in
 sh
ar
e 
vo
tin
g 
ye
a 
am
on
g 
no
n-
ab
se
nt
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f
co
ali
tio
n,
 a
s a
 re
su
lt o
f g
ov
t. 
pr
es
su
re
161
F
ig
u
re
5.
3:
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
p
re
ss
u
re
in
cl
os
e
v
s.
lo
p
si
d
ed
vo
te
s
0.005.01.015.02
Density
-1
00
-5
0
0
50
10
0
Ch
an
ge
 in
 n
o.
 o
f y
ea
 vo
te
s a
s a
 re
su
lt o
f g
ov
t. 
pr
es
su
re
Lo
ps
ide
d 
vo
te
s
Cl
os
e 
vo
te
s
012345
Density
-.5
0
.5
Ch
an
ge
 in
 sh
ar
e 
vo
tin
g 
ye
a 
am
on
g 
no
n-
ab
se
nt
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f
co
ali
tio
n,
 a
s a
 re
su
lt o
f g
ov
t. 
pr
es
su
re
Lo
ps
ide
d 
vo
te
s
Cl
os
e 
vo
te
s
162
F
ig
u
re
5.
4:
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
co
al
it
io
n
an
d
p
re
si
d
en
t’
s
p
ar
ty
’s
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s
PC
do
B
PC
do
B
PC
do
BPC
do
B
PC
do
B
PC
do
B
PC
do
B
PC
do
B
PD
T
PD
T
PD
T
PD
T
PD
T
PD
T
PD
T
PD
T
PM
DB
PM
DB
PM
DB
PM
DB
PM
DB
PM
DB
PM
DB
PM
DB
PPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
P
PRPRPRP
RPRPRPR
PR P
RBPR
B
PR
B
PR
B
PS
B
PS
B
PS
B
PS
B
PS
B
PS
BPS
D
PTPTPT
PTPTPTPT
PT
PT
B
PVPVPV
AV
AN
TE
DE
M
DE
M
DE
M
DE
M
DE
M
DE
M
DE
M
DE
M
PA
TR
I
PE
N
PH
S
PH
S
PH
S
PH
S
PM
N
PM
N
PM
N
PM
N
PM
N
PM
N
PM
N
PO
DE
PP
L
PP
S
PP
S
PP
S
PP
S
PP
S
PP
S
PP
S
PP
S
PR
B
PR
B
PR
B
PR
B PR
OS
PR
OS
PR
OS
PR
OS
PR
OS
PR
P
PR
P
PR
P
PR
P
PR
TB
PR
TB
PR
TB
PS
B
PS
B
PS
C
PS
C
PS
C
PS
C
PS
C
PS
C
PS
C
PS
C
PS
D
PS
D
PS
D
PS
D
PS
D
PS
D
PS
D
PS
DB
PS
DB
PS
DB
PS
DB
PS
DB
PS
DB
PS
DB
PS
DB
PS
L
PS
OL
PS
OL
PS
OL PS
OL
PS
OL
PS
OL
PS
OL
PS
OL
PT
B
PT
B
PT
B
PT
B
PT
B
PT
B
PT
B
PT
C
PT
C
PT
C
PT
do
B
PT
do
B
PT
do
B
PT
do
B
PT
do
B
PT
do
B
PT
do
B
PVPVPVPV
PV
RE
DE
S.
PA
RT
.
S.
PA
RT
.
S.
PA
RT
.
S.
PA
RT
.
SDSDSDSD
SD
-4-202
Second dimension of ideology, structural model
-2
-1
0
1
2
Fi
rs
t d
im
en
sio
n 
of
 id
eo
log
y, 
str
uc
tu
ra
l m
od
el
Co
ali
tio
n 
m
em
be
rs
Op
po
sit
ion
 m
em
be
rs
Pr
e 
20
16
DE
M
PM
DB
PP
PP
S
PR
PR
B
PS
BP
SD
PS
DB
PT
B
PV
AV
AN
TE
PA
TR
I
PC
do
B
PD
T
PE
N
PH
S
PO
DE
PP
L
PR
OS
PS
C
PS
L
PS
OL
PT
RE
DE
SD
-3-2-101
Second dimension of ideology, structural model
-2
-1
0
1
2
Fi
rs
t d
im
en
sio
n 
of
 id
eo
log
y, 
str
uc
tu
ra
l m
od
el
Co
ali
tio
n 
m
em
be
rs
Op
po
sit
ion
 m
em
be
rs
Po
st 
20
16
163
F
ig
u
re
5.
5:
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
co
al
it
io
n
an
d
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
p
re
ss
u
re
051015
kdensity pressure_sensit_init
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
Se
ns
itiv
ity
 to
 a
dd
itio
na
l p
re
ss
ur
e 
wh
en
 vo
tin
g 
wi
th
ou
t a
ny
 p
re
ss
ur
e
Co
ali
tio
n 
m
em
be
rs
Op
po
sit
ion
 m
em
be
rs
Pr
e 
20
16
051015
kdensity pressure_sensit_init
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
Se
ns
itiv
ity
 to
 a
dd
itio
na
l p
re
ss
ur
e 
wh
en
 vo
tin
g 
wi
th
ou
t a
ny
 p
re
ss
ur
e
Co
ali
tio
n 
m
em
be
rs
Op
po
sit
ion
 m
em
be
rs
Po
st 
20
16
051015
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
Se
ns
itiv
ity
 to
 a
dd
itio
na
l p
re
ss
ur
e 
wh
en
 vo
tin
g 
un
de
r p
re
ss
ur
e 
fro
m
 co
ali
tio
n
Co
ali
tio
n 
m
em
be
rs
Op
po
sit
ion
 m
em
be
rs
Pr
e 
20
16
051015
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
Se
ns
itiv
ity
 to
 a
dd
itio
na
l p
re
ss
ur
e 
wh
en
 vo
tin
g 
un
de
r p
re
ss
ur
e 
fro
m
 co
ali
tio
n
Co
ali
tio
n 
m
em
be
rs
Op
po
sit
ion
 m
em
be
rs
Po
st 
20
16
164
6. References
1. Adachi, Takanori, Yasutora Watanabe (2008). “Ministerial Weights
and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model”.
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 24(1), pp. 95-119
2. Alesina, Alberto, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro (2005). “Inter-
national Unions”. American Economic Review, 95(3)
3. Ansolabehere, Stephen et al (2005). ”Voting Weights and Form-
ateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments”.
American Journal of Political Science, 49(3)
4. Besley, Timothy, Stephen Coate (2003). “Centralized versus de-
centralized provision of local public goods: a political economy
approach”. Journal of Public Economics 87(12)
5. Brollo, Fernanda, Tommaso Nannicinni (2012). ”Tying Your En-
emy’s Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in
Brazil”. American Political Science Review, 106(4)
6. Burgess, Robin et al (2015). ”The Value of Democracy: Evid-
ence from Road Building in Kenya”. American Economic Review,
105(6)
7. Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, Douglas L. Miller (2015).
”Robust Inference with Multiway Clustering”. Journal of Business
& Economic Statistics, 29(2)
8. Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, Douglas Rivers (2004). “The
Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data”. American Political Science
Review, 98(2), pp. 355-370
9. Cox, G., and M. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Re-
sponsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
165
10. Dempster, A.P., N. M. Laird, D. B. Rubin (1977). “Maximum
Likelihood from Incomplete Data via the EM Algorithm”. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), 39(1),
pp. 1-38
11. Dewan, Torun, Arthur Spirling (2011). “Strategic Opposition and
Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies”. American
Political Science Review, 105(2), pp. 337-358
12. Diermeier, Daniel, Hu¨lya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo (2003). “A Struc-
tural Model of Government Formation”. Econometrica, 71(1), pp.
27-70
13. Duverger, Maurice (1954). Political Parties. New York: Wiley
14. Dynes, Adam M., Gregory A. Huber (2015). ”Partisanship and
the Allocation of Federal Spending: Do Same-Party Legislators or
Voters Benefit from Shared Party Affiliation with the President and
House Majority?”. American Political Science Review, 109(1)
15. Evans, Diana (2011). “Pork Barrel Politics”. The Oxford Hand-
book of the American Congress, Edited by.: George C. Edwards
III, Frances E. Lee, and Eric Schickler
16. Fisman, Raymond (2001). “Estimating the Value of Political Con-
nections”. American Economic Review, 91(4), pp. 1095-1102
17. Fisman, Raymond, Daniel Paravisini, Vikrant Vig (2017). “Cul-
tural Proximity and Loan Outcomes”. American Economic Review,
107(2)
18. Finan, Frederico, Maurizio Mazzocco (2017). “Electoral Incentives
and the Allocation of Public Funds”. Working paper.
19. Fisman, Raymond, Yongxiang Wang (2015). ”The Mortality Cost
of Political Connections”. Review of Economic Studies, 82(4)
20. Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, Francesco Trebbi (2015). “How is
Power Shared in Africa”. Econometrica, 83(2), pp. 465–503
21. ”Eduardo Paes diz que sau´de e´ bandeira principal de sua cam-
panha”, G1, Rio de Janeiro, 12/08/08. Available at URL: http://g1.
166
globo.com/Eleicoes2008/0,,MUL720775-15693,00.html, accessed on
05/09/2017
22. Gagliadurcci, Stefano, M. Daniele Paserman (2012). “Gender In-
teractions within Hierarchies: Evidence from the Political Arena”.
Review of Economic Studies, 79(3), pp. 1021–1052
23. Haddad, Fernando. ”Vivi na Pele o que Aprendi nos Livros”. Rev-
ista Piau´ı, Ed. 129, June of 2017. Available at URL: http://piaui.
folha.uol.com.br/materia/vivi-na-pele-o-que-aprendi-nos-livros/ , ac-
cessed on 05/09/2017
24. Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury (2016). “Government-Opposition or
Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legis-
latures”. Political Science Research and Methods, 4(2), pp. 249–273
25. Hoderlein, Stefan, Halbert White (2012). “Nonparametric identi-
fication in nonseparable panel data models with generalized fixed
effects”. Journal of Econometrics, 168(2)
26. Hodler, Roland, Paul A. Raschky (2014). ”Regional Favoritism”.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2)
27. Hoffman, Vivian et al (2017). “There is No Place Like Home: The-
ory and Evidence on Decentralization and Politician Preferences”.
Working Paper
28. Imai, Kosuke, James Lo, Jonathan Olmstead (2016). “Fast Es-
timation of Ideal Points with Massive Data”. American Political
Science Review, 110(4), pp. 631-56
29. Jackson, Matthew O., Hugo F. Sonnenschein (2007). “Overcoming
Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions”. Econometrica 75(1),
pp. 241–257
30. Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu, David Seim (2015). ”Polit-
ical Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections
and Performance”. Journal of the European Economic Association,
13(4)
31. Jenkins, Jeffery A. (2000). “Examining the Robustness of Ideolo-
gical Voting: Evidence from the Confederate House of Represent-
atives”. American Journal of Political Science, 44(4), pp. 811-822
167
32. Kessler, Anke S. (2014). “Communication in Federal Politics: Uni-
versalism, Policy Uniformity, and the Optimal Allocation of Fiscal
Authority”, Journal of Political Economy, 122(4)
33. Knight, Brian (2005). “Estimating the Value of Proposal Power”.
American Economic Review, 95(5)
34. Krehbiel, Keith (1993). “Where is the Party?” British Journal of
Political Science, 23(2), pp. 235-266
35. Kriner, Douglas L., Andrew Reeves (2015). ”Presidential Particu-
larism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics”. American Political Science
Review, 109(1)
36. Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, Atif Mian (2005). “Do Lenders Favor Politic-
ally Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial
Market”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), pp. 1371–1411
37. Leboutte, Alexandre, Maur´ıcio Macedo. ”PSDB e PT fazem em-
bate em Pelotas no segundo turno”. Jornal do Come´rcio, 17 of Oc-
tober, 2012. Available at URL: http://jcrs.uol.com.br/site/noticia.
php?codn=106257 , accessed 05/09/2017.
38. Liebman, Jeffrey B., Neale Mahoney (2017). ”Do Expiring Budgets
Lead to Wasteful Year-End Spending? Evidence from Federal Pro-
curement”. Forthcoming American Economic Review
39. Lockwood (2002). “Distributive Politics and the Costs of Central-
ization”. Review of Economic Studies, 69(2)
40. Manski (1988). “Semiparametric Analysis of Random Effects Lin-
ear Models from Binary Panel Data”. Econometrica, 55(2)
41. McCarthy, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, Howard Rosenthal (2001). “The
Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress”. American Political Science
Review, 95(3), pp. 673-687
42. Merlo, Antonio (1997). “Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic
Environment”. Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), pp. 101-131
43. Morelli, Massimo (2004). “Party Formation and Policy Outcomes
under Different Electoral Systems”. Review of Economic Studies,
71(3), pp. 829-853
168
44. Nokken, Timothy P., Keith T. Poole (2004). “Congressional Party
Defection in American History”. Legislative Studies Quarterly
29(4), pp. 545-568
45. Oates, Wallace E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. NY: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
46. Peress, Michael (2012). “Identification of a Semiparametric Item
Response Model”. Psychometrika, 77(2), pp. 223–243
47. Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini (1996). “Federal Fiscal Consti-
tutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution”. Journal of Political
Economy, 104(5).
48. Poole, Keith T., Howard Rosenthal (1985). “A Spatial Model for
Legislative Roll Call Analysis”. American Journal of Political Sci-
ence, 29(2), pp. 357-384
49. Poole, Keith T., Howard Rosenthal (1991). “Patterns of Congres-
sional Voting”. American Journal of Political Science, 35(1), pp.
228-278
50. Poole, Keith T. (2000). “Nonparametric Unfolding of Binary Choice
Data.” Political Analysis, 8(3), pp. 211–37
51. Power Timothy; Zucco Cesar, 2011, ”Brazilian Legislative Surveys
(1990-2013)”, https://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14970, Harvard Data-
verse, V5, UNF:5:VWkkenGqJz8okIV/iX0+yQ==
52. Power Timothy; Zucco Cesar (2012). “Elite Preferences in a Con-
solidating Democracy: The Brazilian Legislative Surveys, 1990–2009”.
Latin American Politics and Society, 54(4), pp. 1-27
53. Sole´-Olle´, Albert, Pilar Sorribas-Navarro (2008). ”The effects of
partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers.
Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain”. Journal of Public
Economics, 92
54. Snyder Jr., James M., Time Groseclose (1996). “Buying Superma-
jorities”. American Political Science Review, 90(2), pp. 303-315
169
55. Snyder Jr., James M., Tim Groseclose (2000). “Estimating Party
Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting”. American Journal of
Political Science, 44(2), pp. 193-211
56. Snyder Jr., James M., Tim Groseclose (2001). “Estimating Party
Influence on Roll Call Voting: Regression Coefficients versus Clas-
sification Success”. American Political Science Review, 95(3), pp.
689-698
57. Spirling, Arthur, Iain McLean (2007). “UK OC OK? Interpreting
Optimal Classification Scores for the U.K. House of Commons”.
Political Analysis, 15(1), pp. 85-96
58. Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Sec-
tion and Panel Data. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
London, England.
59. Zucco Jr., Cesar (2009). “Ideology or What? Legislative Behavior
in Multiparty Presidential Settings”. Journal of Politics, 71(3), pp.
1076-1092
60. Zucco Jr., Cesar (2013). “Legislative Coalitions in Presidential
Systems: The Case of Uruguay”. Latin American Politics and
Society 55(1), pp. 96-118
61. Xu, Guo (2017). ”The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the
British Empire”. Working Paper
170
